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ABSTRACT AND KEY WORDS 
 This thesis explores, in the context of pharmaceutical clinical trials, Canadian 
federal, provincial and territorial personal data protection laws (which are consistent with 
Canada’s membership in the international Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). This thesis establishes that, despite scholarly concerns over de-
identifiability of data, these laws govern collection, use, dissemination, and disposal of 
data about individuals in clinical trials right through and including applications made by 
innovator pharmaceutical companies to the federal government for approval to market 
new drugs. At this latter point, federal data exclusivity regulations also apply (as required 
by international trade agreements). This thesis establishes that both personal data 
protection and data exclusivity apply to clinical trials only for defined periods. Finally, 
this research demonstrates that, unlike protection of confidential information which 
remains secret and does not contribute to the public good of access to information, data 
exclusivity displays characteristics of classic intellectual property. 
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Introduction 
Modern intellectual property law seeks to maintain a balance between the rights 
of individual innovators, the private interests of corporations that dominate intellectual 
property ownership in many contexts, and the public good in accessing knowledge that 
will further human progress and development.
1
 The development of new pharmaceutical 
products is an essential endeavor that improves and saves human lives. Pharmaceutical 
companies invest significant resources into the research and development of new drugs, 
and the effects of these drugs on human health are evaluated in research studies called 
clinical trials. The information that is obtained during the course of these clinical trials is 
valuable to both pharmaceutical companies and the public alike, albeit in different ways. 
On one hand, pharmaceutical companies consider clinical trial data to be valuable 
confidential business information, which is subject to intellectual property protections. In 
contrast, the public interest lies in accessing this information in order to increase the 
availability of affordable medicines and to advance scientific understanding of the effects 
of certain drugs on human health. The tension that arises between the interests of 
pharmaceutical companies and those of the public at large illustrates the reality that there 
can be different, yet compelling, claims to control over the same set of information. 
The need for balance among multiple, potentially divergent interests raises 
important questions with respect to access and control over confidential information, and 
specifically over clinical trial data. Since international trade agreements confer 
                                                          
1
 For example, Wilkinson observes that modern copyright law seeks a balance between the interests of the 
following groups: a) the individuals whose cognitive activity produces innovation; b) the corporations that 
currently dominate ownership of technologies and influence upon economies; and c) the public. See 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “International Copyright: Marrakesh and the Future of Users’ Rights 
Exceptions” in Mark Perry, ed, Global Governance of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century 
(Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016) 107 at 114-115 [Wilkinson, “Marrakesh”].  
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temporary, exclusive rights upon pharmaceutical companies to the test data involved in 
their pharmaceutical products, how do these rights affect public health? In particular, do 
these rights, known as “data exclusivity” protection, either promote or hinder positive 
public health outcomes? Moreover, members of the public are entitled to protection of 
their personal information in both the public and private sectors, in accordance with 
Canadian personal data protection statutes. These personal data protection rights also 
extend to the health context, where clinical trials comprise part of the treatment options 
that are sometimes made available to individual patients. Individual patients access 
clinical trials under the care of a medical professional and have personal data protection 
rights in their information under personal health information protection statutes. 
The work presented in this thesis arose out of a program of research, which was 
foreshadowed by my supervisor, Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson in 2014.
2
  In 2016, 
she and Professor Mistrale Goudreau, of the Faculty of Civil Law at the University of 
Ottawa, obtained a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada
3
 for research on “Le prisme de la culture d’enterprise et la protection des 
inventions et donneés” (“The Prism of Corporate Culture and the Protection of Inventions 
and Data”). My work on this thesis was supported by the grant, as I assisted Professor 
                                                          
2
 See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “What is the Role of New Technology in Tensions in IP?,” (Presentation 
delivered at the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and research in Intellectual 
Property [ATRIP], Montpellier, Monday July 7, 2014), online: 
<http://law.uwo.ca/about_us/our_people/PDFs/Wilkinson_ATRIP_Montpellier_2014.pdf>. See also: 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “What is the role of new technologies in tensions in Intellectual Property?,” 
in Tana Pistorius (ed) Intellectual Property Perspectives on the Regulation of Technologies [ATRIP 
Intellectual Property Law Series] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar) (in press). 
My thesis also builds upon my work on personal data protection in 2015, which culminated in my paper 
entitled “Balancing Individual and Collective Interests: Disclosure of Personal Health Information in Public 
Health Emergencies,” for which I was awarded the J.S.D. Tory Writing Prize. 
3 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council [SSHRC] Insight Grant 435-2016-1638, funded 
through the Faculty of Law at Western University under Professor Wilkinson’s supervision. I was the first 
“graduate research assistant” to be supported under this grant. 
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Wilkinson with research
4
 under this grant: this thesis forms part of the initial output from 
the four-year research program that is being supported by the grant. 
The reality of an individual’s right to control his or her personal data raises an 
important question in the context of clinical trials over the control and access to clinical 
data. Specifically, does the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies either 
operate consistently with or abrogate an individual’s right to personal data 
protection in the clinical trial context? To answer this question, this thesis will examine 
three constructs: 1) the legislative regulation of clinical trials; 2) the data exclusivity right 
of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s right to personal data protection. 
This thesis will accordingly explore the tension between the interests of pharmaceutical 
companies in maintaining confidentiality of data produced in clinical trials and the 
interests of the public in accessing this data to promote and protect public health.  
Chapter One of this thesis offers an introductory discussion with respect to the 
legal regulation of pharmaceutical innovation, data exclusivity, and personal data 
protection. In particular, this chapter will briefly introduce and discuss the following 
matters: the history of Canadian regulatory requirements for the sale of new drugs; the 
movement of intellectual property rights into the international trade environment and the 
protection of confidential information therein; the notion of data exclusivity as a 
limitation on the permanent secrecy of confidential information; the need for personal 
                                                          
4
 Together with JD student Colin Hyslop, I supported Professor Wilkinson in the preparation of her paper 
entitled “The Subject of Data and Intellectual Property in It: Do They Compete for Legal Priority?” 
(Presentation delivered at the 2017 Canadian IP Scholars’ Workshop, Ottawa, 10 May 2017) [unpublished].  
I was also a Discussant for the session in which the paper was presented. Professor Wilkinson’s work on 
this paper (and her chapter forthcoming in the monograph that will flow from it) was directly supported by 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Grant 435-2016-1638 and the entire workshop, 
organized by Professors Goudreau and Wilkinson, was supported through a 2017-2018 SSHRC 
Connections Grant for “Nouveaus paradigmes en propriété industrielle (New Paradigms in Industrial 
Property).” 
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data protection laws to safeguard the confidentiality of personal information in the face of 
increased computerization; and how modern information technology facilitates 
techniques that enable previously “anonymized” data to be re-identified.  
Chapter Two provides the theoretical and historical background to the main 
constructs that are addressed in this thesis and provides a review and discussion of the 
literature and Canadian case law surrounding confidential information, data exclusivity, 
and personal data protection. The nature of these constructs will be explored both as 
individual concepts and in terms of how they all relate to one another in the context of 
Canada’s legislative regime that regulates clinical trials and public health with respect to 
new drugs. 
Chapter Three consists of a technical discussion of Canada’s legislative regimes 
for data exclusivity and personal data protection. First, this discussion will involve a 
review of data exclusivity laws in Canada and the flow of information under them. 
Second, an analysis of personal health information protection legislation will occur in 
order to explore whether there is a conflict between data exclusivity and personal data 
protection with respect to patient health information in clinical trial data. The definition 
of “personal health information” will be discussed in terms of its meaning under different 
personal health information statutes and its relationship to the notion of individual 
identifiability. Since current information technology has rendered complete anonymity to 
be impossible, this chapter emphasizes the importance of clarifying what it means for 
information to be identifiable. Through legislative analyses, this chapter will demonstrate 
that data exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently with each other 
under Canadian law and that, despite any anonymization of patient data, personal data 
5 
 
 
 
protection applies to this data in clinical trials. Because of this latter finding, individual 
clinical trial participants retain their rights to control their personal health information. In 
this way, this chapter will also demonstrate that there is potential for conflict between the 
legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection. 
Chapter Four answers the research question of this thesis and provides a list of 
findings in conclusion. These findings are subsequently discussed in the context of 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 1 – Historical Background of Constructs 
1.1. Historical Overview of Drug Regulation 
 In Canada, drug manufacturers must satisfy federal legislative requirements that 
“prescribe the standards of composition, strength, potency, purity, quality or other 
property” of drugs.5 For example, in order to sell or advertise a new drug in Canada, a 
drug manufacturer must receive a notice of compliance (NOC) after submission of 
evidence to the government which enables the government to assess the safety and 
efficacy of the drug.
6
 Clinical trials play a key role in the evidentiary record for efficacy 
and safety: these investigations are conducted to discover or verify clinical, 
pharmacological, or pharmacodynamics effects of drugs and identify possible adverse 
effects.
7
 Clinical trials generate unique information about a new drug, and data 
exclusivity protection, which constitutes a key focus of this thesis, refers to the 
temporary, exclusive rights to the information generated in clinical trials.
8
 
 The implementation of national regulatory requirements for drugs, such as those 
found in Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations,9 ultimately arose from the need to ensure 
the quality and safety of medicines, thereby reflecting a gradual evolution in the 
legislative protection of public health. Lembit Rägo and Budiono Santoso note that two 
major events catalyzed the development of the regulation of medicines.
10
 In 1937, over 
100 people in the United States died following the use of a sulfanilamide elixir which 
                                                          
5
 See Food and Drug Regulations, CRC, c 870, s A.01.002 [Food and Drug Regulations]. 
6
 See ibid. The regulatory approval process for new drugs will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
7
 Ibid, s C.05.001. 
8
 This thesis focuses solely on data exclusivity for pharmaceutical products. Data exclusivity will be 
subsequently explored in further detail in Chapters Two and Three. 
9
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5. 
10
 Lembit Rägo & Budiono Santoso, “Drug Regulation: History, Present and Future,” in Drug Benefits and 
Risks: International Textbook of Clinical Pharmacology, revised 2nd ed, CJ van Boxtel, B Santoso & IR 
Edwards, eds, (IOS Press and Uppsala Monitoring Centre, 2008), 65-77 [Rägo & Santoso]. 
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used diethylene glycol without any safety testing, thereby instigating the introduction of 
premarket notification requirements for new drugs.
11
 The worldwide thalidomide disaster 
constituted the second catastrophe that influenced the development of a regulatory system 
for medicines: thalidomide, a sedative and hypnotic, was introduced in 46 different 
countries worldwide between 1958 and 1960 and resulted in approximately 10,000 babies 
being born with various deformities.
12
 Following this tragedy, the Council of the 
European Economic Community approved Directive 65/65, which required that “no 
proprietary medicinal product may be placed on the market in a Member State unless an 
authorization has been issued by the competent authority of that Member State.”13 The 
need for further pharmaceutical regulatory harmonization to facilitate the availability of 
safe, effective, and quality drugs ultimately led to the establishment in 1990 of the 
International Council on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration 
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH).
14
 This collaborative initiative, of which 
Canada is currently a “standing regulatory member,” focuses primarily on technical 
requirements for new, innovative medicines.
15
  
The Food and Drug Regulations currently provide the only legally binding 
environment under which clinical trials are conducted in Canada. Guidance on the 
conduct of research, including clinical trials, can be found in the 2014 Tri-Council Policy 
                                                          
11
 Ibid at 65. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 EEC, Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products, [1965] OJ 022, P 0369 
– 0373 at art 3, available online: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31965L0065:EN:HTML> (accessed June 24, 2017). 
14
 Rägo & Santoso, supra note 10 at 66. 
15
 See ICH, Current and Standing Members (June 2017), online: 
<http://www.ich.org/about/membership.html> (accessed June 24, 2017). 
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Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (“TCPS 2”).16 This policy is 
administered through the research ethics boards of institutions that receive funding from 
three federal agencies: the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). These agencies all require, as a 
condition of funding, that researchers and their institutions apply the ethical principles 
and articles contained in the TCPS 2.
17
  
Individual consent to participation in research is a key principle of the TCPS 2 
and applies generally to any research involving human participants. According to article 
3.1 of the TCPS 2, research participants must give their consent voluntarily,
18
 and this 
consent can be withdrawn at any time.
19
 The data collected about a participant is also 
relevant to the principle of informed consent to participation in research. The TCPS 2 
states that informed consent involves giving participants an indication about the 
information that will be collected about them, the purpose of collection, anticipated uses 
of the data, and information about who may have a duty to disclose information and to 
whom disclosure can be made.
20
 For example, according to the TCPS 2, a participant 
                                                          
16
 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 
and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans, December 2014, online: < 
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2-2014/TCPS_2_FINAL_Web.pdf> [TCPS 2]. 
17
 Ibid at 3. This policy applies only to investigators who are typically researchers and their institutions: 
investigators are distinct from clinical trial sponsors, as can be seen in Table 3 in Chapter Three. 
18
 Ibid, art 3.1(a):  
Consent shall be given voluntarily. 
19
 Ibid, art 3.1(b): 
Consent can be withdrawn at any time. 
20
 Ibid, art 3.2:  
…The information generally required for informed consent includes…(i) an indication of 
what information will be collected about participants and for what purposes; an indication 
of who will have access to information collected about the identity of participants, a 
description of how confidentiality will be protected (see Article 5.2), a description of the 
9 
 
 
 
who withdraws consent is also able to request the withdrawal of his or her data from the 
study.
21
 However, the TCPS 2 also acknowledges that there may be circumstances which 
do not allow withdrawal of participant data: the TCPS 2 specifically cites the 
anonymization of personal information and its subsequent addition to a data pool as an 
example of situations in which the withdrawal of data may not be possible.
22 
Nevertheless, since the TCPS 2 is not law,
23
 legislated requirements will determine 
whether or not participant data remains in a clinical trial dataset.
24
 This thesis thus 
focuses exclusively on the legislated aspects of clinical trials. 
In light of the principle of informed consent to research, it might be tempting to 
conclude that, since the patient is aware of the consequences of participation in research, 
a patient loses any individual rights of control that may have been conferred by personal 
data protection legislation by virtue of signing a consent form for participation in the 
research. However, consent does not reach the binding level of contract, and even in the 
case of the stronger legal imperative of contract law, the recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision, Douez v. Facebook  (“Douez”),25 establishes that organizations cannot oust 
                                                                                                                                                                             
anticipated uses of data; and information indicating who may have a duty to disclose 
information collected, and to whom such disclosures could be made. 
21
 Ibid, art 3.1(c):  
If a participant withdraws consent, the participant can also request the withdrawal of their 
data or human biological materials. 
22
 Ibid, art 3.1(c):  
…In some research projects, the withdrawal of data or human biological materials may 
not be possible (e.g., when personal information has been anonymized and added to a 
data pool). 
23
 Ibid at 16: The TCPS 2 states that researchers are responsible for “ascertaining and complying with all 
applicable legal and regulatory requirements with respect to consent and the protection of privacy of 
participants.” Where researchers experience a tension between the requirements of the law and the 
guidance of the ethical principles in the TCPS 2, “researchers should strive to comply with the law in the 
application of ethical principles.” 
24
 The issue of withdrawal of data by clinical trial participants will be addressed in Chapter Three. 
25
 2017 SCC 33 [Douez]. The seven-person Court was split 4-3 in this decision. Justice Karakatsanis wrote 
for herself and Justices Wagner and Gascon: together with Justice Abella, who wrote for herself, these four 
judges constituted the majority and held that the forum selection clause contained in Facebook’s Terms of 
10 
 
 
 
privacy legislation through contract. In Douez, the appellant was a resident of British 
Columbia and claimed that Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) infringed her privacy rights and 
those of other British Columbians in a manner contrary to British Columbia’s Privacy 
Act.
26
 Facebook sought to have the action stayed on the basis of the forum selection 
clause contained in its “Terms of Use” (a contract between Facebook and its users).  
Karakatsanis J., writing one of the majority judgments in the Supreme Court, 
noted that forum selection clauses are regularly enforced since they create certainty and 
security in transactions,
27
 and in commercial contexts, sophisticated parties that agree to 
forum selection clauses are deemed to have informed themselves about the risks of 
foreign legal systems and are deemed to have accepted those risks.
28
 However, 
Karakatsanis J. also noted that “commercial and consumer relationships are very 
different,” since the “unequal bargaining power of the parties and the rights that a 
consumer relinquishes under the contract, without any opportunity to negotiate, may 
provide compelling reasons for a court to exercise its discretion to deny a stay of 
proceedings.”29 Moreover, Karakatsanis J. characterized the issue in Douez in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Use was unenforceable. Chief Justice McLachlin, with Justice Côté, wrote the dissent, for themselves and 
Justice Moldaver. 
26
 RSBC 1996, c 373. The Privacy Act renders the violation of privacy an actionable tort. It is not a 
personal data protection statute, because it does not regulate the collection and handling of personal 
information by organizations. Unlike personal data protection statutes, the Privacy Act is not restricted to 
information about an identifiable individual: according to section 1(3), the “nature, incidence, and occasion 
of the act or conduct” and the relationship between the parties must be considered in order to determine 
“whether the act or conduct of a person is a violation of another’s privacy.” Furthermore, since section 1(4) 
states that eavesdropping or surveillance may constitute violations of privacy, the Privacy Act encompasses 
the individual’s right to refuse to disclose any information that he or she wishes to keep secret, which 
includes (but is not limited to) personal information.  
27
 Douez, supra note 25, per Karakatsanis J. at para 24. 
28
 Ibid at para 31. 
29
 Ibid at para 33. 
11 
 
 
 
following language: “At issue in this case is Ms. Douez’s statutory privacy right. Privacy 
legislation has been accorded quasi-constitutional status.”30  
Through this reasoning and the concurring reasoning of Abella J., the majority of 
the Supreme Court judges hearing this case found that, although the Privacy Act does not 
specifically override the forum selection clause in a contract, the inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties gave Facebook the “unilateral ability to require that any legal 
grievances Ms. Douez had could not be vindicated in British Columbia,” which conferred 
an unfair procedural benefit upon Facebook.
31
 Abella J., concurring, noted a gross 
imbalance in bargaining power between Facebook, a multi-national corporation, and 
Douez, a private citizen, who “had no input into the terms of the contract and, in reality, 
no meaningful choice as to whether to accept them given Facebook’s undisputed 
indispensability to online conversations.”32 Abella J. found that the facts of the case 
satisfied the conditions for application of the doctrine of unconscionability.
33
 Thus, the 
Supreme Court held that the forum selection clause in the contract between Facebook and 
Douez was unenforceable and therefore that the law of British Columbia, including its 
Privacy Act, would apply. 
While Douez occurred in the context of a consumer contract, clinical trial 
participants most certainly face unequal bargaining power with respect to the entities that 
conduct clinical trials, particularly when these entities are pharmaceutical companies. 
Aside from the obvious imbalance in financial resources, the patient’s decision to 
                                                          
30
 Ibid at para 59. While the British Columbia Privacy Act is not a personal data protection statute,  
Karakatsanis J. cited, in support of her point that “privacy legislation [is] quasi-constitutional,” inter alia, a 
Supreme Court decision based upon a personal data protection statute: Dagg v Canada (Minister of 
Finance), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at paras 65-66. 
31
 Douez, supra note 25, per Abella J. at para 116. 
32
 Ibid at para 111. 
33
 Ibid at para 115. 
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participate in a clinical trial may be heavily influenced by the need for treatment of a 
particular medical condition, such that it may not be a meaningful choice at all. Although 
the primary goal of clinical research is to produce generalizable scientific knowledge, 
some clinical investigators argue that the purpose of this research also includes ensuring 
state-of-the-art therapy for participants.
34
 In this way, the administration of an 
experimental drug can be viewed “both as a means to learn about its safety and efficacy 
and as a therapeutic option.”35 This perspective appears to be in accordance with that of 
organizations such as the Canadian Cancer Society, which lists the following potential 
benefits of participation in a clinical trial: the receipt of “state-of-the-art cancer care;” the 
possibility that the participant may be “the first to benefit from a new and effective 
treatment;” the possibility that the participant “may undergo an effective new treatment 
that has fewer side effects than standard treatment”; and, regardless of the outcome of the 
trial, “helping scientists answer important questions about cancer” which “may contribute 
new knowledge about cancer and eventually help others with the disease.”36 Therefore, 
while certain information must be collected and retained from patients in order to meet 
the goals of the clinical trial, the “price” for this treatment would, especially in light of 
Douez, be unlikely to be considered to include relinquishing the individual’s statutory 
rights to control his or her personal information. 
                                                          
34
 Gail E Henderson et al, “Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception” 
(2007) 4 PLoS Medicine 1735 at 1736. Henderson et al note that there is some conceptual disagreement as 
to the true purpose of a clinical trial: while some clinical researchers argue that the sole purposes of a 
clinical trial are to further the progress of science and help future patients, others argue that helping patients 
enrolled in a trial can serve as a legitimate additional purpose of a clinical trial.  
35
 Ibid at 1737. 
36
 Canadian Cancer Society, Why Participate? online: < http://www.cancer.ca/en/about-us/our-
research/clinical-trials-we-are-funding/?region=on> (accessed August 6, 2017). 
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Since drug research and development has important consequences for the life 
sciences,
37
 Elina Petrova has observed that the pharmaceutical industry faces enormous 
pressure to innovate, because “no other industry is expected to affect how long people 
can live or how fast they recover from an illness.”38 On the other hand, “no other industry 
can burn through billions of dollars and man-hours only to end up empty-handed, with 
not much to show for its vast expenditure, dedication, and effort.”39 Pharmaceutical 
innovation has thus influenced intellectual property law-making, particularly at the 
international level, owing to a confluence of factors such as the public’s need for 
essential medicines and the need to protect the large-scale investments of powerful 
pharmaceutical companies in drug development. 
 
1.2. The Movement of Innovation (and Confidential Information) into International 
Trade 
 In 1967, developed countries established the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in order to promote the harmonization of intellectual property 
laws.
40
 WIPO administers two principal international intellectual property covenants, the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”)41 and 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne 
                                                          
37
 See Elina Petrova, “Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Process of Drug Discovery and 
Development,” in M Ding et al, eds, Innovation and Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Emerging 
Practices, Research, and Policies (New York: Springer, 2014), 19-81 at 25 [Petrova]: According to 
Petrova, the Second World War instigated a worldwide “extraordinary need” for antibiotics. In response to 
market demands, pharmaceutical firms invested in unprecedented research and development programs. 
Firms thus acquired technical and managerial experience and the organizational capability to produce 
massive volumes of drugs, thereby forever altering the process of drug discovery and development.  
38
 Ibid at 23. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Brook K Baker & Katrina Geddes, “Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of IP 
Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (2015) 23 J 
Intell Prop L 1 at 6 [Baker & Geddes]. 
41
 (1883) 828 UNTS 305, revised, July 14, 1967 [Paris Convention]. 
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Convention”),42 which were both signed at the end of the nineteenth century and were 
updated at various conferences.
43
 Although the Paris Convention and the Berne 
Convention represented the first efforts to set global standards with respect to intellectual 
property rights protections,
44
 these conventions suffer from two major flaws in that they 
both lack detailed rules on the enforcement of intellectual property rights before national 
judicial and administrative authorities as well as a binding and effective mechanism to 
settle disputes between states.
45
 WIPO thus has limited success in its efforts to create 
normative intellectual property rights standards.
46
 
Beginning in the 1970s, developed countries such as the U.S. faced increasing 
pressure from domestic intellectual property industries to combat widespread 
infringement and raise standards of protection worldwide, thereby improving their ability 
to compete in foreign markets.
47
 In 1986, the contracting parties of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947
48 launched the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (“Uruguay Round”), which concluded in 1994 with the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
49
 At the urging of corporate intellectual property 
owners, the U.S. pressed for the inclusion of intellectual property issues in the 1986 
                                                          
42
 (1886) 828 UNTS 221, revised, July 14, 1967 [Berne Convention]. 
43
 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 4
th
 ed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 2012) at 10 [Gervais]. 
44
 Baker & Geddes, supra note 40 at 6. 
45
 Gervais, supra note 43 at 10. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Laurence R Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking” (2004) 29 Yale J Int’l L 1 at 12 [Helfer]. 
48
 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [GATT 1947]. This treaty was 
established after the Second World War to promote free trade. 
49
 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Confidential Information and Privacy-Related Law in Canada and in 
International Instruments” in Chios Carmody, ed, Is Our House in Order? Canada’s Implementation of 
International Law (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 275-311 at 281 
[Wilkinson, “Confidential Information”]. 
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negotiating mandate of the Uruguay Round.
50
 Corporate intellectual property owners, 
including those in the pharmaceutical industry, heavily influenced the shift of innovation 
and intellectual property rights away from the public international law environment of 
WIPO and into international trade. The connection between intellectual property rights 
and trade is subsequently reflected in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”)51 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(“TRIPS”),52 which was introduced in 1995. TRIPS now includes no fewer than seven 
categories of intellectual property rights.
53
  
Linking intellectual property rights protection to trade issues effectively 
facilitated a restructuring of dispute settlement rules, creating a system in which decisions 
are binding on all states, and the use of retaliatory sanctions is authorized if states do not 
offer compensation or alter domestic laws found to be incompatible with the World Trade 
Organization Agreement.
54
 Member states that fail to enforce intellectual property rights 
under both TRIPS and NAFTA are subject to potential economic sanctions under each 
agreement. TRIPS facilitates a dispute mechanism
55
 through the General Agreement on 
                                                          
50
 Helfer, supra note 47 at 21. 
51
 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. This agreement 
brought together the economies of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico with the objectives of eliminating barriers 
to free trade and facilitating the cross-border movement of goods and services between the member 
countries.  
52
 April 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, (as 
amended on 23 January 2017), 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 [TRIPS]. This thesis will focus mainly on 
intellectual property rights issues that arise with respect to TRIPS rather than NAFTA, owing to the broader 
global scope of TRIPS. 
53
 Ibid, art 1(2):  
For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "intellectual property" refers to all 
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II.  
   Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of TRIPS encompass the following: copyright and related rights; 
trademarks; geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; layout-designs (topographies) of 
integrated circuits; and protection of undisclosed information. 
54
 Helfer, supra note 47 at 22. 
55
 See TRIPS, supra note 52, art 64(1):  
16 
 
 
 
Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (“GATT 1994”)56 and the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (“DSU”).57 Article XXIII of GATT 1994 provides for certain courses of 
action if any contracting party considers that “any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired” through, for example, the 
failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations.
58
 If the circumstances are 
“serious enough to justify such action,” contracting parties may authorize the suspension 
of “concessions or obligations under this Agreement.”59 Article 22 of the DSU contains 
the rules governing the suspension of concessions or obligations, and, within it, Article 
22(3) provides a number of principles and procedures that complaining parties must 
apply: although complaining parties should first seek to suspend concessions or other 
obligations with respect to the same sector in which the nullification or impairment 
occurred,
60
 parties are authorized to seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in 
other sectors under the same agreement
61
 or under another covered agreement.
62
 In this 
way, since TRIPS authorizes sanctions involving sectors other than those for intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of 
disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided herein.  
56
 April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153 (1994) [GATT 1994]. 
57
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [DSU]. 
58
 GATT 1994, supra note 56, art XXIII(1). 
59
 Ibid, art XXIII(2). 
60
 DSU, supra note 57, art 22(3)(a): 
The general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend 
concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the 
panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment. 
61
 Ibid, art 22(3)(b):  
If that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or 
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions 
or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement.” 
62
 Ibid, art 22(3)(c):  
If that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or 
other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the 
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other 
obligations under another covered agreement. 
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property, failing to carry out intellectual property obligations under TRIPS can result in 
far-reaching economic consequences. NAFTA provides for economic sanctions in a 
similar manner: Article 2019 of NAFTA directly authorizes the “suspension of benefits” 
for “measures” that do not conform to NAFTA.63 In a manner similar to TRIPS, 
complainant parties under NAFTA are also authorized to apply sanctions in different 
economic sectors.
64
 
In addition to establishing binding dispute settlement mechanisms for intellectual 
property rights, the movement of innovation into international trade also created a new 
discourse with respect to the protection of confidential information. For instance, 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson notes that TRIPS used the texts of public international law 
treaties such as the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention as the threshold for 
patent protection and copyright protection, respectively, in the new international trade 
environment.
65
 However, international parameters with respect to the protection of 
confidential information were introduced for the first time in the context of the 
“coercive” conditions of trade negotiations.66  Confidential information is now protected 
                                                          
63
 NAFTA, supra note 51, art 2019(1):  
If in its final report a panel has determined that a measure is inconsistent with the 
obligations of this Agreement or causes nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 
2004 and the Party complained against has not reached agreement with any complaining 
Party on a mutually satisfactory resolution pursuant to Article 2018(1) within 30 days of 
receiving the final report, such complaining Party may suspend the application to the 
Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they have 
reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute. 
64
 Ibid, art 2019(2):  
In considering what benefits to suspend pursuant to paragraph 1: (a) a complaining Party 
should first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors as that affected by the 
measure or other matter that the panel has found to be inconsistent with the obligations of 
this Agreement or to have caused nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004; 
and (b) a complaining Party that considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend 
benefits in the same sector or sectors may suspend benefits in other sectors. 
65
 Wilkinson, “Confidential Information,” supra note 49 at 282. 
66
 Ibid. 
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as intellectual property under TRIPS and NAFTA,
67
 thereby reflecting the importance of 
confidential information with respect to innovation and, consequently, to national 
economic interests. 
  
1.3. Data Exclusivity: Relationship to Intellectual Property and Confidential 
Information 
Although the protection of confidential information may be advantageous to the 
person or business entity that is holding the information,
68
 the philosophical 
underpinnings of the protection remain unclear. Indeed, as an aspect of law, the 
normative basis for protecting confidential information has differed.
69
 At common law, 
confidential information can be protected through contract, and in equity, confidentiality 
can be buttressed by the concept of fiduciary obligations.
70
 In Canada, the first clear 
recognition of the protection of confidential information occurred in 1989 with respect to 
breach of the duty of confidence, but the Supreme Court of Canada has declined to 
precisely classify the basis of protection.
71
  
The protection of confidential information is directly relevant to data exclusivity 
for pharmaceutical products. Obligations of data exclusivity originate from TRIPS and 
NAFTA, under which member states are required to protect “undisclosed” 
pharmaceutical test data against disclosure.
72
 Data exclusivity is thus directly related to 
                                                          
67
 The protection of confidential information as intellectual property will be explored later in Chapter Two. 
68
 Gregory Hagen et al, Canadian Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials, (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2013) at 573 [Hagen et al]: For example, a secret recipe, client list, or 
technological drawings may be “all the more valuable” if kept secret by the holder, particularly with respect 
to competitors of the holder.  
69
 Ibid at 576. 
70
 Ibid at 575-576. 
71
 See International Corona Resources Ltd v LAC Minerals Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 [LAC Minerals].  
72
 See TRIPS, supra note 52, art 39(3) and NAFTA, supra note 51, art 1711(5)-(6). 
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states’ regulatory regimes for new drugs, and Canada introduced its first data exclusivity 
framework in 1995.
73
  
Although pharmaceutical companies typically seek patent protection to protect a 
new, innovative drug, the issuance of the patent for the drug does not discharge a 
pharmaceutical company’s legal obligation to obtain market approval where required 
from a state government. Because of the requirement for market approval, and although a 
patent grants an innovator the right to distribute an invention,
74
 a pharmaceutical 
company cannot use this patent-related right of distribution unless it first undertakes the 
extra step of receiving regulatory approval from the state government.
75
 Data exclusivity 
can be defined as the temporary protection of clinical test data that is required to be 
submitted to a regulatory agency in order to prove the safety and efficacy of a new 
drug.
76
 During the period of data exclusivity, only the innovator is permitted to rely on 
this data in an application for regulatory approval.
77
 While a patent is typically filed 
before the start of clinical trials that generate safety and efficacy information,
78
 the period 
of data exclusivity typically extends beyond the life of the patent and allows companies 
to recoup the cost of investment in generating the information for regulatory approval. In 
                                                          
73
 The law of data exclusivity in Canada will be explored in detail in Chapter Three. 
74
 Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4, s 42 [Patent Act]:  
Every patent granted under this Act shall…grant to the patentee and the patentee’s legal 
representatives for the term of the patent, from the granting of the patent, the exclusive 
right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it 
to others to be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of 
competent jurisdiction [emphasis added]. 
75
 Arguably, the inability to distribute significantly weakens the utility of a patent in the pharmaceutical 
context, since distribution is the ultimate goal of any patent – a way to capitalize on the effort expended in 
innovation. 
76
 Olasupo A Owoeye, “Data Exclusivity and Public Health under the TRIPS Agreement” (2015) 23 J L 
Info & Sci 106 at 108. 
77
 See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.08.004.1(3).  
78
 Dana P Goldman et al., “The Benefits From Giving Makers of Small Molecule Drugs Longer Exclusivity 
over Clinical Trial Data” (2011) 30 Health Affairs 84 at 85. 
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this way, data exclusivity operates independently from patent,
79
 and one commentator has 
noted that both patent protection and data exclusivity create a temporary, monopoly 
situation that enables the recovery of costs incurred during drug discovery and 
development.
80
  
The data exclusivity framework that originates from TRIPS and NAFTA 
essentially placed the data generated in clinical trials into the realm of intellectual 
property. Intellectual property rights have been expressed as having a pre-defined scope, 
and within this scope, they negatively exclude the world and positively grant limited, 
exclusive rights to use the subject matter.
81
 Since intellectual property rights are intended 
to both stimulate and reward individual creativity, innovation, and investment,
82
 the reach 
of exclusivity and the requirements of intellectual property protection reflect a balance 
with respect to the public interest.
83
 In light of this balance, temporary exclusive rights 
are viewed as the norm for classic intellectual property devices such as patent, copyright, 
and trademark.
84
  
However, whereas traditional intellectual property frameworks specifically 
encourage the dissemination of information in society, the protection of confidential 
information “does the opposite,”85 because confidential information has the potential to 
remain secret forever.
86
 Since confidential information does not have a public access 
                                                          
79
 See Petrova, supra note 37 at 31: For example, patent and data exclusivity may or may not run 
concurrently and they may not necessarily encompass the same claims.  
80
 Ibid at 32. 
81
 Alexander Peukert, “Individual, multiple and collective ownership of intellectual property rights – which 
impact on exclusivity?” in The Structure of Intellectual Property Law: Can One Size Fit All?, Annette Kur 
& Vytautas Mizaras, eds, (Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). 
82
 Ibid at 197-198. 
83
 Ibid at 199-200. 
84
 Ibid at 200. 
85
 Hagen et al, supra note 68 at 573. 
86
 A more detailed discussion of confidential information will occur in Chapter Two. 
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aspect at all, it does not appear to lie within the classic definition of intellectual property 
that includes a “bargain” between an intellectual property rights holder and the public 
interest.
87
As this thesis will demonstrate, however, data exclusivity places a limitation on 
the secrecy of clinical trial data. In doing so, data exclusivity functions in a manner 
similar to classic intellectual property devices. It grants a limited-term monopoly over the 
data from clinical trials: the flow of information is interrupted during the period of 
protection. With respect to the testing of new pharmaceutical products, data exclusivity 
ensures that innovators who invest money and effort into conducting clinical trials will 
have an initial opportunity to maintain the secrecy of valuable data, and competitors of 
these innovators will not be able to use the information for a given number of years in an 
application for regulatory drug approval, giving the innovators a competitive market 
advantage. The information subsequently becomes accessible to other drug manufacturers 
following the expiration of the data exclusivity period, thereby ending the innovator’s 
ability to control the free flow of information. Data exclusivity thus requires an end to the 
confidentiality of information that would otherwise remain secret forever.
88
  
 
1.4. Personal Data Protection: Historical Overview 
Beginning in the late 1970s with the emergence of global telecommunications and 
computerization, countries began to seek domestic legislative implementation of privacy 
values in light of the increased memory capacity, processing speed, and ubiquity of 
computers.
89
 Since the portability of data between states was essential for ensuring that 
all nations could participate in the anticipated “information economy,” the Organization 
                                                          
87
 The “bargain” in intellectual property law will be explained and discussed in Chapter Two. 
88
 The nuances of data exclusivity will be analyzed in Chapter Two. 
89
 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Confidential Information,” supra note 49 at 283. 
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) first published the OECD 
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data
90
 (“OECD Privacy Guidelines”) in 1981 in order to both protect personal 
information and promote the free flow of data between countries.
91
 Member countries of 
the OECD, including Canada, are required to implement the OECD Privacy Guidelines, 
including the Basic Principles of National Application
92
 and are advised to adopt laws 
protecting privacy and to coordinate various government bodies through the development 
of national privacy strategies.
93
 Importantly, according to the Individual Participation 
Principle under the OECD Privacy Guidelines, individuals have express rights to access 
their personal information and to “have the data erased, rectified, completed, or 
amended” in the event of a successful challenge to the collection of this data.94  
Canada accordingly enacted the Privacy Act,
95
 which aims to provide individuals 
with a right of access to their personal information held by a federal government 
institution and to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to that information.
96
 At 
the same time, however, Canada acknowledged the need for democratic openness with 
respect to the public accessibility of government documents and enacted the Access to 
Information Act
97
 (“Access Act”). The Privacy Act and the Access Act together create a 
                                                          
90
 The 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines now constitute the first update to the Guidelines since 1980 but 
leave intact the original “Basic Principles”: see OECD, 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines, 
<https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm> (accessed June 24, 2017). 
91
 Wilkinson, “Confidential Information,” supra note 49 at 283. 
92
 The eight Basic Principles are as follows: Collection Limitation, Data Quality, Purpose Specification, 
Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation, and Accountability. See Part Two 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), available online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf> [OECD Guidelines]. 
93
 Ibid, Part Five. 
94
 Ibid, Part Two at para 13. 
95
 RSC, 1985, c P-21 [Privacy Act]. 
96
 Ibid, s 2. 
97
 RSC 1985, c A-1 [Access Act]. 
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balance between access to information generally and the confidentiality of certain 
information held by federal institutions in the public sector. 
The provinces followed suit generally by creating “omnibus” statutes that 
combined access and personal data protection regimes in single statutes.
98
 Both 
provincial and federal legislators also perceived a need to address questions of an 
individual’s control over his or her personal information held by private sector 
organizations and a need to ensure that this information was adequately protected.
99
 
Quebec was the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt personal data protection legislation 
for the private sector,
100
 which has been in force since 1994. More recently, the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
101
 (“PIPEDA”) was passed by the 
federal government in 2000 and protects personal information with respect to federally 
regulated private sector organizations and organizations that engage in “commercial 
activities.”102 The need for comprehensive regulation of the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information in the hands of both public and private sector 
organizations has ultimately led to a proliferation of personal data protection statutes 
across Canada. All Canadian jurisdictions have now legislated in the area of public sector 
personal data protection.
103
 In addition to Quebec and the federal government, Alberta
104
 
and British Columbia
105
 have their own private sector personal data protection laws. 
                                                          
98
 See for example, Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31 
[FIPPA]. 
99
 Mark Perry & Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The Creation of University Intellectual Property: Confidential 
Information, Data Protection, and Research Ethics” (2010) 26 CIPR 93 at 96 [Perry & Wilkinson]. 
100
 An Act respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1 [QC 
Act]. 
101
 SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].  
102
 Ibid, s 2(1). 
103
 See Perry & Wilkinson, supra note 99. 
104
 Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [AB PIPA]. 
105
 Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [BC PIPA]. 
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Personal data protection specifically designed for the health context has also now been 
enacted by nearly all Canadian jurisdictions.
106
  
 
1.5. Personal Data Protection: Questions of Identifiability and Relationship to Data 
Exclusivity 
The immense computing and processing power of modern information technology 
in 2017 raises personal data protection issues that did not exist when Canada’s data 
exclusivity framework was first introduced in 1995. For instance, privacy issues in 
clinical research were, in 1995, typically addressed through the protection of the 
identities of the research participants because patient data underwent anonymization (or 
de-identification) using techniques to aggregate the data into large sets which meant the 
removal of identifiers, such as individual names, not necessary for statistical analyses.
107
 
However, advances in information technology and storage have now resulted in the 
ability to perform large-scale analyses of vast data sets, which in turn decreases the need 
to “strip” data of identifiers in the first place and, if stripped, increases the likelihood for 
re-identification of data that has been rendered anonymous: identifying information can 
now be produced from non-identifying information because of the potential to link 
multiple data sets together.
108
  
The risk of re-identification through modern information technology such as data 
linkage calls into question the meaning of individual identifiability with respect to the 
                                                          
106
 Personal health information protection laws constitute the focus of this thesis with respect to personal 
data protection and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
107
 Khaled El Emam & Bradley Malin, Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data 
(2014), Paper commissioned by the Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial 
Data, at 2, available online: 
<http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2015/SharingData/ElEmamandMalin%2
0Paper.pdf> (accessed June 2017). 
108
 Data matching will be fully addressed in Chapter Three, along with the personal health information 
protection statutes that address this technique. 
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application of personal data protection laws in the context of clinical trials. As will be 
discussed in section 3.3 in Chapter Three of this thesis, large amounts of personal health 
information, including an individual’s weight, blood pressure, and medical history, are 
collected from individual participants in the course of a clinical trial, and clinical trial 
practices mandate the retention of records that would identify each individual participant 
in the case of adverse events.
109
 The ability to identify clinical trial participants in this 
manner raises the question of whether personal data protection actually still applies to 
“de-identified” clinical trial data, since this data is simply assumed to be truly anonymous 
but may in fact not be so in light of current technological realities.  
However, if individuals retain rights of control to their data in clinical trials in 
accordance with personal data protection principles, each individual’s rights of control 
could conflict with the rights of drug manufacturers with respect to data exclusivity. 
Furthermore, if the result of this conflict is such that personal data protection prevails 
over data exclusivity, this situation would challenge Canada’s international obligations 
under TRIPS and NAFTA and would place Canada in a difficult position in terms of its 
simultaneous attempts at enforcing rights under the legislative regimes of both personal 
data protection and data exclusivity. Owing to the potential struggle for control over 
information in clinical trials, this thesis seeks to determine whether data exclusivity 
operates consistently with personal data protection in Canadian law.  
 
1.6. Conclusion 
The research question of this thesis arises in the context of Canada’s obligations 
to implement two potentially conflicting legislative regimes in the context of the public 
                                                          
109
 See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012. 
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health regulation of drugs. On one hand, data exclusivity originates from the international 
trade environment in a “top-down” manner, under which member states are required to 
enforce intellectual property rights through their domestic laws. A member state’s failure 
to adequately implement these rights can result in negative economic consequences at the 
national level. On the other hand, while personal data protection originates from an 
international instrument and gives an individual the right to control his or her personal 
data, personal data protection has arisen across Canada in a largely “bottom-up” manner 
with the implementation of legislative personal data protection regimes occurring at both 
the provincial and national levels.  
The protection of confidential information serves as common ground with respect 
to both data exclusivity and personal data protection. Confidentiality of information 
creates a potentially permanent barrier to the free flow of information, and an important 
goal of both data exclusivity and personal data protection concerns the secrecy of 
information. Nevertheless, both these regimes of data exclusivity and personal data 
protection transcend confidential information protection since they each only maintain 
secrecy of information to a certain extent. Data exclusivity functions in a manner akin to 
intellectual property protection and provides a limited-term monopoly on secrecy. 
Legislated personal data protection controls are imposed on organizations for the benefit 
of individuals, which, unlike the law of confidential information, apply whether or not the 
information was confidential in the first place and regardless of an individual’s awareness 
of the collection of the information.
110
  
Modern information technology has also called into question the understanding of 
identifiability. Anonymization is closely related to the question of whether the 
                                                          
110
 Perry & Wilkinson, supra note 99 at 96. 
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confidentiality of personal information can be ensured: if de-identified information can 
be re-identified and so constitutes identifiable information in a factual sense, such a 
finding has implications for an individual’s right to control his or her personal 
information under personal data protection laws. This thesis thus examines whether data 
exclusivity operates consistently with personal data protection or instead abrogates an 
individual’s right to personal data protection in the clinical trial context. 
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Chapter Two – Theoretical Background of Constructs 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical backgrounds of confidential information, 
data exclusivity, and personal data protection. Examination of the first construct, 
confidential information, will involve an exploration of the nature of confidential 
information by reviewing case law and academic scholarship, particularly with respect to 
the duty of confidence. The regulation of the sale of drugs will also be explored to 
illustrate that clinical trials are heavily regulated in order to protect public health. Within 
this context, a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. 
Canada (Minister of Health),
111
 will be used to demonstrate the tension between the 
access and secrecy of confidential information in the pharmaceutical context. To explore 
the second construct, data exclusivity protection, the discussion will consist of a brief 
description of the origins of data exclusivity in international trade agreements to provide 
a contextual framework. In this context, the nature and purpose of data exclusivity will be 
examined from the perspectives of supporters and opponents of data exclusivity. Finally, 
examination of the third construct, personal data protection, will involve a discussion of 
how personal data protection is related to, but distinct, from privacy law with respect to 
regulating the flow of information between individuals and organizations. The chapter 
ultimately concludes that, although personal data protection is relevant to data 
exclusivity, personal data protection has largely been excluded from the data exclusivity 
discourse.  
 
                                                          
111
 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 SCR 23 [Merck Frosst SCC]. 
29 
 
 
 
2.1.1. The Nature of Confidential Information: Excluding Others - The Importance of 
Confidential Information to Private Businesses 
 
Exclusive rights to information ultimately result in a monopoly over use of the 
knowledge. In order to justify this exclusion, knowledge must be novel, unique, 
identifiable, or secret: mere ideas will not suffice to receive legal protection.
112
  In 
particular, a company’s ability to maintain secrecy over information pertaining to its 
technology may successfully delay a competitor from copying the technology, thereby 
giving the company a competitive market advantage.
113
 Intellectual property rights, 
which provide exclusive rights to activities including the manufacture, use, and sale of 
particular goods, are thus crucial business assets.
114
 For modern business organizations, 
the slightest advances in technology can give companies an enormous competitive 
advantage over their market rivals, and maintaining exclusive possession of valuable 
technical and commercial information can sometimes mean the difference between 
cornering a particular market and fighting for financial survival.
115
  
Despite the present characterization of confidential information as intellectual 
property in the international trade environment,
116
 the type of intellectual property 
protection available for a particular thing is arguably determined by “the nature of the 
thing.”117 Wilkinson has noted that the inclusion of confidential information under TRIPS 
and NAFTA marked the first time that confidential information has been classified as 
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intellectual property.
118
 There has been much uncertainty in legal scholarship with respect 
to the nature of confidential information and its proper characterization. Indeed, the 
philosophical base for its protection has remained unclear owing to the absence of 
legislative enactment and the lack of consistent judicial guidance. 
 
2.1.2. The Nature of Confidential Information: A Question of Duty 
 
According to Arnold Weinrib, writing in 1988,
119
 there is a prima facie case for 
recognizing confidential information as property.
120
 However, at the very least, a dispute 
about the protection of confidential information will be based on the express or implied 
contractual obligation to maintain confidentiality of the information.
121
 In the absence of 
a contract, the relationship between the parties may give rise to a fiduciary obligation,
122
 
in which misuse of information would constitute a breach of this obligation.
123
 
The existence of certain duties between parties has thus featured prominently in 
the discourse regarding the protection of confidential information. Duties may arise 
because of the exchange of valuable information between parties in a context in which 
the need for confidentiality has been made clear to the confidante.
124
 The exchange of 
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valuable information causes the confiding party to be vulnerable if the information is 
divulged by the confidante, such that this exposure to risk leads to duties being imposed 
on the confidante.
125
 It follows that the legal duty imposed based on the exchange of 
information is restricted both in terms of scope and duration, in which the duty endures 
only as long as the secret remains a secret and also pertains only to maintaining the secret 
and not to a wider, fiduciary relationship.
126
  
In this way, English and Canadian courts have observed a duty of confidence with 
respect to the protection of confidential information. The relevant English and Canadian 
case law will be explored in the sections below, in which this thesis will show that the 
law still remains uncertain as to the proper characterization of confidential information.  
 
2.1.3. The Nature of Confidential Information: The Duty of Confidence in English 
Case Law 
A leading authority for breach of confidence is the English case, Saltman 
Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co.,
127
 in which Lord Greene uttered a classic 
articulation of the key characteristics of confidential information: 
….The information, to be confidential, must, I apprehend, apart from contract, 
have the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be 
something which is public property and public knowledge. On the other hand, it 
is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a formula, a plan, a 
sketch, or something of that kind, which is the result of work done by the maker 
upon materials which may be available for the use of anybody; but what makes it 
confidential is the fact that the maker of the document has used his brain and thus 
produced a result which can only be produced by somebody who goes through 
the same process.
128
 
 
According to Lord Greene’s statement, confidential information is knowledge that 
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is not public and can also constitute information which has resulted from an individual’s 
unique mental labour. Confidentiality of information also persists independently from 
contract. If a contract is silent on the matter of confidence, there is an implied obligation 
to treat the confidential matter “in a confidential way,” such that the obligation to respect 
confidence is not limited to cases where the parties are in a contractual relationship.
129
 If 
a defendant uses confidential information, either directly or indirectly obtained from a 
plaintiff without the plaintiff’s express or implied consent, the defendant will be guilty of 
an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights.130  
Based on this reasoning, Lord Greene observed that, “contract or no contract,” the 
defendants came into possession of the plaintiffs’ drawings in light of the knowledge that 
this material belonged to the plaintiffs and was “obviously confidential matter.”131 
Moreover, by using the confidential drawings, the defendants managed to “dispense in 
certain material respects with the necessity of going through the process which had been 
gone through in compiling these drawings,” thereby saving the defendants “a great deal 
of labour and calculation and careful draughtsmanship.”132 The circumvention of the 
labour and production process that arose from the use of the confidential information thus 
constituted a breach of the duty of confidence, which was owed by the defendants to the 
plaintiffs, who were the “owners of the confidential matter.”133 
Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering identified some important characteristics of 
confidential information. However, he did not expressly classify confidential information 
as property. Despite Lord Greene’s use of proprietary language in referring to the 
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plaintiffs as “owners” of the confidential material, this term may simply have referred to 
the physical documents that happened to contain the confidential information at issue.
134
 
Since Saltman Engineering concerned the duty of confidence and the relationship 
between the parties to the dispute, it is unclear as to whether a duty of confidence arises 
from an interest in the information itself or from other factors such as the relationship 
between the parties or the circumstances of the case. 
The classic articulation of the duty of confidence can be found in the English 
case, Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd.
135
 Megarry J. agreed with Lord Greene’s 
comments in Saltman Engineering, in that the duty of confidence may exist where there 
is no contractual relationship between the parties. Accordingly, he observed that, where 
there is no contract, “the question must be one of what it is that suffices to bring the 
obligation into being.”136 Megarry J. subsequently identified three essential elements of a 
breach of the duty of confidence: 1) the information must be of a confidential nature; 2) 
the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence; and 3) there must be unauthorized use of the information to the detriment 
of the party that communicated it.
137
 With respect to the concept of confidentiality, 
Megarry J. echoed the views of Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering, in that a person’s 
ingenuity and innovative skill may impart a quality of confidentiality to an invention 
constructed from publicly available materials.
138
 Megarry J. further concluded that “there 
must be some product of the human brain which suffices to confer a confidential nature 
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upon the information.”139 It is through the exertion of mental effort and the creative 
thought process by which “something new and confidential may have been brought into 
being.”140  
In this way, one commentator has noted that the action for breach of confidence 
essentially protects original thought processes and creative efforts.
141
 In accordance with 
the reasoning in Coco, as well as Saltman Engineering, breach of confidence will occur 
when the defendant takes unfair advantage of information that has been disclosed to him 
or her, thereby saving the “time, trouble, and expense of going through the same 
process.”142 However, although the three-step test enunciated by Megarry J. in Coco is 
certainly informative with respect to the factors that amount to breach of confidence, 
Megarry J. was concerned mostly with concept of confidentiality alone, rather than the 
nature of confidential information. Accordingly, he did not attempt to classify 
confidential information into a specific category and so did not provide further guidance 
as to the proper characterization of confidential information. 
 
2.1.4. The Nature of Confidential Information: The Protection of Confidential 
Information in Canadian Case Law  
 
In Canada, the nature of confidential information has been raised in case law in 
both the criminal and civil contexts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Stewart
143
 examined the question of whether confidential information can be the subject 
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of theft under the Criminal Code and ultimately held that confidential information does 
not qualify as property for the purposes of the law of theft. However, Lamer J., writing 
for the Court, also commented on the nature of confidential information in the context of 
civil law with respect to this information’s potential characterization as property: 
It can be argued…that confidential information is property for the purposes of 
civil law. Indeed, it possesses many of the characteristics of other forms of 
property: for example, a trade secret, which is a particular kind of confidential 
information, can be sold, licensed or bequeathed, it can be the subject of a trust or 
passed to a trustee in bankruptcy. In the commercial field, there are reasons to 
grant some form of protection to the possessor of confidential information: it is 
the product of labour, skill and expenditure, and its unauthorized use would 
undermine productive efforts which ought to be encouraged. As the term 
“property” is simply a reference to the cluster of rights assigned to the owner, 
this protection could be given in the form of proprietary rights.
144
 
 
The above statement echoes the perspective of Weinrib, mentioned previously, 
who asserted that confidential information is property. However, this statement 
nevertheless fell far short of clarifying the nature of confidential information in any 
definitive manner. Lamer J. merely declared that “it can be argued” that confidential 
information can be classified as property, which certainly does not translate into an 
assertion that “confidential information should be classified as property.” Rather than 
settling the law, Lamer J. simply described the inconsistencies in judicial decision-
making with respect to the treatment of confidential information as property. In the civil 
context, Lamer J. noted that Canadian law
145
 does protect confidential information, but 
the legal basis for doing so has not been clearly established by the courts: while some 
cases treat confidential information as property that entitles an owner to exclude others 
                                                          
144
 Ibid at para 23. 
145
 For example, see International Corona Resources Ltd v LAC Minerals Ltd, (1987) 62 OR (2d) 1, aff’g 
(1986) 53 OR 2(d) 737. 
36 
 
 
 
from use,
146
 the courts have also recognized certain rights to confidential information that 
arise from the equitable obligation of good faith.
147
 Furthermore, Lamer J. noted that the 
protection afforded to confidential information in most civil cases arises “more from an 
obligation of good faith or a fiduciary relationship than from a proprietary interest,”148 
concluding that “no Canadian court has so far conclusively decided that confidential 
information is property, with all the civil consequences that such a finding would 
entail.
149
 Lamer J. thus raised, but ultimately did not answer, the question as to whether 
confidential information constitutes property.  
Wilkinson has noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has ultimately declined to 
specifically characterize confidential information.
150
 International Corona Resources Ltd 
v. LAC Minerals Ltd.151 is a leading case
152
 on breach of confidence and fiduciary duty in 
the commercial context and the appropriate remedies that arise from such breaches. The 
appellant, LAC Minerals Ltd. (“LAC”), had expressed interest in joining the respondent, 
International Corona Resources Ltd. (“Corona”), in exploring a property that Corona 
suspected had gold. Information that was not available to the public was revealed to LAC 
during meetings to discuss the venture. Subsequently, LAC used this information to make 
an offer for the property and then acquired and mined it. Although the ultimate finding of 
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a fiduciary relationship between the parties divided the court,
153
 all five judges agreed 
that a breach of confidence had occurred. However, despite the fact that Lamer J. was 
also one of the deciding judges in this case, neither he nor any of the other judges 
addressed the nature of confidential information in their reasoning.  
For example, La Forest J. concluded that unjust enrichment had occurred and that 
a constructive trust was an appropriate remedy. However, he added that since “it is not 
the recognition of a right of property that leads to a constructive trust, it is not necessary, 
therefore, to determine whether confidential information is property.”154 Sopinka J., on 
the other hand, arrived at the opposite conclusion of La Forest J. and opposed the remedy 
of a constructive trust on the basis that this remedy is usually reserved for situations 
where a right of property is recognized. Most important, he noted that “although 
confidential information has some of the characteristics of property, its foothold as such 
is tenuous,”155 since the originator of an idea does not receive proprietary rights 
equivalent to those of a patentee.
156
 Furthermore, acquisition of the land at issue resulted 
from the use of information that was both public and private. Since it would be 
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impossible to assess the role of either type of information, Sopinka J. argued that there 
was no factual basis for assuming that, but for the confidential information LAC received 
from Corona, LAC would not likely have acquired the land. Sopinka J. concluded that an 
award of damages was appropriate. 
The LAC Minerals case demonstrates that, in an action for breach of confidence, 
the subject of judicial focus is the relationship of confidence, in which confidential 
information is merely viewed as a “medium” that creates the relationship.157 Since the 
characterization of this medium is evidently considered to be of secondary importance, 
LAC Minerals thus offers limited judicial guidance on the nature of confidential 
information. La Forest J. expressly declined to determine whether confidential 
information constitutes property. Sopinka J. also refuted the notion of confidential 
information as property in order to support his assertion that a constructive trust was not 
an appropriate remedy, but he did not undertake a comprehensive exploration of the 
nature of confidential information. Instead, he merely voiced his doubts on the 
characterization of property rights in confidential information in the context of his choice 
of remedy. Therefore, based solely on Sopinka J.’s statements in LAC Minerals, one 
might conclude that confidential information likely does not constitute property. 
 In any event, it is clear that Canadian judges disagree on the proper 
characterization of confidential information. Prior to the decision in LAC Minerals, Cory 
J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal once offered the following justification for 
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maintaining confidentiality of information pertaining to commercial enterprises:   
Information and its collection, collation and interpretation are vital to most 
modern commercial enterprises. Compilations of information are often of such 
importance to the business community that they are securely kept to ensure their 
confidentiality. The collated, confidential information may be found in many 
forms covering a wide variety of topics. It may include: painstakingly-prepared 
computer programs pertaining to all aspects of the firm’s business; meticulously-
indexed lists of suppliers, with comments as to their efficiency, reliability and 
time required for delivery; laboriously-compiled lists of customers and their 
needs; instructions as to manufacturing processes learned from months of 
experimentation and trial; or lists of employees, including reference to their 
physical well-being and disciplinary history, that may be required to be kept 
confidential in compliance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
For many businessmen their confidential lists may well be the most valuable 
asset of their company. Their security will be of utmost importance to the firm.
158
 
 
 Cory J.A.’s comments emphasize the value of certain business information and 
the subsequent importance of maintaining the secrecy of business information. In 
addition to its direct influence on the performance and effective management of a firm, 
confidential information is often gathered through labour-intensive activities. Because of 
the effort required to obtain these informational “assets,” Cory J.A. advocated for the 
recognition of confidential business information as property and its subsequent protection 
as such. He asserted: 
If questioned, a businessman would unhesitatingly state that the confidential lists 
were the “property” of his firm. If they were surreptitiously copied by a 
competitor or outsider, he would consider his confidential data to have been 
stolen. The importance of confidential information will increase with the growth 
of high technology industry. Its protection will be of paramount concern to 
members of industry and the public as a whole.
159
 
 
While Cory J.A. acknowledged that mere information may not constitute 
property, he maintained that there is a right of property in confidential information.
160
 
Moreover, by asserting that confidential business lists can constitute literary works, 
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which are subject to copyright
161
 that is a “form of property analogous to personal 
property,”162 Cory J.A. thereby introduced the possibility that intellectual property 
protection could encompass confidential business information. 
However, although Cory J.A. offered a decisive articulation regarding the nature 
of confidential information, his statements do not represent the final word on this matter 
because the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in this case was subsequently 
overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada.
163
 Furthermore, while the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in LAC Minerals establishes that the protection of confidential 
information in Canadian law is based upon the duty of confidence, appellate-level 
judicial guidance on the proper classification of confidential information remains elusive. 
Nevertheless, Cory J.A.’s comments are noteworthy because they reflect a common 
philosophical justification for intellectual property protection: based on the notion that 
“every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour,” patent and copyright provide 
safeguards against piracy for the “fruits of labour” of inventors and authors.164 This 
perspective also happens to be in accordance with Lord Greene’s reasoning in Saltman 
Engineering, in which a person’s labour with respect to information justified the 
maintenance of its confidentiality. 
Perhaps the notion that people are entitled to the fruits of their labour provides a 
compelling justification for the right to exclude others from the access and use of 
information for which one has undertaken painstaking efforts to compile. In other words, 
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perhaps it is justified for a commercial entity to maintain control over information that it 
has generated and which is also directly tied to the success of the business. Nevertheless, 
if such a monopoly over the control of information is warranted, should the right to 
control information in this manner necessarily endure indefinitely in order to satisfy a 
person’s entitlement to the fruits of his or her labour? In other words, does the right to 
control information come with a “price” or “trade-off”? These questions will be explored 
in the following section. 
 
2.1.5. The Nature of Confidential Information: Questions of Balance - The “Bargain” 
in Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
 
The concept of “entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour” is reflected in 
intellectual property law, but this entitlement does not continue indefinitely. For example, 
patent
165
 and copyright
166
 confer monopolies, but the inventions and works to which they 
pertain face competition in the marketplace following the expiration of the term of 
protection. There is also a clear public interest aspect to copyright and patent with respect 
to the dissemination of knowledge. For example, the information contained in a 
copyrighted work freely circulates among the public even though the author retains 
exclusive rights to produce, reproduce, or perform the work.
167
 Likewise, information 
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about a patent is made publicly available
168
 despite the inventor’s monopoly on the right 
to manufacture, sell, and distribute the invention. Figure 1 thus demonstrates the flow of 
information with respect to the patent process, in which the public is eventually capable 
of accessing the knowledge associated with a patent. When a patent application is filed 
with the government, the information is removed from the realm of secrecy and placed 
within the knowledge of the government. The government maintains the secrecy of patent 
applications for 18 months and then publicly discloses the information contained 
therein.
169
 
 
Figure 1 - Flow of Information in the Patent Process 
 
Binnie J. has noted in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents): 
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…The grant of a patent simply reflects the public interest in promoting disclosure 
of advancements in learning by rewarding human ingenuity. Innovation is said to 
be the lifeblood of a modern economy. We neglect rewarding it at our peril. 
Having disclosed to the public the secrets of how to make or use the invention, 
the inventor can prevent unauthorized people for a limited time from taking a 
“free ride” in exploiting the information thus disclosed. At the same time, 
persons skilled in the art of the patent are helped to further advance the frontiers 
of knowledge by standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before.
170
 
 
Binnie J.’s comments with respect to the purpose of patent protection reflect the balance 
that intellectual property law seeks to achieve between the private interests of innovators 
and the public interest of society at large. An innovator must be rewarded for the fruits of 
his or her labour in order to continue to engage in innovation that will ultimately benefit 
the national economy. Intellectual property protections such as copyright and patent 
allow the innovator, for a defined period of time, to maintain exclusive rights to the 
exploitation of creative works or inventions. Public disclosure of information with respect 
to an invention or creative work, thereby allowing society to benefit from new knowledge 
contained therein, is accordingly the “price” for a limited-term monopoly. 
Ten years after the decision in LAC Minerals, the Supreme Court of Canada again 
had the opportunity to address the nature of confidential information in Cadbury 
Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.,
171
 a case concerning the protection of trade secrets. 
The respondents, Cadbury Schweppes Inc. (“Cadbury Schweppes”) alleged that 
confidential information regarding their product, Clamato juice, had been used to develop 
a competing product. Cadbury Schweppes asserted that, where trade secrets constitute the 
subject matter of wrongful use or disclosure, the policy objectives underlying patent 
protection are applicable to breaches of confidence in the commercial context.  
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Binnie J., writing for the Court, referred to the comments of Lamer J. in Stewart 
in acknowledging that confidential information possesses many characteristics of other 
forms of property.
172
 Nevertheless, he observed that the respondents’ characterization of 
confidential information as property was “controversial,” given that an action for breach 
of breach of confidence has traditionally been “rooted in the relationship of confidence 
rather than the legal characteristics of the information confided.”173  
Most important, Binnie J. refuted the respondents’ arguments that breach of 
confidence is akin to patent infringement. Binnie J. concluded that the respondents’ 
reliance on intellectual property law ignored the “bargain” that constitutes the heart of 
patent protection:  
A patent is a statutory monopoly which is given in exchange for a full and 
complete disclosure by the patentee of his or her invention. The disclosure is the 
essence of the bargain between the patentee, who obtained at the time a 17-year 
monopoly on exploiting the invention, and the public, which obtains open access 
to all of the information necessary to practise the invention. Accordingly, at least 
one of the policy objectives underlying the statutory remedies available to a 
patent owner is to make disclosure more attractive, and thus hasten the 
availability of useful knowledge in the public sphere in the public interest... 
Entrepreneurs in the food industry frequently eschew patent protection in order to 
avoid disclosure, and thus perhaps perpetuate their competitive advantage beyond 
the 17-year life span of a patent.
174
 We are told that the secrecy of the Coca-Cola 
recipe has apparently endured for decades. If a court were to award compensation 
to the respondents on principles analogous to those applicable in a case of patent 
infringement, the respondents would be obtaining the benefit of patent remedies 
without establishing that their invention meets the statutory criteria for the 
issuance of a patent, or paying the price of public disclosure of their secret.
175
 
 
Binnie J.’s comments regarding the purpose of patent protection emphasize the 
key trade-off in intellectual property law, in that the law will provide an innovator with a 
temporary right to exclude others from exploiting his or her invention or work, so long as 
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the rights holder makes the secret therein publicly available. It would appear, then, that 
contribution to the public interest is a key requisite in the conferral of intellectual 
property rights.  
 
2.1.6. The Nature of Confidential Information: Confidential Information as 
(Intellectual) Property - Is the Bargain Present? 
 
In Cadbury Schweppes, Binnie J.’s insight into the relevance of intellectual 
property law with respect to breach of confidence may explain why the respondents were 
not entitled to receive compensation equivalent to “patent remedies.” Nevertheless, these 
statements focus on the maintenance of secrecy of the information and the subsequent 
lack of a public interest component, rather than the nature of the confidential information 
at issue. Despite the fact that Binnie J. earlier stated that “the nature of the information 
may influence the appropriate remedy,”176 he only acknowledged the controversy 
surrounding the characterization of confidential information and did not elucidate his 
own thoughts on the matter. 
Similar to the situation in LAC Minerals, judicial determination of the nature of 
confidential information did not occur in Cadbury Schweppes, because this appeal 
focused on the determination of the appropriate remedy. In this context, Binnie J. asserted 
that a proprietary remedy should not automatically follow for breach of confidence, and 
that determination of the remedy should depend on a “case-by-case balancing of the 
equities.”177 The remedy awarded in LAC Minerals was driven by “the course of events 
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that would have likely occurred “but for” the breach,” rather than the “property status” of 
the confidence.
178
 The decision in Cadbury Schweppes thus did not settle the law 
regarding the nature of confidential information.  
Nevertheless, Cadbury Schweppes does raise an important question with respect 
to the intellectual property protection of confidential information. As noted by Binnie J. 
in his observations about the bargain in intellectual property law, innovators in the food 
industry often avoid patent protection, presumably to maintain secrecy of information 
that in turn facilitates a competitive edge beyond the life of a patent. Figure 2 illustrates 
the fact that there is no flow of information with respect to confidential information and 
the public, such that confidential information has the potential to remain forever excluded 
from public knowledge (thus the two separate circles in the diagram). The entity in 
possession of confidential information would thus have a monopoly in the market for the 
product or service to which the information pertains.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
cases, the choice of remedy will be influenced by the “course of events that would likely have occurred but 
for the breach,” instead of the “property” status of the confidence. 
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Figure 2 - Relationship between Confidential Information and Public Knowledge - 
Two Solitudes 
 
Wilkinson notes that, in the context of the current Canadian law, there are three 
factors that set the protection of confidential information apart from traditional 
intellectual property devices. Unlike patent or copyright, the protection of confidential 
information: a) is a product of judicial decision rather than statute; b) is an “unbounded 
monopoly” that can persist forever, provided that the conditions of confidentiality are 
maintained; and c) lacks an apparent element of direct public interest, other than the 
public’s general interest in the success of the national economy.179 If disclosure of 
information to benefit the public is the “price” for a limited-term monopoly in exploiting 
an invention or work, then this bargain appears to be absent in the context of the 
intellectual property protection of confidential information.  
One could argue that subjecting confidential information to intellectual property 
protection is philosophically justified on the basis that the information is a product of 
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human ingenuity and labour,
180
 and lack of protection in this manner would allow others 
to unjustly avoid the effort and expense of undertaking the same process. Classifying 
confidential information as “a product of the mind” that warrants the appropriate 
intellectual property protection would appear to be consistent with the judicial reasoning 
in the Coco and Saltman Engineering cases, as well as the underlying rationale of 
intellectual property law in providing incentives for innovation.  
The shift of confidential information protection into the realm of intellectual 
property law has also brought confidential information into that of international trade. For 
example, TRIPS articulates the obligations of member states to protect confidential 
information as follows: 
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by 
others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices 
so long as such information: 
 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration 
and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to 
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in 
question; 
 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
181
 
 
NAFTA also mandates the protection of confidential information but, unlike 
TRIPS, expressly refers to “trade secrets”: 
1. Each Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade 
secrets from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the 
consent of the person lawfully in control of the information in a manner contrary 
to honest commercial practices, in so far as: 
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(a) the information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; 
(b) the information has actual or potential commercial value because it is 
secret; and 
(c) the person lawfully in control of the information has taken reasonable steps 
under the circumstances to keep it secret. 
2. A Party may require that to qualify for protection a trade secret must be 
evidenced in documents, electronic or magnetic means, optical discs, microfilms, 
films or other similar instruments. 
3. No Party may limit the duration of protection for trade secrets, so long as the 
conditions in paragraph 1 exist. 
4. No Party may discourage or impede the voluntary licensing of trade secrets by 
imposing excessive or discriminatory conditions on such licenses or conditions 
that dilute the value of the trade secrets.
182
 
  Based on the language in the above provisions of TRIPS and NAFTA, one can 
observe that confidential information derives its value from the very fact that it is secret. 
Making the information publicly available in accordance with the principles of the 
traditional “bargain” in intellectual property law would thus destroy this value. 
Nevertheless, if a purpose of intellectual property protection is to maintain a balance 
between private and public interests, there should arguably be an exchange between the 
innovator and the public in accordance with this principle. The act of sequestering 
knowledge from public scrutiny, particularly when this information could promote 
scientific or social progress, leads to philosophical difficulties in justifying a monopoly 
on control over information that will contribute to a perpetual competitive advantage for 
the entity that controls the information. 
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2.1.7. The Nature of Confidential Information: Controlling Confidential Information - 
The Tension between Access and Secrecy 
 
Although the value of confidential information and intellectual property rights lies 
in the rights holder’s ability to exclude others from exploiting them, private rights 
regarding information may conflict with the federal Access Act.
183
 The Access Act is 
based on the principles that government information should be available to the public, 
exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific, and decisions regarding 
disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of the 
government.
184
 Under the Access Act, Canadian citizens and permanent residents of 
Canada are entitled, in accordance with section 4(1), to access any records under the 
control of a government institution.
185
 
Despite this entitlement to information in the hands of the government, there are 
some notable exceptions to disclosure under the Access Act.
186
 The head of a government 
institution must refuse to disclose any record that contains information that falls within 
the scope of the exemptions.
187
 For example, personal information constitutes one 
exception to disclosure
188
 unless the individual has consented to disclosure, the 
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information is publicly available, or if disclosure is authorized under the Privacy Act.
189
 
Third party information, which encompasses confidential information when placed in the 
hands of a government organization, constitutes another exception to disclosure and is 
protected under section 20(1) of the Access Act. The provision reads: 
Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose 
any record requested under this Act that contains 
(a) trade secrets of a third party;  
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is confidential 
information supplied to a government institution by a third party and is treated 
consistently in a confidential manner by the third party;  
(b.1) information that is supplied in confidence to a government institution by a third 
party for the preparation, maintenance, testing or implementation by the government 
institution of emergency management plans within the meaning of section 2 of 
the Emergency Management Act and that concerns the vulnerability of the third 
party’s buildings or other structures, its networks or systems, including its computer 
or communications networks or systems, or the methods used to protect any of those 
buildings, structures, networks or systems;  
(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in 
material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the 
competitive position of, a third party; or  
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with contractual or other negotiations of a third party.
190
 
 
The Access Act thus attempts to strike a balance between the need to maintain 
confidentiality of valuable business information and the public interest in the free flow of 
information. In this context, Figure 3 illustrates the effect of an access request on the flow 
of information, in which third party information is exempted from disclosure in this 
manner and thus remains inaccessible by the requester. 
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Figure 3 - Flow of Information when Access Request is made 
 
The exceptions to disclosure under the Access Act reflect the importance of 
considering the different and potentially conflicting interests with respect to a particular 
set of information. In Stewart, Lamer J. advocated for a balanced approach with respect 
to access to information: 
Indeed, the realm of information must be approached in a comprehensive way, 
taking into account the competing interests in the free flow of information and in 
one’s right to confidentiality or again, one’s economic interests in certain kinds 
of information.
191
 
 
Public access to information can “increase transparency in government, contribute 
to an informed public, and enhance an open and democratic society.”192 In this way, 
certain types of information are entitled to confidentiality in order to avoid undermining 
the very principles of access and promote good governance.
193
 In addition to the 
exception to the general disclosure requirement, the Access Act also provides for 
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procedural protections for third parties where a head of a government institution intends 
to disclose a record but has reason to believe that the record contains trade secrets or 
other forms of confidential business information. In this case, the head of an institution is 
required to give written notice to the third party regarding the access request and the 
head’s intention to disclose the information,194 thereby allowing the third party to 
subsequently make representations as to why the record should not be disclosed.
195
 It is 
thus a matter of balancing the tension between the access and secrecy of information in 
order to satisfy the needs and interests of all the stakeholders involved. 
 
2.1.8 The Nature of Confidential Information: Confidential Information is a Wider 
Class of Information than Trade Secrets 
 
In the 2012 case, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Health) 
(“Merck Frosst”)196 Cromwell J., writing for the majority, observed that there are 
different types of confidential information. Cromwell J. first noted the deliberate 
separation of trade secrets and confidential commercial information under the Access Act 
into exemptions under sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(b), respectively. According to 
Cromwell J., this distinction suggests that the information covered under section 20(1)(b) 
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constitutes a “more general class of confidential, commercial, scientific, and technical 
information” than the “narrower concept” of “trade secrets” in section 20(1)(a).197 
Cromwell J. further noted that the section 20(1)(a) exemption under the Access Act is not 
subject to disclosure in the public interest, whereas the section 20(1)(b) exemption for 
confidential information is subject to this type of disclosure.
198
  
It therefore follows that trade secrets constitute a smaller subset of confidential 
information. One academic has noted that although all trade secrets are confidential 
information, not all confidential information constitutes a trade secret.
199
 Whether or not 
a particular set of information constitutes a trade secret will be a question of fact, in 
which the plaintiff must demonstrate the confidential nature of the information.
200
 
Cromwell J. noted that information does not require an “inherent value” in order to 
constitute financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information.
201
 Unlike a trade 
secret, the value of confidential information may fluctuate over time, since it will 
ultimately depend upon “the use that may be made of it” and “who may want it, and for 
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what purposes.”202 Cromwell J. concluded that a trade secret must be given its 
“traditional legal meaning,” and that information must satisfy the following criteria to 
constitute a trade secret:  
a) The information must be secret in an absolute or relative sense (it is known by 
one or a relatively small number of persons;  
b) The possessor of the information must demonstrate that he has acted with the 
intention to treat the information as secret;  
c) The information must be capable of industrial or commercial application; and  
d) The possessor must have an interest (e.g. an economic interest) worthy of legal 
protection.
203
 
  
The above criteria emphasize the importance of secrecy with respect to the value 
of a trade secret. One commentator, Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, has observed that a trade 
secret’s claim to protection rests upon its possessor’s reasonable efforts to keep it secret 
by refusing to divulge the secret to any party who does not owe an obligation of 
confidentiality to the owner.
204
 Fellmeth further notes that the law of trade secrets 
protects information that is valuable by virtue of being publicly unknown, such that 
public knowledge of a trade secret would diminish or destroy whatever monopoly the 
trade secret confers upon its owner.
205
  
In addition, Cromwell J.’s articulation of a trade secret considers the inherent 
value of the information and the specificity of its application. Gregory Hagen et al also 
agree that trade secrets are a subset of the more “inclusive” category of confidential 
information and tend to be more specific than confidential information: for example, 
“trade secrets” are typically secret plans, processes or formulae, and compounds, recipes, 
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or tools, whereas confidential information can include customer lists, knowledge or 
opportunities, “and just about any information that is of value when confidential to the 
holder.”206  
 The characterization of trade secrets as a narrower class of confidential 
information is further supported by section 20(6) of the Access Act, which authorizes 
disclosure in the public interest. While all confidential information constitutes an 
exception to the general requirements of disclosure under section 4(1) of the Access Act, 
there is an “exception to the exception,” in which some types of confidential information 
can be subject to disclosure:  
The head of a government institution may disclose all or part of a record 
requested under this Act that contains information described in any of 
paragraphs (1)(b) to (d) if 
(a) the disclosure would be in the public interest as it relates to public health, 
public safety or protection of the environment; and 
(b) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs in importance any 
financial loss or gain to a third party, any prejudice to the security of its 
structures, networks or systems, any prejudice to its competitive position or 
any interference with its contractual or other negotiations [emphases 
added].
207 
 
Provisions authorizing the disclosure of confidential information for the purposes 
of protecting public health or the public interest can also be found in other Canadian 
legislation. For instance, where there is a “serious risk of injury to human health,” 
section 21.1 of the federal Food and Drugs Act states that the Minister of Health “may 
disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic product” without the 
consent of the person to whose business the information relates.
208
 Similarly, the 
                                                          
206
 Hagen et al, supra note 68 at 575. 
207
 Access Act, supra note 97, s 20(6). 
208
 Food and Drugs Act, RSC, 1985, c F-27, s 21.1(2):  
The Minister may disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic product 
without notifying the person to whose business or affairs the information relates or 
57 
 
 
 
Minister of Health may disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic 
product to the government, an advisor to the Minister, or someone who carries out 
functions that are related to the “protection or promotion of human health or the safety 
of the public.” 209 The Food and Drugs Act defines “confidential business information” 
as business information that has “actual or potential economic value” and that is not 
publicly available, in which measures have been taken to ensure that the information 
remains not publicly available.
210
 A “therapeutic product” is defined as “a drug or device 
or any combination of drugs and devices.”211 Thus, the Food and Drugs Act indicates 
that the confidential information generated for drugs in clinical trials does not constitute 
a trade secret.  
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has ultimately declined to comment on 
the nature of confidential information, the tension between protecting confidential 
                                                                                                                                                                             
obtaining their consent, if the Minister believes that the product may present a serious 
risk of injury to human health. 
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information and sharing it for the greater public good is reflected in the comments made 
by Lamer J. in Stewart:  
From a social point of view, whether confidential information should be 
protected requires a weighing of interests much broader than those of the parties 
involved. As opposed to the alleged owner of the information, society’s best 
advantage may well be to favour the free flow of information and greater 
accessibility by all. Would society be willing to prosecute the person who 
discloses to the public a cure for cancer, although its discoverer wanted to keep it 
confidential?
212
 
 
Lamer J. thus seems to suggest that in some contexts, it may not be clear as to 
who should hold the right to control a particular set of information. In creating valuable 
information, it follows that the generating entity should be granted the right to control 
this information. However, if that entity’s rights of control unduly restrict the free flow of 
information, especially when disclosure of this information can save human lives, 
perhaps these rights should be limited for the benefit of the public at large. The need to 
acknowledge other legitimate claims to the same set of information accordingly calls into 
question the theoretical validity of the permanent secrecy of confidential information. 
Nevertheless, despite providing for disclosure of confidential information in the 
public interest, section 21.1 of the Food and Drugs Act and section 20(6) of the Access 
Act do not mandate disclosure, but instead leave the decision of disclosure to the 
discretion of the institutional head.
213
 Most important, Hagen et al further note that in 
Canada, there is currently no difference in juridical treatment as between trade secrets 
and confidential information.
214
 Therefore, there is no time limit on the protection of 
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secrets, and obligations of confidence may be claimed and enforced as long as the 
information is kept secret.
215
 The strategy of keeping information a secret is an effective 
and flexible way to maintain a competitive advantage in light of changing business 
practices and technology: legal protection of secrets allows an idea, information, process, 
or technology to be tested without fear of appropriation, thereby encouraging 
investment.
216
 Moreover, Hagen et al assert that the legal protection of confidential 
information also fosters ethical behaviour in fair competition by “promoting, protecting, 
and enforcing relationships founded on trust and confidence.”217 
  
2.1.9. Conclusion on the Nature of Confidential Information 
 While legal scholars such as Weinrib and Cory J.A. have explored the notion of 
confidential information as property, the law of confidential information in Canada does 
not characterize confidential as property. As demonstrated in cases such as LAC Minerals 
and Cadbury Schweppes, the protection of confidential information in Canada is based 
upon the duty of confidence, in which a breach of confidence will give rise to a cause of 
action. Although confidential information may continue to be discussed in terms of 
property because of its classification as intellectual property under international trade 
agreements, confidential information differs from traditional intellectual property devices 
such as copyright and patent because it lacks a public interest component that would 
justify its continued secrecy and a subsequent limitless monopoly.  
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Therefore, it is perhaps more useful to frame a discussion of the protection of 
confidential information in terms of a party’s rights of control over information, as this 
framework also considers the possibility that there may be multiple, yet also compelling 
claims to the same set of confidential information. As this thesis will show, the existence 
of potentially conflicting rights to information is particularly salient in the pharmaceutical 
context. 
 
2.2. Regulation of the Drug Approval Process: Protecting Public Health 
 The ultimate goal of national regulatory authorities, such as Health Canada, is to 
protect and promote public health.
218
 Governments have a responsibility to protect their 
citizens, especially in areas where citizens are not able to protect themselves.
219
 
Government regulation and oversight is particularly necessary with respect to the 
manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products. Drugs are not ordinary consumer 
goods, since most consumers do not possess the requisite knowledge to make informed 
decisions “about when to use drugs, which drugs to use, how to use them, and to weigh 
potential benefits against risks.”220 Although medical doctors are presumably competent 
to diagnose a patient’s disease and select the appropriate course of treatment, a 
comprehensive understanding of the complex scientific issues that are associated with 
medicines often requires highly specialized training in the field of clinical 
pharmacology.
221
 It is thus in the public interest to have a strong, centralized regulator 
                                                          
218
 Rägo & Santoso, supra note 10 at 67. 
219
 Ibid. 
220
 Ibid. 
221
 Ibid. 
61 
 
 
 
that has both the knowledge and authority to make definitive judgments on the safety, 
efficacy, and labelling of medicines.
222
  
 Another important purpose of a national regulatory agency is to provide a check 
on powerful pharmaceutical companies that might allow commercial interests to prevail 
over public safety. A regulator’s failure to uphold its responsibility regarding adequate 
oversight within its authority can lead to disastrous consequences for public health. For 
example, in 1999, the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) was granted 
approval for the drug rofecoxib (also known as Vioxx) by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the national health regulator in the U.S.
223
 On September 30, 
2004, after more than 80 million patients had taken rofecoxib and annual sales had 
reached $2.5 billion, Merck withdrew rofecoxib from the market owing to increased risks 
for myocardial infarctions and stroke. One commentator, Eric Topol, has noted that 
Merck could have conducted a specific trial to ascertain cardiovascular risks and benefits, 
but such a trial was never conducted even though the FDA possessed the authority to 
mandate one.
224
 Merck instead issued a “relentless series of publications” that asserted 
the safety of rofecoxib, which were subsequently complemented by papers in peer-
reviewed medical literature by Merck employees and consultants.
225
 Merck also spent 
over $100 million per year in direct-to-consumer advertising, another activity regulated 
by the FDA, which was essential in generating its massive annual sales for rofecoxib.
226
 
Despite the efforts of many investigators in conducting and publishing independent 
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research on the cardiovascular toxicity of rofecoxib, only the FDA was authorized to take 
action regarding the findings.
227
 In estimating that there may be “tens of thousands of 
patients who have had major adverse events attributable to rofecoxib,” Topol thus asserts 
that the FDA failed to fulfil its responsibilities to the public by passively waiting for data 
to accrue and in failing to exercise its regulatory power.
228
 
 Effective regulatory systems clearly require appropriate action on the part of the 
people who run them, particularly when these individuals are the only ones authorized to 
act. Since the efficacy of regulatory systems depends on the actual enforcement of the 
laws therein by individuals, the system may not always ensure perfect safeguards against 
cases such as the rofecoxib incident. However, this reality does not detract from the 
necessity of legislative requirements that mandate standards for rigorous scientific testing 
of new compounds in preparation for their subsequent use by humans. This process 
involves the balancing of the benefits, risks, and the availability of other drugs for a 
particular disease.
229
 In this way, when Health Canada decides that a drug is safe and 
effective, this approval means that the drug’s benefits outweigh the risks, which reflects a 
policy choice based in part on society’s collective level of risk tolerance.230  
As mentioned in Chapter One of this thesis, the manufacturer of a new drug must 
submit evidence to the government regarding the drug’s safety and efficacy before the 
drug can be marketed and sold in Canada. In order to receive the NOC that indicates 
proof of the government’s approval, the manufacturer must first file a New Drug 
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Submission (NDS) with the Minister of Health.
231
 The NDS must contain “sufficient 
information and material to enable the Minister to assess the safety and effectiveness of 
the new drug,” including the following: detailed reports of tests made to establish the 
drug’s safety under the recommended purpose and conditions of use; “substantial 
evidence” of the new drug’s clinical effectiveness for the recommended purpose and 
conditions of use; and details of the tests to control the drug’s potency, purity, safety, and 
stability.
232
  
An NDS consists of a vast amount of information, much of which is generated by 
clinical trials which are heavily regulated in Canada by the Food and Drug 
Regulations.
233
 Clinical trials typically consist of four phases. During Phase I, an 
experimental drug is tested on a small group of people for the first time in order to assess 
the drug’s safety or toxicity, identify side effects, and determine a safe dosage range.234 
In Phase II, the drug is administered to a larger group of 100 or more individuals to 
further assess the drug’s safety and obtain preliminary data on the drug’s effectiveness 
for a particular disease or condition.
235
 In Phase III, the drug is administered to a group of 
1000 or more people to confirm the drug’s effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare 
the drug to commonly used treatments, and collect information that will allow the drug to 
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be used safely.
236
 Finally, Phase IV occurs once the drug is approved and is available on 
the market, and researchers gather information on the drug’s optimal use and its long-
term benefits and risks.
237
 The entities that conduct clinical trials (“clinical trial 
sponsors”)238 are required to maintain “complete and accurate records” with respect to the 
use of a drug in a clinical trial and are obligated to identify and subsequently contact 
clinical trial participants if the sale of the drug may endanger their health or that of other 
people.
239
 
 The regulatory process for new drugs is particularly relevant to the protection of 
confidential information in the pharmaceutical context. As will be discussed in the next 
section of this thesis, information in an NDS is disclosed to the government in the course 
of the market approval process, but the information constitutes third party information 
that is generally exempt from disclosure under section 20 of the Access Act. Moreover, 
the pharmaceutical context offers a clear illustration of the struggle between the 
competing interests of the parties that wish to gain access to confidential information and 
those that seek to maintain its secrecy. 
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2.3. Access and Control over Confidential Information in the Pharmaceutical 
Context  
  
In section 2.1.8, the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision, Merck Frosst,
240
 
was discussed as supporting the characterization of trade secrets as a subset of the 
broader category of confidential information. However, the key role of this decision in 
the analysis in this thesis concerns the aspect of the case revolving around the protection 
of confidential information in the pharmaceutical context with respect to exceptions to 
disclosure under the Access Act. The decision demonstrates the tension between access 
and secrecy: in the Merck Frosst case, the access was sought by someone who was not a 
subject of the data. In this thesis, the access that is of concern is access to the data of a 
person who is a subject of the data.  
Cromwell J., writing for the majority in Merck Frosst,
241
 first acknowledged that 
broad rights of access to government information serve an important public purpose by 
ensuring accountability, thereby strengthening democracy.
242
 On the other hand, 
Cromwell J. noted that providing access to government information also engages the 
interests of third parties that provide information to the government for regulatory 
purposes, since the information in question may include trade secrets and “other 
confidential commercial matters” which may be valuable to competitors of the third 
party.
243
 Since disclosing valuable confidential information may result in financial harm 
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to a third party, the routine disclosure of this information may “ultimately discourage 
research and innovation.”244  
The Merck Frosst decision thus illustrates the tension between the public’s right 
to access government information and the need to preserve the private interests of third 
parties. This decision is the final result of lengthy and complex litigation, in which five 
decisions led to the appeals before the Supreme Court of Canada. At issue was the 
information contained in an NDS and Supplementary New Drug Submission (SNDS),
245
  
which had been submitted to the respondent Health Canada by the appellant, Merck 
Frosst Canada Ltd. (“Merck”), in the course of obtaining regulatory market approval for 
an asthma medication, Singulair®. The initial judicial review was heard by Harrington J. 
of the Federal Court in 2004,
246
 whose decision was subsequently overturned by the 
Federal Court of Appeal in 2005.
247
 The matter was returned to the Federal Court, which 
                                                          
244
 Ibid. 
245
 A supplement to an NDS is submitted to request authorization to market a drug that has already been 
approved and for which certain changes have been made. See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s 
C.08.003 (1):  
Despite section C.08.002, no person shall sell a new drug in respect of which a notice of 
compliance has been issued to the manufacturer of that new drug and has not been 
suspended under section C.08.006, if any of the matters specified in subsection (2) are 
significantly different from the information or material contained in the new drug 
submission, extraordinary use new drug submission, abbreviated new drug submission or 
abbreviated extraordinary use new drug submission, unless  
(a) the manufacturer of the new drug has filed with the Minister a supplement to that 
submission;  
(b) the Minister has issued a notice of compliance to the manufacturer of the new drug in 
respect of the supplement; and  
(c) the notice of compliance in respect of the supplement has not been suspended under 
section C.08.006. 
246
 Merck Frosst Canada & Co v Canada (Minister of Health), 2004 FC 959, [2005] 1 FCR 587 [Merck 
Frosst FC 2004]. Harrington J. allowed Merck’s application and held that all the information at issue was 
third party information that would not exist but for Merck’s NDS. 
247
 Merck Frosst Canada & Co v Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FCA 215, [2006] 1 FCR 379. 
Desjardins J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal held that Harrington J. had erred in law in ruling that the 
documents in question met the criteria for exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Access Act. 
67 
 
 
 
heard the applications for judicial review related to the NDS
248
 and SNDS.
249
 For both of 
the NDS and SNDS judgments, Health Canada appealed and Merck cross-appealed: the 
Federal Court of Appeal heard the appeals and cross-appeals concurrently and delivered 
one judgment.
250
 
 In accordance with the approval process, Merck had made comprehensive 
disclosure to Health Canada of all its information on Singulair®, including raw data from 
pre-clinical and clinical studies.
251
 Figure 4 illustrates the flow of information with 
respect to the data submitted by Merck. Information in an NDS, such as clinical trial data, 
is disclosed to the government, and information contained in government records is 
subject to access requests through the Access Act. 
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Figure 4 - Flow of Information with respect to Data Submitted by Merck 
 
 Health Canada subsequently received access to information requests under the 
Access Act with respect to information contained in Merck’s NDS and SNDS. The 
specific documents to which the requester
252
 sought access were the NOC, the 
Comprehensive Summary,
253
 the Health Canada reviewers’ notes,254 and the 
correspondence
255
 between Health Canada and Merck. In accordance with procedural 
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requirements under the Access Act, Health Canada was required to give notice to Merck 
of the request for access and of Health Canada’s intent to disclose part of the NDS 
record.  
 While Health Canada found that 30 of the 550 pages identified under the access 
request contained confidential information and could not be disclosed, Health Canada 
also concluded that the NDS record contained 15 pages that did not constitute 
confidential information. Health Canada subsequently disclosed these pages without 
notifying Merck. In contrast, Merck claimed that all of the information covered by the 
access request, including the disclosed pages, was exempt from disclosure. The same 
events unfolded with respect to the SNDS, in which Health Canada disclosed eight pages 
of the SNDS after concluding that they contained no confidential information, while 
Merck insisted that none of the 300 pages of the SNDS could be disclosed. Thus, Merck 
complained that Health Canada failed to give Merck notice and an opportunity to make 
objections before disclosing some of its confidential information and that Health Canada 
did not conduct a sufficiently detailed review of the documents before deciding the 
information was subject to disclosure. In addition, Merck claimed that certain categories 
of records, of which an NDS and a SNDS are part, should “automatically” trigger a right 
to notice because of the confidentiality and competitive value of the information 
contained therein.
256
 
  Cromwell J. rejected Merck’s assertion that the proposed disclosure of any part 
of an NDS or SNDS automatically triggers a duty to give notice.
257
 Cromwell J. noted 
that the ordinary meaning of the notice provision did not support Merck’s position of a 
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right to notice regarding particular categories of records.
258
 In addition, Merck’s position 
was not consistent with an important principle of the Access Act, in that exceptions to the 
right of access should be “limited and specific.”259 The creation of classes of documents 
that would “presumptively trigger the notice requirement and be presumptively exempt 
from disclosure” would thus be inconsistent with this principle.260  
Nevertheless, Cromwell J. acknowledged that observing a low threshold for 
triggering the notice requirement would ensure procedural fairness and reduce the risk of 
the mistaken disclosure of exempted information.
261
 Deschamps J. also raised the 
question of whether a government entity is capable of determining whether all 
confidential information has been redacted from a record intended for disclosure. 
According to Deschamps J.: 
Health Canada’s statement that all confidential information has been redacted is 
just an argument. It is not proof that all such information has in fact redacted. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the proceedings, Health Canada took the position that 
none of the information was confidential. The number of documents that either 
were subsequently found to be exempt in their entirety or were redacted 
extensively is a clear indication that Health Canada’s word cannot be taken as 
proof.
262
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Because an institutional head has equally important duties “to disclose and not to 
disclose,” the institutional head must thus give third parties notice if they are in doubt 
about whether the information is exempt.
263
 In particular, a third party will be in a better 
position than a head of a government institution to identify information that falls within 
the exemptions to disclosure under the Access Act. A third party will have knowledge and 
understanding about the industry in which it participates, as well as “intimate knowledge” 
of the information at issue and the possible harm that could result from its disclosure.
264
 
Therefore, a third party’s assistance will be required “to know how, or if, the third party 
treated the information as confidential,” such that “whether the information is 
confidential cannot be determined without representations from the third party.”265  
 It is important to note that Cromwell J. did not dispute the potential value of 
Merck’s confidential information. He acknowledged that “disclosure of information that 
is not already in the public domain and that could give competitors a head start in product 
development, or which they could use to their competitive advantage, may be shown to 
give rise to a reasonable expectation of probable harm or prejudice to the third party’s 
competitive position.”266 Instead, Merck’s claims were dismissed owing to its failure to 
present sufficient evidence to support its claims under the various exemptions under 
section 20 of the Access Act.  
With respect to the section 20(1)(a) exemption for trade secrets, Cromwell J. 
noted that Merck’s evidence was not capable of establishing that the documents in the 
                                                          
263
 Ibid, per Cromwell J. at para 84. 
264
 Ibid at para 79. 
265
 Ibid at para 79, citing Deschamps J. in HJ Heinz Co of Canada Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 
SCC 13, [2006] SCR 441 at para 51. 
266
 Ibid at para 220. 
72 
 
 
 
NDS record either contained trade secrets or revealed trade secrets.
267
 Moreover, to the 
extent that portions of the records revealed trade secrets, this information had been 
redacted.
268
 Merck failed to demonstrate how the remaining information constituted trade 
secrets within the meaning of the exemption, since “the conclusion that virtually blank 
pages constituted trade secrets is a palpable and overriding error” on the part of the 
reviewing judge.
269
  
Merck encountered similar evidentiary problems with respect to the section 
20(1)(b) exemption: Merck could not explain why the remaining information on heavily 
redacted pages constituted confidential information. Merck argued that its assembled list 
of studies and articles was not public knowledge, and that releasing the articles in 
response to the access request would link them to Singulair® and the NDS or the SNDS. 
Cromwell J. concluded that Merck’s evidence failed to support the claim that Merck’s 
listing of the studies was confidential information, although he did not “foreclose the 
possibility of a claim of this nature being established in some cases in which the evidence 
supported it.”270  
Finally, Merck argued that the compilation of publicly available studies is a 
separate work from the studies themselves, a separate work which had been created by 
Merck’s employees using substantial time and resources. The studies themselves may 
have been publicly available, but “what was not publicly available…is the way a group of 
publicly available studies was compiled for a particular purpose.”271 In determining 
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whether this information could trigger an exemption under section 20(1)(c) with respect 
to the reasonable expectation of harm to Merck, Cromwell J. agreed that “it may be 
possible in some cases to show that the way in which publicly available information has 
been assembled in a particular situation is not, itself, publicly known.”272 Nevertheless, 
Cromwell J. again noted that Merck failed to show evidence about how disclosure of the 
redacted form of the information, as presented by Health Canada, would reasonably be 
expected to give rise to the harm and prejudice claimed by Merck. Furthermore, in light 
of these redactions, Cromwell J. asserted that the public interest favoured disclosure of 
the redacted records, noting that “it is particularly important to allow broad access to this 
sort of information in the context of the pharmaceutical industry…Health Canada 
systematically posts on its website about undesirable effects of all drugs sold in 
Canada.”273 
The Merck Frosst case illustrates the battle for control over confidential 
information in the pharmaceutical context. Moreover, since the Food and Drug 
Regulations require drug manufacturers to disclose all information about a new drug to 
the government, the protection of confidential information in Merck Frosst occurred in a 
statutory context rather than at common law, a statutory context in which the Access Act 
protects third party information through exemptions to disclosure. The Merck Frosst case 
is thus informative with respect to a discussion about data exclusivity, which is also 
based on a statutory regime.
274
 Harrington J. of the Federal Court specifically noted that, 
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to recoup their investment in the costly development of new medicines, innovator 
pharmaceutical companies “are dependent upon patent protection and protection of data 
submitted to government authorities.”275  
However, it is important to note that the Merck Frosst decision did not concern 
data exclusivity at all. The Federal Court of Appeal noted that Merck cited, but ultimately 
did not argue at trial, Canada’s obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA in support of its 
position against disclosure under the Access Act.
276
 Although it is not expressly 
mentioned in any of the judgments, the fact that Merck did not rely on data exclusivity 
protection in its arguments likely occurred because the term of data exclusivity would 
have expired by the time the initial judicial review was heard by the Federal Court in 
2004. Prior to 2006, the duration of data exclusivity in Canada was five years, and Merck 
obtained market approval for Singulair® in 1998.
277
  Nevertheless, the protection of 
confidential information in the course of the market approval process for new drugs, as 
seen in the Merck Frosst decision, provides the contextual foundation for a discussion 
about data exclusivity.   
In exploring the research question for this thesis, recall that the following three 
constructs must be addressed: 1) the regulation of clinical trials; 2) the data exclusivity 
right of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s right to personal data 
protection. This thesis has completed the initial explanation of the first construct, the 
regulation of clinical trials. Confidential information was also discussed to illustrate the 
tension between access to information and the maintenance of its secrecy, in which this 
tension is evident in the pharmaceutical context. The discussion of confidential 
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information has now laid the groundwork for the second construct, data exclusivity, 
which will be explored in the following section. 
 
2.4. Data Exclusivity and Control over Confidential Information 
Data exclusivity is related to the law of confidential information and thus relates 
to the free flow of information (or lack thereof). By affecting access to information about 
new drugs, data exclusivity also has an impact on public health. The present discussion 
will focus on the nature of data exclusivity and will discuss intellectual property in 
pharmaceutical research and development as well as the different perspectives regarding 
the impact of data exclusivity on public health outcomes and innovation.   
 
2.4.1. Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection: Safeguarding 
Investment  
 
 A new drug that contains a medicinal ingredient that has not been previously 
approved by the Minister of Health is defined as an “innovative drug.”278 Accordingly, 
drug manufacturers that conduct clinical trials for innovative drugs are known as 
“innovative manufacturers” or “brand name drug manufacturers.” Once the Minister of 
Health approves the innovative drug and issues an NOC to the manufacturer, the drug 
becomes listed as a Canadian Reference Product.
279
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However, the road to approval of an innovative drug involves significant financial 
costs. A U.S. study from 2003 collected data from ten multinational pharmaceutical firms 
and estimated that the research and development cost per new drug was $802 million, and 
that this cost increased to nearly $900 million for research conducted after the drug was 
approved.
280
 These results were independently verified by another study from 2006 which 
used a publicly available data set.
281
 Furthermore, the authors of the 2006 study estimated 
the costs per approved drug to be $836 million before approval, and that the expected 
cost to large pharmaceutical firms for developing a drug ranged from $521 million to 
$2.1 billion.
282
  
While no published estimate of the costs of developing a new drug can be 
considered a gold standard since clinical trials vary in their methods, data sources, 
samples,
283
 and the health conditions under investigation,
284
 it is nonetheless clear that 
pharmaceutical companies must invest vast amounts of capital into the research and 
development process, which can easily span a decade or more.
285
 The process also 
involves a high risk of failure, since it is estimated that fewer than 1% of compounds 
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examined during pre-clinical testing ultimately advance to the clinical trial stage,
286
 and 
drugs may also fail in late-stage clinical trials owing to their inability to outperform a 
placebo.
287
 
 Therefore, the expense and effort involved in pharmaceutical innovation 
ultimately gives rise to the perceived need for intellectual property protection. An 
innovative manufacturer will typically seek and obtain a patent for an innovative drug 
which will confer a monopoly of twenty years
288
 regarding the drug’s manufacture, sale, 
and use.
289
 According to the Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations,
290
 the 
first person who files an NDS may submit a patent list to the Minister of Health for 
addition to the patent register.
291
 Among other criteria, a patent list must identify the NDS 
to which the list relates; identify the medicinal ingredient, brand name, dosage form, 
strength, route of administration, and use set out in the NDS; and, for each patent on the 
list, contain a statement that the first person who filed the NDS to which the list relates is 
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the owner of the patent or has an exclusive license.
292
 With respect to a patent on a patent 
list in relation to a NDS, the patent is eligible for addition to the patent register if it 
satisfies the criteria regarding the medicinal ingredient, formulation, dosage form, or use 
of the medicinal ingredient.
293
 
 The expiration of a patent on an innovative drug results in the loss of the 
manufacturer’s monopoly over the drug’s manufacture, sale, and use. Other drug 
manufacturers are subsequently free to engage in these activities regarding that drug. 
However, any new entrant to the Canadian market for the drug will also require an NOC 
from the Minister of Health. These later entrants are commonly known as “generic drug 
manufacturers,” which simply means that these manufacturers are not innovators but 
produce drugs that are pharmaceutically equivalent and bioequivalent to the original 
innovative drugs. Instead of conducting their own clinical trials,
294
 a generic drug 
manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS) to demonstrate that 
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their drug is equivalent to a Canadian Reference Product in terms of pharmaceutical 
equivalence, bioequivalence, route of administration, and conditions of use.
295
 Section 
C.08.002.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations outlines the criteria for the content of an 
ANDS, which must consist of the identification of the Canadian Reference Product used 
in any comparative studies and evidence from comparative studies that demonstrates that 
the new drug is equivalent to the Canadian Reference Product.
296
 
In this way, generic drug manufacturers do not have to incur the costs associated 
with conducting clinical trials. Competition in the marketplace also increases with the 
expiration of the patent on an innovative drug, which generally results in drug price 
reductions.
297
 Thus, generic drugs are also typically sold at cheaper prices than those 
charged by innovative drug companies. A report published by the Patented Medicine 
Prices Review Board found that, of a sample of 284 drugs, the price of a typical Canadian 
generic drug in 2013 was 39% of the corresponding price of the innovative drug, and in 
Ontario, the generic price was 31% of that for the innovative drug.
298
 The cheaper generic 
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versions of drugs accordingly result in considerable cost savings to the consumer and 
ultimately promote access to affordable, essential medicines. 
The enormous financial costs and labour associated with clinical trials and the 
ability to circumvent these efforts by generic manufacturers provide the initial context in 
which data exclusivity arises. As once observed by Binnie J., if innovation is the 
lifeblood of a modern economy, human ingenuity must be rewarded in order to further 
advance the frontiers of knowledge.
299
 Intellectual property protection thereby satisfies a 
person’s entitlement to the “fruits of their labour” by allowing the innovator to exploit the 
subject matter of the protection for a defined period of time. Patent protection and data 
exclusivity arguably provide the means for exploitation. This perspective of data 
exclusivity’s purpose, however, has created considerable controversy with respect to the 
impact on public health. This controversy largely has to do with arguments over the 
nature of data exclusivity and the extent of the protection it confers under the trade 
agreements, specifically TRIPS, from which it originates.  
 
2.4.2. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Interpretative Context and International Trade 
  The term “data exclusivity” is not a legally defined term. It is nonetheless an apt 
description of the protection’s effects on intellectual property rights holders. Recall that 
TRIPS and NAFTA both mandate the protection of confidential information.
300
  For 
example, under Article 39 of TRIPS, member states are required to protect “undisclosed 
information.”301 Article 39(3) contains the data exclusivity rules under TRIPS and 
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mandates protection for “undisclosed” data, “the origination of which involves a 
considerable effort”302 against “unfair commercial use” and “disclosure”:  
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of 
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair 
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against 
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are 
taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
303
 
 
 NAFTA contains similar language to Article 39(3) of TRIPS with respect to the 
obligation to protect test data against unfair commercial use and disclosure. Article 
1711(5) states:  
If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical 
or agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the 
submission of undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the 
use of such products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect against 
disclosure of the data of persons making such submissions, where the 
origination of such data involves considerable effort, except where the 
disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure 
that the data is protected against unfair commercial use.
304
 
 
Despite the aforementioned similarities between TRIPS and NAFTA, there is an 
important distinction between the two agreements regarding the duration of data 
exclusivity. Whereas TRIPS does not specify a minimum term of protection, Article 
1711(6) of NAFTA mandates a “reasonable period” of protection of “not less than five 
years”: 
Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph 5 that are 
submitted to the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no 
person other than the person that submitted them may, without the latter's 
                                                                                                                                                                             
undisclosed information, but rather, “information disclosed selectively and under precise conditions”: See 
Gervais, supra note 43 at 541. 
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permission, rely on such data in support of an application for product 
approval during a reasonable period of time after their submission. For this 
purpose, a reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five years 
from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person that 
produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account of the 
nature of the data and the person's efforts and expenditures in producing 
them. Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation on any Party to 
implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of 
bioequivalence and bioavailability studies [emphasis added].
305
 
 
Data exclusivity therefore originates from TRIPS and NAFTA. These agreements 
mandate that, where drug manufacturers are required to submit test data to a regulatory 
agency in the course of a market approval process for new drugs, this data is confidential 
and must be protected as such. Members of the WTO, including Canada, that are 
signatories to TRIPS and NAFTA are accordingly required to implement data exclusivity 
obligations into their domestic legislation.
306
 Owing to the possibilities for economic 
sanctions for failure to comply with obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA, it is essential 
to determine the nature and scope of the rights that data exclusivity provides to the 
entities that generate confidential clinical trial information. The following two sections of 
this thesis will discuss the academic literature with respect to the purpose of data 
exclusivity. 
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2.4.3. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Perspective of Proponents – Protecting Public 
Health and Preventing Free-Riding 
 
 Proponents of data exclusivity typically characterize its purpose as a means to 
encourage drug research and development. For example, Erika Lietzan observes that, to 
ensure that “pioneers” do the necessary research for the benefit of subsequent applicants 
and patients alike, “some delay is necessary before that research may be used by 
others.”307 This delay will satisfy the needs of future generations of patients for as-yet 
undiscovered and undeveloped drugs by ensuring that innovative manufacturers do not 
face immediate competition from companies who circumvent research and pay “a 
fraction of the same price for market entry.”308 Public health concerns thus justify data 
exclusivity.
309
  
In their analysis of the language used in Article 39(3) of TRIPS, G. Lee 
Skillington and Eric Solovy focus on the intentions of the TRIPS negotiators and also 
note that WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body are “very reluctant to interpret 
provisions in a manner that leaves them without meaning and that makes them 
redundant.”310 In addition, Skillington and Solovy assert that a “fundamental” purpose of 
data exclusivity protection is to provide incentives to bring new drugs to market, such 
that prohibiting reliance on an innovator’s data would be consistent with this purpose.311 
Reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data before the innovator has had the chance to 
recoup the costs of the efforts to generate the data would be unjust, since the competitor 
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would not only receive a “free ride” on the innovator’s investment but would be in a 
better market position than the innovator, owing to the substantial economic savings from 
circumventing the clinical trial process.
312
 Skillington and Solovy thus conclude that the 
term “unfair” would also be interpreted in light of commercial consequences, and would 
be interpreted as prohibiting any reliance on an innovator’s data.313 Logically, the TRIPS 
negotiators likely intended “unfair commercial use” of data to mean that the data will not 
be used to support or review submissions of second applicants, since to conclude 
otherwise would effectively give second applicants a commercial advantage because they 
did not have to generate their own data, unlike innovative manufacturers.
314
 
Daniel Gervais has similarly noted that uses of an innovator’s data by a 
competitor could be deemed unfair if they give the competitor a “springboard” to 
“shortcut” research and development efforts,315 such that generic manufacturers who 
demonstrate bioequivalence to an innovative drug would be encompassed by this 
interpretation of the expression. Daria Kim has also observed that, according to WIPO’s 
Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition, disclosure of test or other 
data constitutes an act of unfair competition, since this disclosure may have similar 
detrimental effects on an enterprise in the same manner as unauthorized use of the 
information.
316
 
The prevention of “free-riding” upon an innovator’s work is also central to 
Lietzan’s argument that data exclusivity does not constitute a reward conferred on 
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innovative manufacturers by the government, which creates the perception that data 
exclusivity is “artificial and provided, as a benefit, to pioneers.”317 Instead, Lietzan 
argues that data exclusivity is “not a grant of anything to anyone” but is “the absence of 
an abbreviated pathway,” since it does not prevent subsequent market entrants from 
“doing exactly what the first entrant did.”318 Owing to reliance on an innovative 
manufacturer’s research, subsequent market entrants such as generic manufacturers face a 
reduced regulatory burden because approval of an innovative drug will eliminate “much 
of the trial and error” experienced by the innovative manufacturer.319 Lietzan accordingly 
claims that reliance-based generic drug submissions should not be controversial with 
respect to proving use of the innovative manufacturer’s data, since a subsequent applicant 
“uses” an innovator’s research when it refers to the innovative drug by using the “fact” of 
the innovator’s approval to obtain its own approval.320 
 
2.4.4. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Perspective of Opponents – Impeding Public Health 
while Providing “Double Protection” 
 
Owing to the expense and effort involved in pharmaceutical innovation, 
incentives to innovate, through intellectual property protection, are arguably warranted. 
However, in the pharmaceutical context, the requirements to uphold intellectual property 
standards in TRIPS have inspired a continuous debate over effects on public health 
outcomes, since the higher costs of patented drugs erect financial barriers for access to 
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essential medicines in developing countries.
321
 At the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the WTO members affirmed that TRIPS 
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health, and in particular, to promote access to medicines 
for all.”322 In particular, owing to the inadequacy or outright lack of manufacturing 
capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries, the members called for 
an “expeditious” solution to the difficulties faced by developing countries with respect to 
compulsory licensing under TRIPS.
323
 A compulsory license provides for flexibility in 
patent protection: it allows for “other use” of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the rights holder, thereby enabling a generic version of a patented 
medicine to be exported to developing countries that lack their own pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacities.
324
 The 2003 decision of the WTO General Council thus 
addressed public health concerns of developing countries by waiving the domestic market 
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requirement under Article 31(f) of TRIPS,
325
 thereby enabling any country to receive 
imported medicines through compulsory licensing.
326
 
  Arguably, the above measures prevent patent holders from unduly emphasizing 
commercial interests at the expense of public health. However, it is important to note that 
Article 31 of TRIPS applies exclusively to the subject matter of patent protection and not 
that of data exclusivity. While Article 30 authorizes the provision of limited exceptions to 
the exclusive rights conferred by patent,
327
 there are no corresponding provisions under 
TRIPS or any WTO decisions that provide exceptions to data exclusivity protection. In 
this way, although data exclusivity functions in a manner akin to patent protection by 
providing a temporary monopoly on information generated in clinical trials and thus 
contributes to the delay of the market entry of cheaper drugs, there is a lack of formal 
mechanisms to address the potential impact of data exclusivity on public health 
outcomes.  
 Much of the opposition to data exclusivity occurs because of the uncertainty of 
interpretation of Article 39(3) of TRIPS regarding the rights conferred to confidential 
clinical trial data. For one thing, TRIPS does not mandate a uniform period of data 
exclusivity, unlike that seen for patent protection.
328
 Despite the fact that members are 
required to protect test data against “unfair commercial use,” TRIPS also does not 
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provide a clear definition of this expression.
329
 Antony Taubman thus proposes three 
possible forms of protection that can potentially arise in accordance with three 
corresponding interpretations of the Article 39(3) standard: 1) proprietary rights in the 
form of data exclusivity, in which protection against unfair commercial use would involve 
a fixed period of exclusive rights to data, such that any use of the data during this time 
would be deemed unfair; 2) a compensatory regime, in which the innovator cannot 
prevent others from using or referring to the data but is entitled to equitable financial 
compensation in order to remedy the “unfairness” of a competitor’s use of the data; and 
3) direct data protection, in which there is no obligation to provide for exclusivity or 
compensation and where, although undisclosed data must be protected from unauthorized 
disclosure, “unfairness” is limited to data that is acquired by “dishonest means.”330 In any 
event, the arguably broad wording of Article 39(3) has led to controversy regarding its 
interpretation and, subsequently, the nature and extent of the protection conferred by the 
provision.  
For example, owing to the fluidity in interpretation of “unfair commercial use,” 
some academics have concluded that the expression is not synonymous with exclusive 
proprietary rights. Peter Yu concludes that the scope of Article 39(3) is limited, in that it 
does not offer broad protection of test data but includes the following narrow conditions: 
1) protection against unfair competition, which does not create exclusive rights in data; 
                                                          
329
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and 2) protection for products that utilize new chemical entities, such that the provision 
should exclude entities that have been reformulated or sold for a new indication.
331
  
Similarly, in observing that Article 39(3) merely requires countries to protect data 
against “unfair commercial use,” Carlos Correa asserts that countries are not granted 
exclusive rights but instead have only the right to bring legal action against whoever has 
obtained commercial advantage through dishonest practices.
332
 If the underlying rationale 
of data exclusivity is indeed to allow innovative manufacturers to recover their costs of 
research and development, this purpose protects investment rather than a creative or 
inventive outcome, which would be contrary to the very purpose of intellectual property 
rights.
333
 Unlike the TRIPS provisions related to trademark and patent, Correa observes 
that Article 39 of TRIPS does not use language that confers ownership rights, thereby 
supporting the notion that innovative manufacturers do not have exclusivity rights to 
trade secrets and test data.
334
 In addition, Correa asserts that the interpretation of “unfair 
commercial use” must be based on the ordinary meaning of the words therein.335 Correa 
observes that there is no universal rule to determine whether certain practices should be 
deemed unfair, since different countries will likely judge certain situations differently in 
accordance with their values and competitive advantage.
336
 Thus, Article 39(3) only 
applies when a competitor obtains a benefit or advantage as a result from unfair 
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commercial practices, in which it is the qualification of the practice that is relevant rather 
than the mere existence of an advantage or benefit.
337
  
In addition to interpretative issues surrounding Article 39(3) of TRIPS, another 
common concern among academics is the effects of the dual application of patent 
protection and data exclusivity. For example, Trudo Lemmens and Candice Telfer assert 
that data exclusivity confers a de facto extension of patent protection, which should 
already have been fair compensation for the investment in drug development.
338
 This 
patent-style protection on pharmaceutical products forces generic manufacturers to: a) 
either wait until the period of data exclusivity has passed; or b) invest in clinical test data 
without receiving the same financial reward that innovators receive from patent.
339
 
Jerome Reichman similarly contends that longer terms of data exclusivity do not actually 
create greater incentives for conducting clinical trials, since they essentially allow 
innovative manufacturers to “have it both ways,” without accounting for the excess 
profits yielded, in many cases, by the overlapping patent and data exclusivity regimes.
340
 
Yu thus asserts that, while the costs of clinical trials remain high and consist of a major 
portion of research and development costs for new drugs, innovative manufacturers have 
considerable incentives under the patent system, thereby rendering the need for data 
exclusivity laws to be “economically dubious.”341 
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There is merit in the concerns regarding the legitimacy of data exclusivity with 
respect to the “bargain” at the heart of intellectual property law. Data exclusivity laws 
confer exclusive rights in a manner akin to patent protection despite the differences 
between these regimes with respect to the public knowledge contributed by an innovator 
in exchange for a market monopoly. In Canada, for example, notwithstanding a 
confidentiality period of eighteen months that begins on the date of filing,
342
 all patents, 
patent applications, and documents that are filed in connection with patents or 
applications are subject to public access and scrutiny.
343
 Patent is thus not a restraint on 
free competition. By contributing a new and useful technical achievement that others in 
the relevant field could not themselves have developed, disclosing the invention to the 
public in exchange for a legal monopoly actually helps to elevate the existing state of 
competition to the next highest level.
344
 In this way, public disclosure of an invention not 
only encourages people with the appropriate skills to innovate but also contributes to the 
education of the public at large. Owing to the requirement for direct public disclosure, it 
is therefore arguable that patent protection does promote creative outcomes in accordance 
with the purpose of intellectual property law.  
However, it is more difficult to justify data exclusivity on the same grounds. 
Since innovative drug manufacturers are not required to publicly disclose their clinical 
                                                          
342
 Patent Act, supra note 74, s 10(2)-(3):  
…(2) Except with the approval of the applicant, an application for a patent, or a 
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trial data, the characterization of clinical trial data as a proprietary asset to which 
innovative manufacturers maintain exclusive rights seems to lack social utility that is 
readily apparent. Pamela Andanda also observes that data exclusivity may impede efforts 
by clinical researchers and regulatory authorities to share information that may 
potentially benefit clinical research participants, which constitutes a public health 
concern that has been “overshadowed” by the innovative industry’s preoccupation with 
preventing competition from generic manufacturers.
345
  
In addition, the notion that generic manufacturers are free to conduct their own 
clinical trials may be illusory owing to both financial and ethical concerns. Generic 
manufacturers, by definition, do not have a patent which allows them to monopolize the 
market and so would not be able to charge consumers sufficient amounts of money to 
recoup the huge costs of clinical trials.
346
 Moreover, having a generic manufacturer repeat 
a pre-existing trial simply for the sake of conducting its own trial would ultimately deny 
some patients access to medicines
347
 and would submit research participants to 
unnecessary duplicate testing, which would be ethically problematic for patients who are 
asked to participate in placebo-controlled trials.
348
 Yu therefore declares that there are 
serious moral implications for introducing data exclusivity laws that would delay the 
entry of pharmaceuticals that would otherwise become readily available at the end of a 
patent term.
349
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2.4.5. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Conclusion 
Based on the above review of the literature on data exclusivity, one can conclude 
that the nature of data exclusivity remains unclear, in a manner similar to the uncertainty 
surrounding the nature of confidential information. What is clear, however, is that the 
characterization of data exclusivity depends on the perspective of the particular advocate, 
since persuasive arguments have been made by both proponents and opponents of the 
protection. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next chapter, data exclusivity has 
been implemented in a way such that the generating entities of clinical trial data maintain 
exclusive rights of control for the term of protection.  
Data exclusivity and patent protection function in similar ways through the grant 
of limited term monopolies. Some academics view data exclusivity as necessary to 
reward innovation and thus protect public health through the development of new 
medicines, while other commentators criticize data exclusivity as a detriment to public 
health by hindering access to medicines. Despite this debate over the purpose and impact 
of data exclusivity, however, this thesis established in the previous discussion of the 
nature of confidential information that the secrecy of confidential information has the 
potential to continue indefinitely. In contrast, since data exclusivity protection endures 
for a limited time, it can be considered as a limitation on secrecy for information that 
would otherwise remain forever secret. Classifying clinical trial data, such that it fits 
within the scope of data exclusivity protection and not that of trade secrets,
350
 leads to the 
situation where the initial restriction on access to information ultimately results in a 
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greater benefit – access to otherwise permanently secret information – than would be 
obtained had the protection not existed in the first place.  
 
2.5. Uniting the Constructs: Confidential Information, Data Exclusivity, and 
Personal Data Protection in the Context of Clinical Trials 
 
 The law of confidential information and data exclusivity protection concern the 
secrecy and maintenance of control over information, which often can be in direct 
opposition with public interest outcomes. By delaying the entry of cheaper drugs into the 
market, data exclusivity can contribute to financial barriers in accessing affordable 
medicines. Deschamps J., writing for the minority in the Merck Frosst case, observed that 
“access to information may be becoming the favourite battleground of innovative and 
generic drug manufacturers.”351 The struggle between innovative and generic 
manufacturers over the issue of confidential information generated in clinical trials for 
new drugs constitutes one illustrative example of the different, yet compelling, interests 
of the multiple stakeholders that compete for control over the same information.  
 However, the discourse regarding data exclusivity is so focused on the struggle 
between the interests of innovative and generic manufacturers, access to medicines, and 
public health outcomes that it has neglected to consider the interest of another key 
stakeholder: that of the individual clinical trial participants with respect to their personal 
information. The failure to account for personal data protection is evident since no 
authors, whether or not they support or oppose data exclusivity protection, have 
addressed the reality that patient health information is collected in clinical trials and 
necessarily constitutes part of the same set of test data. Thus, it is also necessary to 
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clarify the individual patient’s rights of control with respect to this data. The lack of 
guidance on this issue accordingly forms the basis of the research question of this thesis: 
whether the regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently 
with each other in terms of the rights that they protect. 
 
2.5.1. Personal Data Protection and the Individual’s Right to Control Information 
Wilkinson, who has written extensively in the area of personal data protection,
352
 
argues that the role of personal data protection has been largely misunderstood by both 
the public and courts alike, owing to its overlapping vocabulary with privacy law.
353
 
While privacy has been commonly understood as “the right to be let alone,”354 this classic 
understanding of privacy does not clarify the nature of privacy but makes a claim to legal 
or normative status.
355
 Instead, Wilkinson asserts that privacy may be better understood 
as a “state of being let alone” and further notes that there are important differences 
between privacy and personal data protection.
356
 Personal data protection is restricted to 
issues related to data, whereas privacy encompasses interests beyond informational 
privacy.
357
 Moreover, whereas personal data protection is confined by statute to 
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information about an identifiable individual,
358
 privacy encompasses rights to refuse to 
divulge any information held by an individual that the individual wishes to keep secret, 
including information about the individual.
359
  
Wilkinson thus argues that personal data protection legislation is designed to 
regulate organizations that obtain information about individuals from various sources.
360
 
Rather than regulating the flow of information between individuals in society,
361
 personal 
data protection laws maintain a balance between individual privacy interests and the 
access of personal information by organizations once an individual “has had information 
about herself or himself come into the hands of an organization governed by [personal 
data protection] legislation.”362 This interpretation of the goal of personal data protection 
is supported by the language used to articulate the purpose of Canada’s federal private 
sector personal data protection statute, PIPEDA: 
The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology 
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to 
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that 
recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal 
information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal 
information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in 
the circumstances [emphases added].
363
 
 
 The above provision of PIPEDA reflects the reality that personal information does 
not always remain exclusively in the hands of the individual. Furthermore, personal data 
protection acknowledges that there can be legitimate interests, other than that of the 
individual, involved with respect to access, use, and dissemination of this information. 
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Both Wilkinson and Mark Perry have thus noted that, while personal data protection is 
closely related to privacy law, there is also a distinction between these two constructs 
with respect to the flow of information.
364
 Whereas privacy law focuses on reinforcing a 
person’s desire for informational seclusion,365 personal data protection laws assume that 
the individual’s personal information is not being held privately by the individual but has 
already made its way into the possession of an organization.
366
 Thus, personal data 
protection is concerned with the flow of information between individuals and 
organizations: instead of regulating whether information can be gathered from individuals 
or about individuals, personal data protection regulates how information is to be gathered 
about individuals.
367
  
Since personal data protection statutes also restrict the scope of organizations’ 
abilities to use and disseminate the collected information, Wilkinson argues that these 
statutes are an extension of the law of confidence, in which personal data protection laws 
mandate a relationship of confidence “between individuals providing information about 
themselves to organizations and the affected organizations.”368 Indeed, the “essence” of 
the protection of confidential information, privacy, and personal data protection is to 
“exclude others completely from access.”369 However, the individual’s entitlement to 
confidentiality in information that is supplied to organizations is limited, under personal 
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data protection legislation, to confidences that involve information that is identified with 
that individual.
370
 Wilkinson observes that this narrow scope of legal protection for 
confidentiality likely constitutes the source of conceptual confusion between personal 
data protection and privacy.
371
  
 James Moor has noted that there are situations in which people may not have 
direct control over the exchange of their personal information but there is no loss of 
privacy.
372
 For example, personal information that is confided to a doctor may be shared 
with other medical professionals in the course of normal medical practice, and 
individuals also have little control over the way their personal information is stored on 
computer databases.
373
 Moor’s observations are consistent with personal data protection 
laws, in that these laws do not promote the absolute secrecy of information but instead 
preserve an individual’s right to confidentiality of personal information by providing 
controls over the ways in which organizations can collect, use, and disclose the 
individual’s personal information. Furthermore, the ability of, say, the health care system 
to function effectively depends on the accuracy, completeness, and availability of health 
data: all participants in the health care system, including regulators and health care 
providers require high-quality information for informed decision-making.
374
 Personal 
data protection is accordingly concerned with both access and secrecy of personal 
information. 
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2.5.2. The Right to Control One’s Personal Information: The Importance of Consent 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that an individual has an interest in 
the control of his or her personal information, which persists despite the fact that the 
information may be in the possession of another person or entity. The 1992 case 
McInerney v. MacDonald (“McInerney”)375 concerned a patient’s right of access to 
information in his or her medical records. The Supreme Court of Canada held that in the 
absence of regulatory legislation,
376
 patients are entitled, upon request, to inspect and 
copy all the information in their medical files which was considered in the administration 
of medical advice or treatment.
377
 According to LaForest J., the physician, institution, or 
clinic that compiles the medical records owns the physical records.
378
 However, LaForest 
J. also acknowledged that patients disclose sensitive information about the personal 
aspects of their lives when they approach a physician for health care. This information is 
“highly private and personal to the individual” and “goes to the personal integrity and 
autonomy of the patient.”379 Since information in a person’s medical records is 
essentially information about that person’s body, such information “remains in a 
fundamental sense one’s own, for the individual to communicate or retain as he or she 
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sees fit.”380 While an individual may decide to make personal information available to 
others to obtain benefits such as medical advice and treatment, the person has a “basic 
and continuing interest in what happens to this information, and in controlling access to 
it.”381 LaForest J. observed:  
The fiduciary duty to provide access to medical records is ultimately grounded in 
the nature of the patient's interest in his or her records…information about 
oneself revealed to a doctor acting in a professional capacity remains, in a 
fundamental sense, one’s own. The doctor’s position is one of trust and 
confidence. The information conveyed is held in a fashion somewhat akin to a 
trust. While the physician is the owner of the actual record, the information is to 
be used by the physician for the benefit of the patient. The confiding of the 
information to the physician gives rise to an expectation that the patient’s interest 
in and control of the information will continue.
382  
 
 LaForest J.’s statements emphasize the fundamental importance of the ability to 
control the information about oneself. This control is reflected in current personal data 
protection legislation in the health context.
383
 Personal health information protection 
statutes generally require individual consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of an 
individual’s personal health information,384 and the individual is also entitled to access a 
record of his or her personal health information.
385
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2.5.3. Personal Information Protection: A Matter of Control and Not Ownership 
The concept of a fundamental interest in and right to control one’s personal health 
information, as conceived by LaForest J. in McInerney and addressed in personal data 
protection statutes, raises the question of the definition of “control” itself. Solove 
observes that control over information is sometimes viewed as synonymous to ownership 
of the information, in which property in personal information is justified on the basis that 
personal information is an extension of one’s personality or “selfhood.”386 Advocates for 
the recognition of property rights in health data have asserted that private ownership 
would increase patients’ power to block the unwanted use of their data and facilitate the 
wider availability of data for clinical and research uses.
387
 
 It is not clear what patient ownership of personal health information would entail 
in practice. Barbara Evans notes that, with respect to the issue of consensual access, use, 
and disclosure of personal data, the concept of property ownership in personal 
information fails to account for the reality that having a property right does not 
necessarily ensure its indefinite protection.
388
 Although personal data protection laws are 
intended to give individuals a right to control and access their personal information, they 
clearly do not confer an absolute right of control upon the individual with respect to his 
or her personal data. For example, an individual’s right to access a personal health 
information record is subject to certain limitations, including situations where the record 
is subject to a legal privilege or where other legislation or a court order prohibits 
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disclosure to the individual.
389
 In addition, despite the general requirement for individual 
consent to disclosure of personal health information, there are some circumstances in 
which this information may be disclosed without the individual’s consent, particularly 
when this disclosure would protect the public. For example, Ontario’s Personal Health 
Information Protection Act (“PHIPA”) authorizes the disclosure of personal health 
information where such disclosure is necessary to eliminate or minimize the risk of harm 
to “a person or group of persons.”390 The limits on the extent to which one can control 
one’s information under personal data protection legislation recognizes that there can be 
at least two, potentially competing interests with compelling claims to information.  
In accordance with the traditional conception of privacy which emphasizes the 
ability to control information about oneself,
391
 personal data protection ensures that 
organizations maintain the confidentiality of personal health information. On the other 
hand, exceptions to the confidentiality of personal health information acknowledge that 
an organization is sometimes justified to access, use, and disclose the information in 
fulfilment of another legitimate purpose. Regardless of whether one believes that 
personal information should be classified as property “owned” by the individual, the 
reality is that no personal data protection legislation has endorsed the notion that there is 
ownership in personal information. Instead, an individual has a “right” to control his or 
her personal information, which can be limited in certain circumstances. The question of 
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who owns the data is thus less important than the question of the rights and 
responsibilities of those who hold the data.
392
 
The ability to control one’s personal information is especially relevant in a digital 
world, where information can be shared instantaneously across multiple jurisdictions. 
Protecting the confidentiality of medical records is essential since health information “is 
perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an 
individual.”393 Lawrence Gostin, writing in 1995, observed that most individual health 
records were kept manually in “voluminous paper files”394 but asserted that “future health 
care information infrastructure will not merely contain automated records within each 
relevant institution” but would “electronically connect each of the vital components of 
the health care system, permitting the rapid exchange of health information.”395  
Patricia Goodman, writing in 2012, observed that Canadian jurisdictions were in 
the process of creating pan-provincial and territorial electronic health record networks, in 
respect of which the provinces and territories were at various stages of converting records 
containing personal health information into electronic form.
396
 Goodman found that 
individual consent to the collection of personal health information into electronic health 
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records from non-electronic records was not required by any Canadian jurisdiction.
397
 
Moreover, Michelle Gordon, writing in 2010, identified three potential privacy concerns 
associated with electronic health records – surveillance,398 aggregation,399 and secondary 
use
400
 – that, if not adequately addressed in legislation and policy, could cause 
individuals to lose control over their personal information in a digital environment.
401
 
Current technological realities with respect to the ways that personal health information is 
stored, handled, and processed by organizations thus support the notion that, instead of 
relying on ownership of personal health information to preserve an individual’s right to 
control this information, it is far more important to clarify the duties of organizations that 
have custody of personal health information with respect to the circumstances in which 
the information can be used and shared.   
A clinical trial participant is wronged when there is improper disclosure of his or 
her data. For example, the inappropriate disclosure of patient health information can lead 
to negative social consequences, such as stigma or discrimination directed toward 
individuals who are identified as having mental illness or HIV infection or who engage in 
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activities such as sex work or substance abuse.
402
 Moreover, with respect to the risks and 
benefits of disclosing information, some researchers observe that decisions by policy 
makers and committees do not usually consider subjective personal distinctions but 
instead instigate sweeping actions that apply to everyone in the same manner.
403
 While 
sharing information about sexual abuse, abortion, or depression medication may be 
liberating for one person, it may be harmful to another.
404
 It is important to expressly 
define the criteria for identifiability, since data such as the sex, age, and geographic 
location of research participants can reveal participants’ identities if they are triangulated 
with other databases.
405
 Eloise Gratton has accordingly noted that it is not always clear at 
what point a particular piece of data can be said to “identify” an individual.406 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 Ultimately, the goal of this chapter was to illustrate the tension between access 
and secrecy of information. To achieve this purpose, this chapter explored the law of 
confidential information and the protection afforded to different types of confidential 
information. The theoretical background regarding the nature of the various concepts 
discussed in this chapter (confidential information, the regulation of medicines, data 
exclusivity, and personal data protection) demonstrates the reality that multiple 
stakeholders can have different but persuasive claims to access and control the same set 
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of information. With respect to confidential information, these claims are best understood 
in terms of rights of control rather than ownership. Indeed, the law of confidential 
information in Canada is such that the protection of confidential information is based on 
the duty of confidence. Data exclusivity provisions in trade agreements do not mention 
ownership of data, and Canadian personal data protection legislation, such as PIPEDA, 
does not protect personal information based on ownership but instead recognizes the 
“right of privacy of individuals.”407  
However, despite the essential role of individual clinical trial participants in 
pharmaceutical innovation, the importance of personal data protection and the rights of 
the individual to control personal information have been completely forgotten in the 
theoretical discourse on data exclusivity. This situation accordingly raises questions 
about whether the individual’s right to control personal data, though subject to certain 
limitations, is also abrogated by the operation of data exclusivity laws. Chapter Three 
will focus on the implementation of data exclusivity and personal data protection in 
Canada. In particular, the chapter will consist of an analysis of the legislative provisions 
of data exclusivity followed by their interpretation in recent Canadian case law. 
Subsequently, the chapter will offer an analysis and discussion of Canadian public and 
private sector personal data protection legislation and health-specific personal data 
protection statutes in order to determine whether the legislative regimes of data 
exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently with each other in Canadian 
law. 
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Chapter 3 – Data Exclusivity and Personal Data Protection in Canada 
3.1. Data Exclusivity in Canadian Legislation 
Just as “data exclusivity” is not legally defined in international instruments, it is 
also not a defined term in Canadian law. As this chapter will demonstrate, the term “data 
exclusivity” has largely been used in relation to the practical effects of the protection on 
the flow of the information generated in clinical trials.  
Canada’s data exclusivity laws arise from the authority granted by Parliament to 
the Governor in Council under the Food and Drugs Act, in which section 30(3) confers 
power upon the Governor in Council to enact regulations that expressly implement 
Canada’s data exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA: 
Without limiting the power conferred by any other subsection of this section, the 
Governor in Council may make any regulations that the Governor in Council 
considers necessary for the purpose of implementing, in relation to drugs, 
Article 1711 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and paragraph 3 
of Article 39 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement [emphases 
added].
408
  
 
Thus, it is clear that data exclusivity is not a Canadian conception but was instead forced 
upon Canada in the course of trade negotiations. The Food and Drugs Act is the enabling 
statute of the Food and Drug Regulations, which contain Canada’s data exclusivity 
provisions. There have been two different versions of this framework since Canada’s data 
exclusivity obligations first arose under TRIPS and NAFTA in the 1990s. The following 
section will describe the former version of these provisions and how judicial 
interpretation of the language therein ultimately led to amendments which resulted in 
Canada’s current regulatory scheme. 
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3.1.1. Implementing Data Exclusivity into Canadian Legislation: Judicial 
Interpretation of the First Regulation 
 
Canada introduced its first data exclusivity framework in 1995.
409
 Under this 
framework, section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations mandated a 
minimum period of five years with respect to reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s 
data:  
Where a manufacturer files a new drug submission, an abbreviated new drug 
submission, a supplement to a new drug submission or a supplement to an 
abbreviated new drug submission for the purpose of establishing the safety and 
effectiveness of the new drug for which the submission or supplement is filed, and 
the Minister examines any information or material filed with the Minister, in a new 
drug submission, by the innovator of a drug that contains a chemical or biological 
substance not previously approved for sale in Canada as a drug, and the Minister, 
in support of the manufacturer’s submission or supplement, relies on data 
contained in the information or material filed by the innovator, the Minister 
shall not issue a notice of compliance in respect of that submission or 
supplement earlier than five years after the date of issuance to the innovator 
of the notice of compliance or approval to market that drug, as the case may 
be, issued on the basis of the information or material filed by the innovator for that 
drug [emphases added].
410
 
 
At first glance, this first version of section C.08.004.1 appears to be consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA, particularly with respect to the specified 
minimum period of protection mandated by Article 1711(6) of NAFTA. However, 
judicial interpretation of this provision considerably weakened data exclusivity protection 
for innovative manufacturers. 
For example, the applicability of section C.08.004.1 concerning the Minister’s 
reliance upon an innovative manufacture’s data was debated in Bayer Inc. v. Minister of 
Health.
411
 Specifically, the issue was whether the Minister would need to rely on data 
contained in an innovative manufacturer’s NDS to establish the safety and efficacy of a 
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second manufacturer’s drug, thereby triggering the application of section C.08.004.1 and 
thus imposing a delay of five years upon the second manufacturer. Bayer Inc. (“Bayer”) 
argued that, if a second manufacturer filed an ANDS naming Bayer’s drug as the 
Canadian Reference Product, the Minister would, inevitably, nearly always rely on the 
data contained in Bayer’s NDS because an NOC would only have been issued to Bayer 
based on the safety and efficacy information in the NDS. Conversely, counsel for the 
Minister of Health argued that the Minister relies on the information contained in the 
ANDS itself without referring to materials previously filed by the innovative 
manufacturer. 
Evans J. ultimately agreed with the Minister of Health. With respect to the scope 
of section C.08.004.1, he concluded: 
“…this provision was not intended to create a protection analogous to a patent for 
the benefit of nearly all the innovators of new drugs who have obtained a NOC. I do 
not accept the submission that the Minister “relies” on the innovator’s information 
for the purposes of C.08.004.1 when considering an ANDS or a NOC, where the 
Minister issues the NOC solely on the basis of the information contained in the 
ANDS…the word adverb “indirectly” should not be read into C.08.004.1(1) so 
as to broaden the scope of the verb “relies” [emphasis added].412 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal subsequently upheld the decision of Evans J. and also 
rejected the notion that the Minister could not issue an NOC to a second manufacturer 
earlier than five years after the issuance of an NOC to an innovative manufacturer.
413
 The 
Court observed that the minimum five year protection under section C.08.004.1(1) would 
not apply if the second manufacturer could demonstrate in an ANDS that its drug was the 
pharmaceutical and bioequivalent of the innovator manufacturer’s drug. The protection 
would thus apply only if the Minister “examines and relies upon information filed by the 
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innovator in its NDS,” since the safety and efficacy of the drug would only be established 
by reference to confidential information provided by the innovative manufacturer.
414
 The 
Court accordingly rejected Bayer’s argument that the Minister implicitly examined and 
relied on confidential information in a NDS whenever an ANDS is filed by a second 
manufacturer. Instead, the Court concluded that the regulation merely contemplated that 
the Minister “may or may not examine and rely upon confidential information filed by 
the innovator,” since to read the provision otherwise would effectively grant a minimum 
five-year market protection to an innovative manufacturer when an ANDS was filed by a 
second manufacturer.
415
 
The Bayer decision thus authorized the issuance of an NOC to a generic drug 
manufacturer as soon as the manufacturer was able to establish, on the basis of an ANDS, 
that its product was equivalent to an innovative manufacturer’s drug. Since this narrow 
interpretation of the data exclusivity regulation would essentially result in the non-
application of the minimum five-year term of protection to an innovative manufacturer’s 
data in many, if not most, cases,
416
 the Bayer case significantly weakened data exclusivity 
protection in Canada and, arguably, favoured generic manufacturers at the expense of 
innovative manufacturers.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Bayer decision led to tension between the U.S. and 
Canada with respect to Canada’s data exclusivity obligations. In 2003, the U.S. included 
                                                          
414
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Canada on the Watch List in its Special 301 Report.
417
 The report claimed that Canada 
“does not provide effective data exclusivity protections, and systematic inadequacies in 
Canadian administrative and judicial procedures allow entry of infringing generic 
versions of patented medicines into the marketplace.”418 This view of Canadian data 
exclusivity law was also consistent with that of some legal commentators, who called the 
judicial reasoning in Bayer “flawed in several ways”: aside from the fact that the meaning 
of the word “rely” in the English language does not mean “review” or “examine,” the 
right to exclusive use of data is consistent with one of the key purposes of the data 
exclusivity regulation, which is to encourage the testing and entry of new drugs into the 
marketplace.
419
 
In response to these criticisms, Canada’s federal government announced proposed 
amendments to the data exclusivity framework in December 2004, and acknowledged 
that Canada had not implemented its data exclusivity obligations in a manner that 
“automatically” prohibited reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data for a minimum 
period of time.
420
 The new data exclusivity regulation, which came into force on October 
5, 2006,
421
 constitutes the current state of data exclusivity protection in Canada. 
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3.1.2. Strengthening Data Exclusivity in Canada: The Data Protection Regulation  
The amended section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations, now known 
as the “Data Protection Regulation” (“DPR”), has expanded the scope of data exclusivity 
protection. For instance, section C.08.004.1(3) reads: 
If a manufacturer seeks a notice of compliance for a new drug on the basis of a 
direct or indirect comparison between the new drug and an innovative drug, 
(a) the manufacturer may not file a new drug submission, a supplement to a new 
drug submission, an abbreviated new drug submission or a supplement to an 
abbreviated new drug submission in respect of the new drug before the end of a 
period of six years after the day on which the first notice of compliance was issued 
to the innovator in respect of the innovative drug; and 
(b) the Minister shall not approve that submission or supplement and shall not 
issue a notice of compliance in respect of the new drug before the end of a period 
of eight years after the day on which the first notice of compliance was issued to the 
innovator in respect of the innovative drug [emphases added].
422  
  
The amendments strengthen data exclusivity in a number of ways. First, under 
section C.08.004.1(3), it is now the manufacturer’s reliance that is relevant rather than 
that of the Minister. This provision essentially incorporates the appellant’s position in 
Bayer with respect to reliance of a generic manufacturer on an innovative manufacturer’s 
NDS materials, in that an ANDS “will merely purport to establish that [the generic 
manufacturer’s] drug is the pharmaceutical equivalent and bioequivalent” of the 
innovative drug, and “will not contain any independent evidence of the safety and 
effectiveness” of the generic product.423 Furthermore, section C.08.004.1(3) expressly 
includes the notion of “indirect” reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data, thereby 
clarifying interpretive difficulties regarding actual or “implied” reliance. Perhaps most 
striking, the amended section now confers a total protection period of eight years, 
compared to the five years under the previous regulation, with mandatory delays on the 
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filing of submissions and issuance of an NOC. For a six-year period, a generic 
manufacturer cannot file any submission to seek regulatory approval, and the provision 
also prohibits the Minister of Health from issuing an NOC to a generic manufacturer for 
an additional two years after the six-year period elapses. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are differences between TRIPS and NAFTA 
with respect to the mandated length of data exclusivity protection. While NAFTA 
requires member states to grant a five-year minimum term of protection, TRIPS does not 
mandate a minimum term of data exclusivity protection and instead leaves member states 
free to address the issue according to their own preferences. However, there is 
nonetheless an important similarity between both agreements regarding the permitted 
scope of intellectual property protection, since both TRIPS and NAFTA authorize their 
member states to enact more extensive protection than that required therein.
424
 Where 
there is a mandatory minimum period of protection and if the phrase “more extensive” 
protection also encompasses the length of protection, member states are within their legal 
rights to select and implement a term that exceeds the minimum requirement into their 
domestic legislation. However, if the purpose of a regulatory regime in the 
pharmaceutical context is to protect public health, the state government has a duty to 
consider the potential impact of any proposed legislation on the citizens of the state. Such 
policy issues are also an essential factor in the determination of the appropriate length of 
data exclusivity protection in Canadian legislation. 
                                                          
424
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Before passage of the new data exclusivity regime, Health Canada accepted 
submissions from various interested parties to ascertain the regulatory impact of the 
proposed amendments to the DPR. Health Canada received representations from 43 
stakeholders, including innovative and generic manufacturers and their trade associations, 
members of parliament, law firms, provincial and territorial Ministers of Health, and 
consumer groups.
425
 These submissions reflected a clear difference in perspectives 
between the innovative and generic pharmaceutical industries with respect to the 
appropriate duration of data exclusivity protection. The generic drug industry objected to 
the proposed eight-year term, observing that this term would impose a delay on generic 
approval for a period that was three years longer than that mandated by NAFTA and in 
other jurisdictions such as the U.S.
426
 In contrast, the innovative drug industry supported 
the eight-year term of protection but encouraged the government to adopt a period of 
protection consistent with that of the European Union,
427
 which had, since November 30, 
2005, begun to offer a ten-year term of protection with the possibility of an extension to 
eleven years for new therapeutic indications.
428
 Therefore, although Pei-Kan Yang 
suggests that Canada may have “overreacted” in its attempt to improve compliance with 
TRIPS and NAFTA,
429
 Canada’s eight-year term of protection actually constitutes a 
midpoint between five years and eleven years, thus reflecting an apparent effort to strike 
a balance between the two divergent terms of protection recommended by the innovative 
and generic drug industries. 
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3.1.3. Judicial Interpretation of the Data Protection Regulation in Canadian Case Law 
In Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Health),
430
 
Canada’s new 2006 DPR was challenged on the basis that the protection was ultra vires 
the federal legislative authority. Mandamin J. of the Federal Court addressed the 
following substantive issues: a) whether the DPR was intra vires the federal legislative 
powers pursuant to subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867; b) whether the DPR 
and subsection 30(3) of the Food and Drugs Act were intra vires the federal legislative 
powers (as matters of national concern or the general regulation of trade and commerce); 
and c) whether the DPR was invalid owing to lack of rational connection to authority 
granted under section 30(3) of the Food and Drugs Act or because section 30(3) was an 
impermissible sub-delegation by Parliament.
431
  
Notably, this case illustrates the tension between the innovative and generic drug 
industries with respect to the nature and scope of data exclusivity protection. The first 
applicant, the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA),
432
 emphasized the 
importance of low-cost generic drugs.
433
 The ability of generic manufacturers to receive 
market approval for their drugs plays an essential role in controlling drug prices in 
Canada, since upon market entry, the price of a generic drug is typically 30-50% below 
that of an innovative drug. The CGPA accordingly estimates that the monopoly imposed 
by the DPR cost the healthcare system $500 million in lost savings. Secondly, the CGPA 
asserted that, where the generic manufacturer submits an ANDS, the Minister does not 
actually rely on an innovative manufacturer’s clinical and pre-clinical studies in assessing 
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the safety and efficacy of a generic drug.
434
 Instead, both the generic manufacturer and 
the Minister rely on: a) the fact that an NOC has previously been issued for a Canadian 
Reference Product; b) the fact that the Canadian Reference Product is being marketed in 
Canada; and c) the information and material in the ANDS. With respect to the validity of 
the DPR, Mandamin J. noted the CGPA’s claims that the DPR was beyond the scope of 
subsection 30(3): 
Permitted regulations must not restrict the authority conferred elsewhere in the 
Act, they must only apply to trade secrets or undisclosed data, and must affect 
only the person who “relies on” such data, and only for a “reasonable period”, 
normally five years. The Data Protection Regulation exceeds these limitations; it 
creates a new intellectual property regime without statutory authority.
435
 
 
On the other hand, Canada argued that the DPR was intra vires the federal 
legislative powers under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In particular, 
Canada asserted that the protection of public health and safety is a valid exercise of the 
federal government’s criminal law power, and that the DPR contributes to the protection 
of public health and safety. By prohibiting all drugs except those that have been proven to 
be safe and effective, the DPR constitutes an integral part of the overall scheme 
concerning the marketing of drugs in Canada. In its submission, Canada emphasized the 
public safety elements of the Food and Drug Regulations, including the goal of 
“minimizing the potential for marketing unsafe drugs while maximizing the potential for 
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safe drugs to be readily accessible in the market”436 and the requirement for exhaustive, 
complete, and accurate information on the safety and effectiveness of a new drug.”437 
Moreover, Canada acknowledged the issue of balance between the interests of 
generic and innovative manufacturers. In providing for an abbreviated process to prove 
the safety and efficacy of a new drug, the regulatory scheme also provides for 
competition in the marketplace by lowering the cost of drugs for the public and reducing 
the testing required for human subjects. Nevertheless, the abbreviated process must be 
subject to constraints (through data exclusivity) in order to avoid reducing the number of 
submissions for approval for innovative drugs. While these constraints may appear to 
relate to unfair commercial practices that would fall within the scope of provincial 
legislative powers, they are an essential component of the overall scheme of criminal law 
and are implemented to protect public safety. 
In the end, contrary to the perspective of the CGPA, Mandamin J. observed that 
making a generic version of an approved drug circumvents the need to generate the 
requisite research and clinical data. Proof of safety and efficacy of a generic drug by 
comparing it to a Canadian Reference Product thus “necessarily relies on the earlier NDS 
information” submitted by an innovative manufacturer.438 In reaching this conclusion, 
Mandamin J. noted the perspective of Binnie J. of the Supreme Court of Canada with 
respect to reliance on an innovator’s submission: 
Generally speaking, the “second person” intends to manufacture and distribute a 
“copy-cat” version of the active medicinal ingredient. If it copies the approved 
product, it can rely on the safety and efficacy data and the clinical studies 
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submitted by the “innovator” first person. Such reliance reduces the amount of 
required supporting data and the approval time, and the shortened submission is 
therefore known as an Abbreviated NDS (ANDS).
439
 
 
Mandamin J.’s conclusion with respect to reliance makes logical sense. Although 
the Minister may review the ANDS material without having to refer to the original NDS 
submission, the reality is such that the evidence in the ANDS would not exist but for the 
Canadian Reference Product with which to compare the generic drug. This interpretation 
is accordingly consistent with the perspective of Lietzan, mentioned in Chapter Two, who 
asserted that there should be no question of reliance where an abbreviated submission 
uses the “fact” of the innovator’s approval as a comparison.440 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the protection of confidential information 
appears to lack a public interest
441
 component. Although this thesis has proposed that data 
exclusivity actually provides a limitation on the potentially perpetual secrecy of 
confidential information, this approach to the purpose of data exclusivity may provide 
little consolation in practice since longer periods of data exclusivity protection do 
contribute to delays in the market entry of cheaper, generic drugs. These delays result in 
the monopoly of more expensive medications, which affects access to affordable 
medicines and thus constitutes a public health issue. Perhaps owing to this reality, 
Mandamin J. made the following observation:  
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The Data Protection Regulation does not directly add to public safety since it 
postpones the introduction of lower cost generic drugs. The [Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement] states that the Data Protection Regulation is to encourage 
innovator drug manufacturers, or at least allow them to recover their investment, 
and thereby foster innovators to develop new drugs. However, the evidence on 
this point is more of a logical assertion than a clear demonstration that innovators 
are not or will not bring forward new drugs for approval without the provision 
[emphasis added].
442
 
 
The connection between data exclusivity and protection of the public health may 
be only theoretical. Nevertheless, perhaps there is merit in the argument that intellectual 
property rights enforcement is highly influential, if not outright determinative, in 
choosing the appropriate location for pharmaceutical research and development. For 
example, Michael Ravvin has noted that of the 1,556 new drugs that received market 
approval during the period from 1975 to 2004, only 21 drugs (barely greater than 1% of 
the total), targeted “neglected” tropical diseases.443 Ravvin has also observed that 
pharmaceutical research and development is devoted almost exclusively to diseases 
prevalent in affluent countries, because innovative companies have no incentive to invest 
in research and development in poor countries that cannot support monopoly drug 
prices.
444
  
Mandamin J. observed that protecting public health and safety is a valid exercise 
of the federal government’s criminal law power, and that the regulatory drug scheme in 
the Food and Drug Regulations was “unquestionably valid criminal law legislation.” The 
contravention of either the Food and Drugs Act or the Food and Drug Regulations can 
result in liability for penalties including fines and imprisonment: 
Subject to sections 31.1, 31.2 and 31.4, every person who contravenes any of the 
provisions of this Act or of the regulations, or fails to do anything the person was 
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ordered to do by an inspector under section 25 or 27.2, is guilty of an offence and 
liable 
(a) on summary conviction for a first offence to a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both and, 
for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both; and 
(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.
445
 
 
  However, notwithstanding that the overall regulatory scheme of drugs falls 
within federal authority, Mandamin J. concluded that the DPR was not a public safety 
provision and was thus not intra vires the federal law criminal powers. In particular, 
Mandamin J. observed that the regulation of drug marketing has a “very significant 
impact in the area of commerce.”446 Thus, according to Mandamin J., the dominant 
feature of the DPR was the balancing of commercial considerations between the 
protection of an innovative manufacturer’s investment in preparing an NDS and the 
approval of a generic manufacturer’s ANDS for a lower cost generic copy of the same 
drug.
447
 The public health and safety aspect of the DPR therefore constituted an “adjunct 
rather than integral” part of the overall regulatory scheme.448 
 Nevertheless, Mandamin J. upheld the DPR as a valid exercise of the section 
91(2) regulation of trade and commerce.
449
 He noted that the DPR addresses a “genuine, 
national economic concern” because Canada’s implementation or failure to implement 
international trade agreements has a “national dimension that relates to Canada’s ability 
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to participate in world trade.”450 Furthermore, Mandamin J. stated that provincial 
legislatures cannot enact legislation that delays the approval of generic drugs for the 
market place. Provincial government approval for drugs for the marketplace would 
seriously encroach on federal criminal law powers to prohibit the marketing of drugs 
unless they have proven to be safe and effective. Finally, Mandamin J. held that the 
Governor in Council was properly delegated the authority to enact regulations and did not 
have indeterminate regulatory power to do so. Rather, Parliament has restricted the scope 
of the Governor in Council’s authority to a narrow area, since section 30(3) of the Food 
and Drugs Act expressly refers only to Article 1711 of NAFTA and paragraph 3 of 
Article 39 under TRIPS. The pith and substance of the DPR thus constitutes the balance 
regarding the commercial considerations between innovative and generic manufacturers 
that arise from the implementation of TRIPS and NAFTA. 
 At the appellate level, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 
Mandamin J.
451
 However, Nadon J.A. disagreed with Mandamin J.’s characterization of 
the pith and substance of the DPR. Whereas Mandamin J. had previously concluded that 
the protection of public safety was ancillary to the regulatory scheme, Nadon J.A. arrived 
at the opposite conclusion and asserted that the DPR must be interpreted in the context of 
the Food and Drug Regulations and its enabling statute.
452
 By granting innovative 
manufacturers an eight-year period of market protection, the DPR encourages research 
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451
 Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn v Canada (Minister of Health), 2010 FCA 334, [2012] 2 FCR 
618, aff’g 2009 FC 725, 348 FTR 29 (Eng), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No 54 
[Canadian Generic FCA]. 
452
 Interestingly, Mandamin J. also interpreted the DPR in light of the entirety of the regulatory scheme as 
provided by the Food and Drugs Act and the Food and Drug Regulations yet arrived at a completely 
different understanding of the purpose of the DPR. 
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and development for new drugs, which thereby constitutes a valid health and safety 
purpose. Nadon J.A. stated:  
The true purpose of the DPR is not to balance the commercial interests of 
innovators and generic drug manufacturers, but rather to ensure that Canadians 
have reasonable access, at reasonable prices, to new, safe and effective drugs…the 
Regulations as a whole encourage the research and development of new medicines 
that save lives, prevent diseases, heal and cure and improve the health of 
Canadians, who can only benefit from the discovery and development of new 
medicines after the information and data generated in extensive pre-clinical and 
clinical trials demonstrate the “innovative drug’s” safety and efficacy to the 
satisfaction of the Minister. The DPR plays an important part in this regulatory 
scheme.
453
 
 
 This interpretation of the DPR’s purpose was directly referenced by Stratas J.A. in 
Takeda Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (“Takeda”).454 Though the dispute in 
Takeda concerned the interpretation of the term “innovative drug” rather than the DPR at 
large, and Stratas J.A. also delivered the dissenting judgment, it is nevertheless important 
to note his judicial interpretation of the DPR’s purpose, particularly since he linked data 
exclusivity protection of an innovator’s investment to the public interest. In doing so, he 
observed that many new, safe, and efficacious drugs are now readily available to the 
public. However, “invisible” to the public are the “years of financial investment, effort, 
research, and testing, all undertaken with no assurance of success,” in which the entire 
process is filled with economic, scientific, and regulatory risk.
455
 Since drug 
manufacturers wish to maximize profits, greater risks and smaller potential rewards 
decrease the likelihood that drug manufacturers will invest in research and 
development.
456
 Accordingly, one area of risk concerns the “valuable” data generated by 
innovative manufacturers: if data that is submitted for regulatory approval can 
                                                          
453
 Canadian Generic FCA, supra note 451 at para 114. 
454
 2013 FCA 13; leave to appeal to the SCC refused, (2013) 460 NR 399. 
455
 Ibid at para 78. 
456
 Ibid at para 79. 
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immediately be used by competitors in order to obtain their own market approval, “what 
is the incentive for the innovator to innovate, submit data, and bring new drugs to 
market?”457 Stratas J.A. concluded that data exclusivity promotes innovation by altering 
the “risk-reward equation” for the innovator, who is then encouraged to research, 
discover, and develop new drugs.  
Since the public benefits from new ideas and inventions, Stratas J.A. observed 
that data exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA ensure that the protection is 
only conferred upon “new” chemical entities.458 This perspective of Stratas J.A. appears 
to reflect the balance sought by intellectual property law: since data exclusivity protects 
confidential information, a limited term monopoly is given to an innovator or “first 
mover” in exchange for a temporary interruption in the flow of valuable information. 
Data exclusivity accordingly brings back the “bargain” into the protection of confidential 
information, since it represents a break in the permanence of the secrecy therein.  
 The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canadian Generic and the 
dissenting opinion of Stratas J.A. in Takeda
459
 reiterate a common perspective of data 
exclusivity, in that data exclusivity protects investment and subsequently leads to 
economic reward, which in turn fosters the development and availability of life-saving 
drugs, thereby resulting in positive public health outcomes. Because data exclusivity 
protects confidential information, these views reflect the theoretical connection between 
data exclusivity and public welfare, in that the public’s initial exclusion from knowledge 
will ultimately result in a greater benefit than would have been obtained had the 
information been immediately available.  
                                                          
457
 Ibid at para 80. 
458
 Ibid at para 82. 
459
 Stratas J.A. was also the only judge in Takeda who discussed the nature and purpose of data exclusivity. 
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Having now completed a discussion of both the legislative regulation of clinical 
trials and data exclusivity, this thesis will next consider personal data protection 
governing the health sector in Canada.  
 
3.2. Personal Health Information Legislation: Controlling Information in the Health 
Context 
 
Prior to the enactment of health-specific personal data protection legislation, it 
was possible for personal health information to be governed by two different regulatory 
standards, depending on whether the data was held by public or private sector 
organizations. In Ontario, for example, two public sector statutes, such as the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act
460
 and the Municipal Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act,
461
 have governed access and privacy of personal 
information held by public sector organizations since 1988 and 1992, respectively.
462
 
However, because of their “piecemeal approach,” these statutes did not offer clear, 
statutory rules with respect to the consistent treatment of health records that were held by 
health care institutions in Ontario.
463
  
With respect to the private sector, the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act
464
 (“PIPEDA”) was passed in April 2000 by the federal 
government.
465
 Before January 2004, PIPEDA was limited in scope to organizations 
                                                          
460
 FIPPA, supra note 98. 
461
 RSO 1990, c M.56. 
462
 Halyna Perun, Michael Orr & Fannie Dimitriadis, Guide to the Ontario Personal Health Information 
Protection Act (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2005) [Perun et al]. 
463
 Ibid at 7. 
464
 PIPEDA, supra note 101. 
465
 Perun et al, supra note 462 at 11. 
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under federal jurisdiction, such as banks and airlines.
466
 As of January 1, 2004, PIPEDA 
began to apply to all organizations within the country that collected, used, or disclosed 
personal information, including personal health information, in the course of commercial 
activities.
467
 PIPEDA would apply to these organizations unless a province had enacted 
“substantially similar” legislation that was applicable to these organizations, and the 
federal government had ordered an exemption from PIPEDA.
468
  
Uncertainty regarding the application of PIPEDA, based on the term “commercial 
activities,” created a lack of consistency in the framework of privacy standards across the 
health sector.
469
 Also, since PIPEDA had been originally enacted to address the needs of 
electronic commerce, stakeholders in the health sector were concerned about whether 
PIPEDA was sufficiently adequate to address the complexities of the health system.
470
  
The rationale amongst various provinces for health-specific personal data 
protection arose out of the need to create a framework that facilitated consistent provision 
of health care. The federal government has noted that enacting “substantially similar” 
legislation to PIPEDA would “enable provinces [and] territories to regulate the personal 
information management practices of organizations operating within their borders and to 
                                                          
466
 Ibid. 
467
 Ibid. 
468
 Ibid. See also PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 26(2)(b): 
The Governor in Council may, by order,… if satisfied that legislation of a province that 
is substantially similar to this Part applies to an organization, a class of organizations, an 
activity or a class of activities, exempt the organization, activity or class from the 
application of this Part in respect of the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information that occurs within that province. 
469
 Perun et al, ibid at 13. 
470
 Ibid at 12-13. For example, Schedule 1 of PIPEDA, supra note 117 at s 4.3.6 states that organizations 
“should generally seek express consent when the information is likely to be considered sensitive.” Perun et 
al thus note that the Ontario Medical Association and the Ontario Hospitals Association considered that 
having express consent as a required norm would unduly restrain the provision of care by health care 
professionals, given the fact that personal health information is almost always considered to be sensitive. 
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minimize the imposition of a dual regulatory regime on these organizations.”471 Where a 
province enacted private sector (including health-related) personal data protection 
legislation that the federal government does not deem “substantially similar” to PIPEDA, 
affected organizations must comply with both statutes: PIPEDA and the provincial 
enactment. 
Ontario’s PHIPA was thus designed to address this duality of regulatory regimes: 
the federal government duly designated PHIPA as “substantially similar” to PIPEDA, and 
health information custodians
472
 under PHIPA are expressly exempt from the application 
of Part 1 of PIPEDA.
473
 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and 
the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act do not apply to 
personal health information in the custody or control of a health information custodian.
474
 
Table 1 contains the Canadian jurisdictions that have enacted health-specific 
personal data protection and addresses whether these statutes have been deemed to be 
substantially similar to PIPEDA. In addition to Ontario’s PHIPA, health-specific personal 
data protection statutes from New Brunswick,
475
 Newfoundland and Labrador,
476
 and 
                                                          
471
 Canada Gazette, Process for the Determination of “Substantially  Similar” Provincial Legislation by the 
Governor in Council, Part I, (22 September 2001) 135(38), 3618 at 3619. 
472
 Health information custodians will be defined and discussed later in this chapter. 
473
 See Health Information Custodians in the Province of Ontario Exemption Order, SOR/2005-
399, s(1):  
Any health information custodian to which the Personal Health Information Protection 
Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Schedule A, applies is exempt from the application of Part I of 
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act in respect of the 
collection, use and disclosure of personal information that occurs within the Province of 
Ontario. 
474
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 8(1):  
Subject to subsection (2), the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and 
the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act do not apply to 
personal health information in the custody or under the control of a health information 
custodian unless this Act specifies otherwise. 
475 Personal Health Information Custodians in New Brunswick Exemption Order, SOR/2011-265. 
476 Personal Health Information Custodians in Newfoundland and Labrador Exemption Order, SI/2012-72. 
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Nova Scotia
477
 have been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA. As shown in Table 1, 
there are six provinces with health-specific personal data protection legislation that have 
not been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA. 
 
Table 1 - Jurisdictions with Health-Specific Personal Information Protection 
Legislation 
 
Jurisdiction Statute Deemed 
Substantially 
Similar to 
PIPEDA?
478
 
Alberta Health Information Act, RSA 2000, c H-5. No 
Saskatchewan Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999 c 
H-0.021. 
No 
Manitoba Personal Health Information Act, CCSM 2005, 
c P33.5. 
No 
Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act, 
RSO 2004, c 3. 
Yes 
New Brunswick Personal Health Information Privacy and 
Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05. 
Yes 
Newfoundland & 
Labrador 
Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c 
P-7.01. 
Yes 
Nova Scotia Personal Health Information Act, SNS 2010, c 
41. 
Yes 
Prince Edward 
Island 
Health Information Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-
1.41.
479
 
No 
Yukon Health Information Privacy and Management 
Act, SY 2013, c 16. 
No 
Northwest 
Territories  
Health Information Act, SNWT 2014, c 2. No 
 
                                                          
477
 Personal Health Information Custodians in Nova Scotia Exemption Order SOR/2016-62. 
478
 Where a statute has not been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA, PIPEDA will continue to apply to 
organizations in that province with respect to personal health information. The organization in question 
must then comply with both PIPEDA and the personal health information statute. 
479
 Proclaimed in force on July 1, 2017. See: Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island, Office of the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner, online: < 
http://www.assembly.pe.ca/index.php3?number=1013943> (accessed August 28, 2017). 
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 There remain three Canadian jurisdictions that have not enacted health-sector 
specific personal data protection legislation. Table 2 identifies these jurisdictions and the 
personal data protection statutes that apply to organizations in the public and private 
sectors with respect to the handling of personal health information. The private sector 
statutes from British Columbia
480
 and Quebec
481
 have been deemed to be substantially 
similar to PIPEDA and organizations in these provinces are thereby exempt from the 
application of PIPEDA. As Table 2 shows, PIPEDA still applies to private sector 
organizations in Nunavut. 
Table 2 - Personal Data Protection Law Applicable Where Jurisdiction Has No 
Health-Specific Statute 
 
Jurisdiction Private Sector Statute Public Sector Statute 
British Columbia
482
 Personal Information Protection 
Act, SBC 2003, c 63. 
 
Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy 
Act, RSBC 1996, c 165. 
Quebec
483
 An Act Respecting the Protection of 
Personal Information in the 
Private Sector, RSQ 2005, c P-39. 
 
An Act Respecting Access 
to Documents Held by 
Public Bodies and the 
Protection of Personal 
Information, RSQ 2005, c 
A-2.1. 
Nunavut Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act, SC 
2000, c 5. 
Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, 
SNWT 1994, c 20. 
 
                                                          
480
 See Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Exemption Order, SOR/2004-220. 
481
 See Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order, SOR/2003-374. 
482
 In British Columbia, the E-Health (Personal Health Information Access and Protection of Privacy) Act, 
SBC 2008, c 38 governs the protection of personal health information in databases known as “health 
information banks.” This statute is not relevant to this thesis. 
483
 In Quebec, An Act Respecting the Sharing of Certain Health Information, CQLR c P-9.0001 establishes 
“information assets” which include a database, information system, telecommunications system, and 
technological infrastructure that allow the sharing of health information to improve the security and quality 
of health and social services. This statute is not relevant to this thesis. 
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 The following sections of this chapter will explore the link between personal data 
protection and data exclusivity through an analysis of the legislatively mandated practices 
for clinical trials and through the determination of the personal data protection laws that 
apply to the relevant parties that are required to maintain records regarding clinical trial 
participants.   
 
3.3. Linking Data Exclusivity to Personal Data Protection 
 Clinical trial data originates from patients and healthy volunteers who participate 
in clinical trials, in which raw data is collected during the following periods: a) first 
enrollment; b) the trial itself; and c) completion of the study.
484
 Raw data consists of 
observations about individual participants, which are collected for the study protocol or 
as part of routine care.
485
 These data may be in the form of measurements of participant 
characteristics including weight, blood pressure, or heart rate and they can also include a 
baseline description of the participant’s medical history including: physical exam 
                                                          
484
 Institute of Medicine, supra note 392 at 93. The Institute of Medicine is a U.S. organization, and this 
document is a U.S. publication. However, it is informative to an analysis of the conduct of clinical trials in 
Canada and the personal data protection issues that arise therein.  
   First, both regulatory health agencies of the U.S. and Canada (the FDA and Health Canada, respectively) 
are members of the non-profit International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). Among other goals, the ICH seeks “to encourage the 
implementation and integration of common standards” with respect to the interpretation and application of 
technical guidelines and requirements for the registration of pharmaceutical products. See: International 
Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, Mission: 
Harmonisation for Better Health, online: <http://www.ich.org/about/mission.html> (accessed June 14, 
2017). 
   Second, this publication was issued in response to the increasingly common practice of publicly sharing 
clinical trial data, which is particularly relevant to personal data protection issues. Although this practice 
has been in place for over ten years in the U.S. and Europe, Health Canada only recently announced a 
similar initiative in March 2017: see, Health Canada, Public Release of Clinical Information in Drug 
Submissions and Medical Device Applications, (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2017) online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/public-release-clinical-information-drug-submissions-
medical-device-applications.html> (accessed March 15, 2017). Therefore, Canada does not possess a 
comprehensive guidance such as the present publication with respect to clinical trial data and patient 
privacy issues.     
485
 Institute of Medicine, ibid at 97. 
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information; clinical laboratory results; genome sequences; procedure results; and self-
reported data such as a person’s quality of life.486 During the course of the trial, the raw 
data is “abstracted, coded, and transcribed” into an analyzable set,487 which is eventually 
“locked” into a final data set in which no further changes may be made.488  
Both the raw data and analyzable data sets ultimately constitute individual 
participant data.
489
 Some observations, such as imaging results from X-rays or magnetic 
resonance imaging, must be interpreted (or “abstracted”) by study investigators and 
entered into case report forms as transcribed narrative data or as coded data according to 
the requisite coding procedures – for example, men may be coded as “0” and women as 
“1.”490 In addition to physiological and clinical measures, it is also becoming increasingly 
common to collect other types of health information in clinical trials, such as sensor data 
from smartphone applications, consumer genomics data, and participant-reported 
outcomes.
491
 
The need for documentation of the vast amount of patient information collected in 
a clinical trial requires clinical trial sponsors to maintain detailed records with respect to a 
drug used in a clinical trial. According to section C.05.012(3)(d) of the Food and Drug 
Regulations: 
The sponsor shall maintain complete and accurate records in respect of the use of 
a drug in a clinical trial, including…records respecting the enrolment of clinical 
trial subjects, including information sufficient to enable all clinical trial 
subjects to be identified and contacted in the event that the sale of the drug may 
                                                          
486
 Ibid. 
487
 Ibid at 93. 
488
 Ibid at 99. If the trial is blinded, the treatment code file is typically merged with the locked, analyzable 
data set, such that the data will be unblinded to the investigators. Although a large percentage of analyzable 
data is never used, it consists of information such as participant characteristics and primary outcome, 
secondary and tertiary outcomes, adverse events data, and exploratory data. 
489
 Ibid at 93. 
490
 Ibid at 97. 
491
 Ibid. 
131 
 
 
 
endanger the health of the clinical trial subjects or other persons [emphasis 
added].
492
 
 
The connection between the legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal 
data protection, at least with respect to the Food and Drug Regulations, largely depends 
on the phrase “information sufficient to enable all clinical trial subjects to be identified.” 
If patients can be re-identified from de-identified clinical trial data, this would suggest 
that personal health information protection laws would apply to the data. At first glance, 
one might think that section C.05.012(3)(d) merely mandates that a master list of all 
contact information for registered clinical trial participants must be retained, such that 
there is no need for examination of the clinical trial data itself. However, there is a 
problem with this interpretation, since the provision mandates that clinical trial 
participants must first be identified and then contacted. Furthermore, because the 
provision expressly mentions that identification and contact are to occur in the event that 
the drug would endanger participants’ health or that of others, it would make little sense 
from a public health standpoint to contact individuals in a blind, wholesale manner, 
particularly since participants might have been randomized into multiple groups under 
different trial conditions and may require further medical intervention from having taken 
the experimental drug in the first place.  
 In mandating that individual clinical trial subjects be identifiable, section 
C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations provides the strongest potential link between 
the legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection. Clinical trial data 
consists of an individual’s health information, and individuals have a right to control their 
                                                          
492
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d). 
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personal information according to personal data protection laws.
493
 However, clinical trial 
sponsors maintain temporary, exclusive rights to clinical trial data because of federal data 
exclusivity legislation. This struggle over access to the same set of confidential 
information leads to a potential conflict with respect to Canada’s abilities to comply with 
both data exclusivity and personal data protection obligations made internationally. To 
determine whether there is a conflict between these two regimes, the following issues will 
be addressed in this chapter: a) the definition of “personal health information” under 
provincial health information protection legislation; and b) whether clinical trial data 
retains the characteristics of information that constitutes “personal health information.” In 
addition to clarifying the consistency of operation between data exclusivity and personal 
data protection, this analysis will help to determine the extent of rights of individual 
clinical trial participants to control their personal health information. 
 
3.3.1. Record-Keeping Requirements: Good Clinical Practices and Identification of 
Patients 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Canada’s federal health regulatory agency, Health 
Canada, is a standing regulatory member of the International Council for Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (“ICH”).494 The ICH is a 
non-profit organization that seeks to achieve greater harmonization in the interpretation 
and application of guidelines and requirements for pharmaceutical product registration 
                                                          
493
 For example, an individual’s consent is generally required for the collection, use, and disclosure of the 
individual’s personal health information under Ontario’s PHIPA: see PHIPA, supra note 384, s 29. 
494
 See Government of Canada, International Council for Harmonisation (ICH), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/applications-
submissions/guidance-documents/international-conference-harmonisation.html> [Gov’t of Canada (ICH)].  
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and “contribute to the protection of public health.”495 This harmonization is achieved 
through the development of ICH Guidelines through a “scientific consensus” with 
regulatory and industry experts, in which the ICH asserts that the key to success of this 
process is “the commitment of the ICH regulators to implement the final Guidelines.”496 
Health Canada accordingly claims to be “committed to the adoption and implementation 
of ICH guidance and standards,”497 which includes the ICH’s Guideline for Good 
Clinical Practice (“ICH-GCP”).498 Health Canada’s commitment is thus consistent with 
Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations, which defines “good clinical practices” as 
“generally accepted practices that are designed to ensure the protection of the rights, 
safety, and well-being of clinical trial subjects and other persons.”499 
Health Canada’s own Guidance for Records Related to Clinical Trials 
(“Guidance”) on the interpretation of the record-keeping requirement under section 
C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations is directly influenced by the ICH-GCP.
500
 
The ICH-GCP’s guidance contains a “minimum” list of “essential documents,” which 
constitutes an Annex to Health Canada’s Guidance. Importantly, some of these records 
are capable of identifying clinical trial participants. Table 3 describes these records, 
which are required to be kept by clinical trial sponsors and institutional investigators:  
                                                          
495
 International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use, Mission: Harmonisation for Better Health, online: <http://www.ich.org/about/mission.html> 
(accessed June 14, 2017). 
496
 Ibid. 
497
 See Gov’t of Canada (ICH), supra note 494. 
498
 International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use, Integrated Addendum to ICH E6(R1): Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, (9 November 2016), 
available online: 
<http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6/E6_R2__Step_4.p
df> (accessed June 14, 2017) [ICH, “Clinical Practice”]. 
499
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.001. 
500
 Health Canada, Guidance for Records Related to Clinical Trials: Interpretation of section C.05.012 of 
the Food and Drug Regulations - Division 5, (May 23, 2006), online: < 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/hc-sc/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/compli-
conform/gui_68-eng.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2017) [Health Canada]. 
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Table 3 - Required Records to be kept in the Course of Clinical Trials that can 
Identify Clinical Trial Subjects
501
 
 
Stage of 
Trial 
Record Title Record Purpose Record Location 
(Files Of) 
Investigator Sponsor 
During 
Clinical 
Phase 
Source 
Documents 
Documents the existence 
of the subject and 
substantiates the integrity 
of trial data collected – 
should include original 
documents related to the 
trial, to medical 
treatment, and history of 
subject 
 
 
 
X 
 
 Subject 
Screening Log 
Documents identification 
of subjects who entered 
pre-trial screening 
X X 
 Subject 
Identification 
Code List 
To document that the 
investigator or institution 
keeps a confidential list 
of names of all subjects 
allocated to trial numbers 
on enrolling in the trial. 
Allows investigator or 
institution to reveal the 
identity of any subject 
X  
 Subject 
Enrollment 
Log 
Documents chronological 
enrollment of subjects by 
trial number 
X  
Completion 
or 
Termination 
of Trial 
Completed 
Subject 
Identification 
Code List 
Enables identification of 
all subjects enrolled in the 
trial in case a follow-up is 
necessary. List should be 
kept confidential and for 
an “agreed upon time” 
X  
 Clinical Study 
Report 
To document results and 
interpretation of the trial 
X X 
 
                                                          
501
 The contents of Table 3 have been adapted from “Essential Documents for the Conduct of a Clinical 
Trial”: ICH, “Clinical Practice”, supra note 498. 
135 
 
 
 
 Based on Table 3, there would be at least the above records extant in every 
clinical trial. As will be demonstrated, personal data protection would give rights to 
patients in respect of each of these records. 
The Food and Drug Regulations define a “sponsor” as an “individual, corporate 
body, institution, or organization that conducts a clinical trial,”502 and sponsors are 
ultimately responsible for conducting trials in accordance with good clinical practices, 
which includes fulfilling the requirements with respect to information and records under 
section C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations.
503
 Health Canada further clarifies 
the role of the sponsor as an individual, institution, or organization that is responsible for 
the “initiation, management, and/or financing of a clinical trial.”504 Sponsors also 
delegate many functions to third parties, including qualified investigators.
505
  
The Food and Drug Regulations define a “qualified investigator” as “a person 
responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a clinical trial site, who is 
entitled to provide health care under the laws of the province where that clinical trial site 
is located.”506 Moreover, the person must be “a physician and a member in good standing 
of a professional medical or dental association.”507 Under the Health Canada Guidance, 
qualified investigators are required to retain clinical trial participants’ medical records as 
well as records that identify the participants.
508
   
                                                          
502
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.001. 
503
 Ibid, s C.05.010 (i). 
504
 Health Canada, supra note 500 at 7. In the event that an independent investigator initiates a clinical trial 
under his or her own sponsorship, that investigator is responsible for all aspects of the trial as both a 
qualified investigator and a sponsor (see page 4). 
505
 Ibid at 9. 
506
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.001.  
507
 Ibid. The person must be a physician or dentist for clinical trials for drugs used for dental purposes only. 
For all other cases, the person must be a physician. 
508
 Health Canada, supra note 500 at 9. 
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Table 3 indicates that some records that facilitate the identification of clinical trial 
subjects, such as the “completed subject identification code list,” are to be retained 
exclusively by the investigator rather than the sponsor. Based on this delegation of record 
retention, it may initially seem that only the qualified investigator is able to identify study 
participants. However, section C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations expressly 
states that it is the sponsor that is responsible for the maintenance of records that would 
enable the identification of clinical trial participants. The Health Canada Guidance 
acknowledges that it is ultimately the sponsor’s responsibility to comply with the Food 
and Drug Regulations, and that in the event of any inconsistency or conflict with the 
Food and Drug Regulations, these regulations take precedence over the Health Canada 
Guidance.
509
 In this way, to comply with the Food and Drug Regulations, it follows that 
the sponsor must also retain the information that facilitates the identification of individual 
participants. 
According to the ICH’s Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports (“ICH-
CSR”), a “clinical study report” (CSR) is a comprehensive report that integrates 
numerous pieces of information relating to an individual study of a drug or treatment 
conducted in patients.
510
 Although the precise contents of a CSR may depend on the 
individual trial,
511
 the report is generally supposed to include information pertaining to 
treatment administered, selection of the study population, statistical analyses regarding 
efficacy, and safety evaluation. In particular, the ICH recommends that the CSR should 
                                                          
509
 Ibid at 4. 
510
 International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use, Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports (30 November 1995) at 1, online: 
<http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E3/E3_Guideline.pdf
> (accessed June 14, 2017) [ICH, “Study Reports”]. 
511
 Ibid at 2: This guideline states that “each report should consider all of the topics described (unless 
clearly not relevant) although the specific sequence and grouping of topics may be changed.”
 
137 
 
 
 
describe demographic and other predictive characteristics of the study population, “and 
where the study is large enough to permit this, present data for demographic (e.g. age, 
sex, race, weight) and other (e.g. renal or hepatic function) subgroups” in order to 
identify possible differences in safety and efficacy.
512
 For example, the ICH-CSR 
recommends that the CSR include a listing of all patients discontinued from the study 
after enrolment, “broken down by centre and treatment group, giving a patient identifier, 
the specific reason for discontinuation, the treatment (drug and dose), cumulative dose, 
(where appropriate), and the duration of treatment before discontinuation.”513 In addition, 
the ICH-CSR states that “it may also be useful to include information, such as critical 
demographic data (e.g. age, sex, race), concomitant medication, and the major response 
variable(s) at termination.”514 
The ICH-CSR notes that investigators should present and compare group data for 
“critical demographic and baseline characteristics of the patients,” and should also 
include a diagram that shows the relationship between the entire sample and any other 
groups in the analysis.
515
 The ICH-CSR notes that the “critical” baseline variables in the 
group data will depend on the nature of the disease and protocol but will usually include 
demographic variables such as age, sex, race, as well as “disease factors” such as disease 
duration, stage, and severity, concomitant illness at trial initiation (e.g. renal disease, 
diabetes, heart failure), relevant previous illness, and relevant previous treatment for 
                                                          
512
 Ibid. 
513
 Ibid at 12-13. Annex V of the ICH-CSR contains an example of such a patient listing, in which the 
patient “identifier” is a number. The sample listing also includes the last visit and concomitant medication. 
514
 Ibid at 13.  
515
 Ibid at 13-14. 
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illness treated in the study.
516
 Other potentially relevant variables include factors such as 
smoking, alcohol intake, special diets, and menstrual status.
517
 
It is thus clear that a clinical trial involves the collection and use of a significant 
amount of patient health information. Figure 5 illustrates the flow of information with 
respect to clinical trial data and the patient data contained therein, thereby representing 
the reality that while clinical trial data is part of the realm of confidential information, 
this data ultimately originates from patient data. 
 
Figure 5 - Flow of Information with respect to Clinical Trial Data and Patient Data 
 
This patient health information subsequently forms part of a CSR that is prepared 
in accordance with the ICH-CSR. Although the term “clinical study report” is not a 
defined term under the Food and Drug Regulations, sponsors are nonetheless required to 
submit, as part of regulatory market approval, “detailed reports of the tests made to 
                                                          
516
 Ibid at 14. 
517
 Ibid. 
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establish the safety” with respect to an innovative drug’s recommended purpose and 
conditions of use.
518
 The record-keeping requirements under section C.05.012 of the 
Food and Drug Regulations and the guidance prepared by the ICH and Health Canada 
also clearly indicate that patient identity is capable of being revealed at any time by both 
the sponsor and investigator alike despite the purported anonymization of patients 
through the assignment of code numbers. 
There are two aspects of the personal data protection analysis that are important to 
determining whether there is a conflict between data exclusivity and personal data 
protection. First, in light of record-keeping requirements under the Food and Drug 
Regulations and Health Canada’s Guidance, one must determine the proper personal data 
protection legislation that applies to qualified investigators and clinical trial sponsors that 
possess the health information of clinical trial participants. Second, one must determine 
whether patient health information in clinical trial data constitutes personal health 
information within the meaning of personal health information protection laws or, where 
applicable, personal information within the meaning of public and private sector general 
personal data protection laws. As this thesis will show through a legislative analysis, 
patient health information that is collected and retained in clinical trials falls within the 
definition of identifiability under health-specific personal data protection statutes and also 
falls under the aegis, where applicable, of public and private sector general personal data 
protection laws. Therefore, personal data protection applies to clinical trial data. 
Furthermore, this thesis will also demonstrate that data exclusivity and personal data 
protection can operate consistently together in Canadian law.  
 
                                                          
518
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.08.002 (2)(g). 
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3.3.2. Which Personal Data Protection Laws Apply to Qualified Investigators and 
Clinical Trial Sponsors? 
The documentation and record-keeping responsibilities of the clinical trial 
sponsor and qualified investigator under Health Canada’s Guidance and the Food and 
Drug Regulations are directly related to the application of the appropriate personal data 
protection laws. For example, in Ontario, section 29(1)(a) of PHIPA states that a “health 
information custodian” must not collect, use, or disclose an individual’s personal health 
information unless “it has the individual’s consent under this Act.”519 Section 3(1) of 
Ontario’s PHIPA defines a “health information custodian” as follows: 
“health information custodian”, subject to subsections (3) to (11), means a 
person or organization described in one of the following paragraphs who has 
custody or control of personal health information as a result of or in connection 
with performing the person’s or organization’s powers or duties or the work 
described in the paragraph, if any: 
1. A health care practitioner or a person who operates a group practice of 
health care practitioners. 
2. A service provider within the meaning of the Home Care and Community 
Services Act, 1994 who provides a community service to which that Act 
applies. 
3. A community care access corporation within the meaning of 
the Community Care Access Corporations Act, 2001. 
4. A person who operates one of the following facilities, programs or 
services: 
i. A hospital within the meaning of the Public Hospitals Act, a private 
hospital within the meaning of the Private Hospitals Act, a psychiatric 
facility within the meaning of the Mental Health Act or an independent 
health facility within the meaning of the Independent Health Facilities 
Act. 
ii. A long-term care home within the meaning of the Long-Term Care 
Homes Act, 2007, a placement co-ordinator described in subsection 40 (1) 
of that Act, or a care home within the meaning of the Residential 
Tenancies Act, 2006. 
                                                          
519
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 29(1)(a):  
A health information custodian shall not collect, use or disclose personal health 
information about an individual unless…it has the individual’s consent under this Act and 
the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be, to the best of the custodian’s 
knowledge, is necessary for a lawful purpose. 
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ii.1 a retirement home within the meaning of the Retirement Homes Act, 
2010. 
iii. A pharmacy within the meaning of Part VI of the Drug and 
Pharmacies Regulation Act. 
iv. A laboratory or a specimen collection centre as defined in section 5 of 
the Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act. 
v. An ambulance service within the meaning of the Ambulance Act. 
vi. A home for special care within the meaning of the Homes for Special 
Care Act. 
vii. A centre, program or service for community health or mental health 
whose primary purpose is the provision of health care. 
5. An evaluator within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 or 
an assessor within the meaning of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992. 
6. A medical officer of health of a board of health within the meaning of 
the Health Protection and Promotion Act. 
7. The Minister, together with the Ministry of the Minister if the context so 
requires. 
8. Any other person prescribed as a health information custodian if the person 
has custody or control of personal health information as a result of or in 
connection with performing prescribed powers, duties or work or any 
prescribed class of such persons.
520 
 
Thus, in order for PHIPA to apply to an organization, the organization must be a 
“health information custodian” within the meaning of this definition. As mentioned 
previously in section 3.3 of this thesis, clinical trials involve the collection of a vast 
amount of personal health information from clinical trial participants, so it is important to 
clarify the responsibilities of the entities that will have custody and control over this 
information.
521
 The question, then, is whether qualified investigators and clinical trial 
                                                          
520
 Ibid, s 3(1). 
521
 For example, see: Canadian Cancer Trials Group, Privacy and Confidentiality (October 1, 2015) at 6-7, 
available online: <https://www.ctg.queensu.ca/docs/public/policies/PrivacyandConfidentiality.pdf> 
(accessed August 6, 2017). This policy was released by the Canadian Cancer Trials Group (CCTG), a non-
for-profit, non-government sponsor that develops and conducts clinical trials for the prevention and 
treatment of cancer. The policy expressly refers to PHIPA’s definition of health information custodians and 
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sponsors constitute health information custodians within the meaning of health-sector 
specific personal data protection statutes, such as PHIPA, and are thereby subject to the 
rules thereunder. 
In Ontario, it is evident that qualified investigators constitute health information 
custodians under PHIPA. As mentioned previously, section C.05.001 of the Food and 
Drug Regulations mandates qualified investigators to be physicians. In Ontario, the 
practice of medicine is regulated under the Medicine Act, 1991,
522
 which requires 
physicians to be members of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.
523
  
Under PHIPA, a health information custodian includes “a health care practitioner or a 
person who operates a group practice of health care practitioners,”524 in which a “health 
care practitioner” is defined as “a person who is a member within the meaning of 
the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991
525
 and who provides health care.”526 The 
Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 defines a “member” as a “member of a 
College,”527 and includes medicine as a self-governing health profession under the 
Medicine Act, 1991.
528
 Since the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 applies to any 
qualified investigator by virtue of his or her status as a physician, qualified investigators 
thus qualify as health information custodians within the meaning of PHIPA. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
outlines the procedures for compliance with applicable personal data protection legislation and states that 
CCTG collects personal health information from participants who have provided written consent to 
participation in a clinical trial, including test results, adverse events, and medical history.  
522
 SO 1991, c 30. 
523
 Ibid, s 9(3): “No person other than a member shall hold himself or herself out as a person who is 
qualified to practise in Ontario as an osteopath, physician or surgeon or in a specialty of medicine.” Section 
1 of the Medicine Act, 1991 defines “member” to mean “a member of the College,” in which “College” is 
defined as “the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.” 
524
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 3. 
525
 SO 1991, c 18 [Regulated Health Professions Act]. 
526
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 2. 
527
 Regulated Health Professions Act, supra note 525, s 1(1). 
528
 Ibid, Sch 1. 
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It is also possible for clinical trials sponsors to qualify as health information 
custodians under PHIPA. Under Health Canada’s Guidance with respect to record-
keeping requirements, “independent investigators” who initiate a clinical trial under their 
own sponsorship become responsible for all aspects of that trial, both as a qualified 
investigator and a sponsor.
529
 In this way, clinical trial sponsors can be health information 
custodians under PHIPA if they are also qualified investigators, based on the requirement 
that a qualified investigator must be a physician.  
However, it is less clear whether clinical trial sponsors that are businesses, such as 
pharmaceutical companies, constitute health information custodians within the meaning 
of health-sector specific statutes such as PHIPA. A corporate entity such as Merck Frosst, 
for example, is not encompassed
530
 by the above definition of a health information 
custodian under PHIPA. This exclusion reflects the fact that, while the research and 
development of life-saving drugs is directly relevant to human health outcomes, an entity 
such as Merck Frosst does not provide health care but engages in pharmaceutical 
innovation for the purpose of selling the products for profit. In other words, the activities 
of innovative pharmaceutical companies are better characterized as having a commercial 
or business purpose rather than a health care purpose.  
Even if PHIPA does not apply to pharmaceutical companies such as Merck 
Frosst, these organizations are nonetheless governed by PIPEDA in the course of their 
commercial activities. So long as information pertains to an identifiable individual,
531
 a 
                                                          
529
 Health Canada, supra note 500 at 4. 
530
 According to PHIPA, supra note 384, s 2: ““prescribed” means prescribed by the regulations made 
under this Act.” Pharmaceutical companies are not prescribed under PHIPA’s General Regulation: see 
Ontario Regulation, 329/04.  
531
 PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1):  
personal information means information about an identifiable individual [emphasis in 
original]. 
144 
 
 
 
pharmaceutical company will be obligated to protect this information with respect to its 
collection, use, or disclosure in the course of commercial activities.
532
 The Federal Court 
of Appeal in Wyndowe v. Rousseau
533
 observed that the definition of personal 
information under PIPEDA rendered this statute “very far reaching.”534 This 
interpretation is supported by Principle 4.9.1 under PIPEDA, which addresses access to 
personal information: since “organizations may choose to make sensitive medical 
information available through a practitioner,” Décary J.A. noted that “medical 
information”, which is “personal health information”, is “personal information.”535  
PIPEDA also provides a definition of personal health information,
536
 and Décary J.A. 
asserted that, despite the fact that these expressions are defined “without reference to one 
another, it is clear that “personal health information” is a subset of “personal 
information.””537   
                                                          
532
 Ibid, s 4(1)(a): This Part applies to every organization in respect of personal information that…the 
organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities. 
533
 Wyndowe v Rousseau, 2008 FCA 39, 373 NR 301 [Wyndowe]. 
534
 Ibid at para 40. 
535
 Ibid at para 44, referring to PIPEDA, supra note 101, Sch 1, s 4.9.1. 
536
 PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1):  
personal health information, with respect to an individual, whether living or deceased, 
means  
(a) information concerning the physical or mental health of the individual; 
(b) information concerning any health service provided to the individual;  
(c) information concerning the donation by the individual of any body part or any bodily 
substance of the individual or information derived from the testing or examination of a 
body part or bodily substance of the individual;  
(d) information that is collected in the course of providing health services to the 
individual; or  
(e) information that is collected incidentally to the provision of health services to the 
individual [emphasis in original]. 
   See also Wyndowe, supra note 533 at para 43: Décary J.A. observes that the only other place in PIPEDA 
in which “personal health information” is mentioned is at subsection 30(1.1), which is a transitional 
provision intended to delay the application of PIPEDA to “personal health information” until one year after 
section 30 comes into force. Décary J.A. states that the presumed reason for the delay was to allow 
practitioners who were about to be covered under PIPEDA to prepare for its application. 
537
 Wyndowe, ibid at para 42. 
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As mentioned previously, British Columbia,
538
 Quebec,
539
 and Alberta
540
 have 
enacted their own private sector personal data protection statutes which have all been 
deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA.
541
 Accordingly, in their respective 
provinces, these private sector statutes would govern clinical trial sponsors that are 
pharmaceutical companies, replacing PIPEDA.
542
 
Therefore, although personal health information is part of the data that is collected 
during clinical trials, the existence of health-specific personal data protection legislation 
in a jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that all parties involved in the clinical trial 
will be governed by this legislation. As discussed above, a “health information custodian” 
is a defined term under Ontario’s PHIPA, and pharmaceutical companies are not 
encompassed by this definition and consequently are not subject to the rules under 
PHIPA.  
To determine the applicable personal data protection laws in other Canadian 
jurisdictions with respect to clinical trial sponsors and qualified investigators, this thesis 
first focuses on the jurisdictions with health-sector specific personal data protection and 
then provides an analysis of the definitions of health information custodians in the health-
                                                          
538
 BC PIPA, supra note 105. 
539
 QC Act, supra note 100. 
540
 AB PIPA, supra note 104. 
541
 See: Organizations in the Province of Alberta Exemption Order, SOR/2004-219; Organizations in the 
Province of British Columbia Exemption Order, SOR/2004-220; and Organizations in the Province of 
Quebec Exemption Order, SOR/2003-374. 
542
 For example, recall that Alberta’s private sector statute replaces the application of PIPEDA in the 
province of Alberta. See AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 4(3)(f):  
This Act does not apply to…health information as defined in the Health Information 
Act to which that Act applies. 
    However, pharmaceutical companies are excluded from the scope of application of the Health 
Information Act, since they do not qualify as “custodians”: see Alberta’s Health Information Act, RSA 
2000, c H-5, s 1(1)(f) [AB HIA] and Health Information Regulation, Alta Reg 70/2001, at s 2(2) [AB Reg]. 
Therefore, Alberta’s private sector statute applies to pharmaceutical companies that are clinical trial 
sponsors. 
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specific personal data protection statutes for the following jurisdictions: Alberta;
543
 
Saskatchewan;
544
 Manitoba;
545
 New Brunswick;
546
 Newfoundland and Labrador;
547
 Nova 
Scotia;
548
 Prince Edward Island;
549
 Yukon;
550
 and the Northwest Territories.
551
  
Despite variations in the legislative definitions of health information custodians 
with respect to the institutions and individuals encompassed therein, health care providers 
constituted health information custodians in all these jurisdictions. Since health care 
providers are health information custodians within the meaning of health-specific 
personal data protection statutes, and in light of the requirement under the Food and 
Drug Regulations that a qualified investigator must be a physician,
552
 Table 4 
demonstrates that health-specific personal data protection applies to all qualified 
investigators in each of these jurisdictions but not to clinical trial sponsors in any of these 
jurisdictions. Clinical trial sponsors are instead governed by PIPEDA in each of these 
jurisdictions, except in Alberta, where Alberta’s private sector legislation replaces the 
application of PIPEDA.
553
 
                                                          
543
 See AB HIA, ibid, s 1(1)(f) and AB Reg, ibid, s 2. 
544
 The term “trustee” is used instead of “custodian”: See Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999 c H-
0.02, s 2(t) [SK HIPA], and Health Information Protection Regulations, RRS c H-0.021 Reg 1, s 3. 
545
 The term “trustee” is used instead of “custodian”: See Personal Health Information Act, CCSM 2005, c 
P33.5, s 1(1) [MB PHIA].  
546
 See Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05, s 1 [NB PHIPAA], and 
General Regulation, NB Reg 2010-112, s 3. 
547
 See Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c P-7.01, s 4 [NL PHIA], and Personal Health 
Information Regulations, NLR 38/11, s 4. 
548
 See Personal Health Information Act, SNS 2010, c 41, s 3(f) [NS PHIA], and Personal Health 
Information Regulations, NS Reg 217/2012, s 3. 
549
 See Health Information Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-1.41, s 1(e) [PEI HIA]. 
550
 See Health Information Privacy and Management Act, SY 2013, c 16, s 2(1) [YK HIPMA] and Health 
Information General Regulation, YOIC 2016/159, s 3. 
551
 See Health Information Act, SNWT 2014, c 2, s 1(1) [NT HIA], and Health Information Regulations, 
NWT Reg 089-2015, s 1(1). 
552
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.001. 
553
 Alberta’s private sector statute applies to pharmaceutical companies that are clinical trial sponsors. First, 
recall that Alberta’s private sector statute replaces the application of PIPEDA in the province of Alberta by 
virtue of having been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA. Alberta’s private sector statute also does 
not apply to information under Alberta’s Health Information Act: see AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 4(3)(f):  
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Table 4 - Application of Health-Specific Personal Data Protection in Clinical Trials 
 
Jurisdiction Applies to Qualified 
Investigator 
(Physician)? 
 
Applies to Clinical Trial 
Sponsor 
(Business – i.e. Pharmaceutical 
Company)? 
Alberta Yes No; the Personal Information 
Protection Act applies 
Saskatchewan Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Manitoba Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Ontario Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
New Brunswick Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Nova Scotia Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Prince Edward 
Island 
Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Yukon Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
Northwest 
Territories 
Yes No; PIPEDA applies 
 
British Columbia, Quebec, and Nunavut have been excluded from Table 4 since 
none of these jurisdictions has enacted a health-specific personal data protection statute. 
Table 5 identifies the applicable personal data protection laws with respect to qualified 
investigators and clinical trial sponsors in these jurisdictions. The public sector personal 
data protection statutes in these jurisdictions apply to qualified investigators that are in 
possession of health information.
554
 The private sector statutes in British Columbia
555
 and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
This Act does not apply to…health information as defined in the Health Information 
Act to which that Act applies.  
    However, pharmaceutical companies are excluded from the scope of application of the Health 
Information Act, since they do not qualify as “custodians”: see AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(f) and AB 
Reg, supra note 542, s 2(2).   
554
 The application of public sector legislation to qualified investigators in this context assumes that these 
physicians are operating within public organizations, such as hospitals.  
555
 See BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 3: British Columbia’s private sector statute applies to “every 
organization” but does not apply where British Columbia’s public sector statute, the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, applies to personal information. 
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Quebec
556
 replace the application of PIPEDA in governing clinical trial sponsors in these 
provinces, and PIPEDA will continue to apply to clinical trial sponsors in Nunavut. 
Table 5 - Application of Personal Data Protection in Clinical Trials for Jurisdictions 
without Health-Sector-Specific Statutes 
 
Jurisdiction Qualified Investigator 
(Physician) 
 
Clinical Trial Sponsor 
(Business – i.e. Pharmaceutical 
Company) 
British Columbia Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 165. 
Personal Information Protection Act, 
SBC 2003, c 63. 
Quebec  An Act Respecting Access to 
Documents Held by Public 
Bodies and the Protection of 
Personal Information, RSQ. 
2005, c A-2.1. 
An Act Respecting the Protection of 
Personal Information in the Private 
Sector, RSQ, c P-39. 
Nunavut  Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, 
SNWT 1994, c 20. 
Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act, SC 
2000, c 5. 
 
 In determining which personal data protection laws that apply to the relevant 
entities holding patient health information, it was necessary to first identify whether these 
entities fell within the definition of information “custodian”: if they do, they lie within 
the scope of health-specific personal data protection statutes. In all cases, the qualified 
investigator under the clinical trials regime falls within this scope where there is 
applicable health-sector specific legislation (see Table 4). Where there is no such 
legislation, the qualified investigator is governed by the relevant public sector personal 
data protection statutes (see Table 5). In the case of clinical trial sponsors, because they 
                                                          
556
 See QC Act, supra note 100, s 1: The purpose of this statute is to establish rules concerning the 
protection of personal information which a person “collects, holds, uses, or communicates…in the course 
of carrying on an enterprise within the meaning of article 1525 of the Civil Code.” See also: Civil Code of 
Quebec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, art 1525, which defines an enterprise as “the carrying on by one or more 
persons of an organized economic activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting of 
producing, administering or alienating property, or providing a service.”  
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are purely businesses, private sector personal data protection legislation (either provincial 
or PIPEDA) will apply rather than health-specific or public sector personal data 
protection. 
 The following section of this thesis will explore the definition of “personal health 
information” with respect to the concept of identifiability of the individual and how the 
application of personal data protection laws affects individuals’ rights to control their 
personal health information in the context of data exclusivity.  
 
3.4. What Information Qualifies as “Personal Health Information”557 under 
Canadian Legislation? 
3.4.1. The Notion of Identifiability 
Consider the famous anecdote about the priest who was asked, at a party, 
whether he had heard any exceptional stories during confessionals. “In fact," the 
priest replied, "my first confessor is a good example, since he confessed to a 
murder." A few minutes later, an elegant man joined the group, saw the priest, 
and greeted him warmly. When asked how he knew the priest, the man replied: 
"Why, I had the honor of being his first confessor.
558 
 
 This anecdote, offered by Ruth Gavison, illustrates the need to clarify the notion 
of “identifiability” as it relates to the definition of personal information within the 
meaning of personal data protection laws. As the custodian of the information about the 
identity of the murderer, it is clear that the priest felt confident that, in withholding the 
confessor’s name, the sensitive information he did reveal was sufficiently anonymous as 
to safeguard the confessor’s identity. At the time of the priest’s disclosure, no one present 
could have uniquely identified the individual to whom the priest was referring. However, 
an additional piece of information that was later made available ultimately removed all 
doubts about the individual’s identity. Gratton also notes that, while information may not 
                                                          
557
 Alberta uses the term “health information” instead of “personal health information.”  
558
 Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421 at 430-431. 
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initially be “identifiable” within the meaning of personal data protection laws, acquiring a 
certain volume of information will eventually be sufficient to make that bundle of 
information “identifiable.”559  
Clarification of the definition of identifiability can involve a factual determination 
of what it means to “de-identify” data, and whether such de-identification is sufficient to 
render it non-personal information and safeguard the identity of the confidante individual 
who confided the data. Data that has been de-identified can lead to later violations of 
patient privacy owing to re-identification through the proliferation of large-scale analyses 
of vast data sets.
560
 Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum observe that the promise of 
anonymity is impossible to fulfil if individual records contain information that may fall 
outside the scope of the commonly defined set of personally identifiable information but 
nonetheless distinguish a person sufficiently to associate those records to a specific 
individual.
561
 For example, combining an anonymized data set with a separate data set 
that includes identifying information, and subsequently looking for areas of overlap in the 
combined data, increases the likelihood of being able to re-identify individuals in the data 
set or determine whether they belong to a subgroup with certain attributes.
562
 The 
existence of these techniques raises the issue of whether de-identified data sufficiently 
addresses the interests of individual patients in maintaining the confidentiality of their 
personal health information.  
                                                          
559
 Gratton, supra note 406 at 184. 
560
 Institute of Medicine, supra note 392 at 53. 
561
 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, “Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent,” in Julia 
Lane et al, Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 44-75 at 50, available online: < 
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/BigDatasEndRun.pdf>. 
562
 Ibid. 
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The issue of identifiability is particularly relevant in the context of clinical trials 
with respect to the application of personal data protection laws because the ability to 
uniquely identify an individual is essential to the definition of personal information in 
both international instruments and Canadian legislation. The international OECD Privacy 
Guidelines define “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual (data subject).”563 Similarly, Canada’s federal PIPEDA states that 
information about an “identifiable” individual constitutes personal information.564 
Although neither the OECD Privacy Guidelines nor PIPEDA offer definitions of 
“identifiable,” Khaled El Emam et al have observed that information that permits the 
direct recognition of an individual, including personal names, social insurance numbers, 
and telephone numbers constitutes “direct identifiers.”565 In contrast, “quasi-identifiers” 
are characteristics that can indirectly identify individuals and include demographic and 
socioeconomic information such as a person’s date of birth, ethnicity, and income 
level.
566
 
The identifiability of an individual is also an essential characteristic of personal 
information in the health context. For example, section 4 of Ontario’s PHIPA defines 
personal health information to mean “identifying information about an individual” with 
respect to several features that include the individual’s physical or mental health, family 
health history, and health number.
567
 “Identifying information” is defined under PHIPA 
                                                          
563
 OECD Guidelines, supra note 92, s 1(b).  
564
 See PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1).  
565
 Khaled El Emam, Sam Rodgers & Bradley Malin, “Anonymizing and Sharing Individual Patient Data” 
(2015) 350 BMJ 1-5 at 2 [El Emam et al]. 
566
 Ibid at 2. 
567
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(1):  
“personal health information”, subject to subsections (3) and (4), means identifying 
information about an individual in oral or recorded form, if the information,  
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as information that identifies an individual or that could be used to identify an 
individual.
568
 Since identifying information includes that which could be used to identify 
an individual, Ontario’s PHIPA appears to contemplate situations in which information 
could be used in combination with other information to identify an individual. 
Recall from section 3.3.2 of this thesis that it was essential to determine the 
relevant personal data protection laws applying to the qualified investigators and clinical 
trial sponsors that have custody of personal health information in clinical trials in order to 
clarify their responsibilities in protecting this information. It is now important to 
determine whether the information involved constitutes information about an 
“identifiable” individual: since identifiability is a key aspect of the definition of personal 
health information, information that does not qualify as identifiable would be excluded 
from the scope of the definition, which could subsequently affect the responsibilities of 
those who have custody of the information. In this context, understanding of the 
“identifiability” of information is a key determinant for whether there is a conflict 
between data exclusivity and personal data protection. If personal data protection does 
not apply because there is no personal health information in clinical trial data by the time 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(a) relates to the physical or mental health of the individual, including information that 
consists of the health history of the individual’s family,  
(b) relates to the providing of health care to the individual, including the identification of 
a person as a provider of health care to the individual, 
(c) is a plan of service within the meaning of the Home Care and Community Services 
Act, 1994 for the individual,  
(d) relates to payments or eligibility for health care, or eligibility for coverage for health 
care, in respect of the individual,  
(e) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or bodily substance of the 
individual or is derived from the testing or examination of any such body part or bodily 
substance,  
(f) is the individual’s health number, or  
(g) identifies an individual’s substitute decision-maker. 
568
 Ibid, s 4(2): PHIPA defines ““identifying information” as “information that identifies an individual or 
for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with 
other information, to identify an individual.” 
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data exclusivity law applies, then there is no conflict between the legislative regimes of 
personal data protection and data exclusivity. 
 
3.4.2. Identifiability of the Individual: Application of Personal Data Protection and 
Control over Information 
The precise definitions of personal health information differ between jurisdictions. 
For example, Manitoba’s personal health information statute has been in force since 
1997, and offers the following definition of personal health information: 
“personal health information" means recorded information about an identifiable 
individual that relates to 
a) the individual's health, or health care history, including genetic information 
about the individual, 
b) the provision of health care to the individual, or 
c) payment for health care provided to the individual, 
and includes 
d) the PHIN and any other identifying number, symbol or particular assigned to 
an individual, and 
e) any identifying information about the individual that is collected in the 
course of, and is incidental to, the provision of health care or payment for 
health care.
569
 
 
Prince Edward Island is the most recent province to have enacted personal health 
information protection legislation. The Health Information Act
570
 received Royal Assent 
on May 14, 2014 and was proclaimed in force on July 1, 2017. In contrast with the 
legislation of Manitoba, Prince Edward Island’s Health Information Act offers a more 
detailed description of the characteristics and activities that contribute to the definition of 
personal health information:  
“personal health information” means identifying information about an individual 
in oral or recorded form that 
(i) relates to the individual’s physical or mental health, family health history or 
health care history, including genetic information about the individual, 
                                                          
569
 MB PHIA, supra note 545, s 1(1). 
570
 PEI HIA, supra note 549. 
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(ii) relates to information about an individual that is collected for the purpose of 
registering the individual for the provision of health care, including a health 
number, medical record number and any other identifier assigned to an 
individual, 
(iii) relates to the provision of health care to the individual, 
(iv) relates to an individual’s entitlement to benefits under or participation in a 
health care program or service, 
(v) is collected in the course of, and is incidental to, the provision of a health care 
program or service or payment for a health care program or service, 
(vi) relates to a drug, a health care aid, device, product, equipment or other item 
provided to an individual under a prescription or other authorization issued by a 
health care provider, 
(vii) relates to information about payments or eligibility for health care in respect 
of the individual, or eligibility for coverage for health care in respect of the 
individual, 
(viii) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or bodily 
substance of the individual or is derived from the testing or examination of any 
body part or bodily substance, 
(ix) identifies the individual’s substitute decision maker, or 
(x) identifies the individual’s health care provider.571 
Of the ten Canadian jurisdictions with health-specific personal data protection, eight 
jurisdictions expressly include the notion of identifiability in their definition of personal 
health information. These include Ontario,
572
 New Brunswick,
573
 Nova Scotia,
574
 
Newfoundland and Labrador,
575
 Manitoba,
576
 Prince Edward Island,
577
 the Yukon,
578
 and 
the Northwest Territories.
579
 Whereas the legislation from Manitoba merely requires 
personal health information to relate to an “identifiable” individual,580 the statutes from 
Ontario, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, and the Yukon expressly define “identifying” information, and these definitions 
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 Ibid, s 1(t). 
572
 See PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(1). 
573
 See NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1. 
574
 NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(r). 
575
 NL PHIA, supra note 547, s 5(1). 
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are essentially identical in each jurisdiction.
581
 For example, New Brunswick’s Personal 
Health Information Privacy and Access Act describes “identifying information” as 
follows:   
“identifying information” means information that identifies an individual or for 
which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, 
either alone or with other information, to identify an individual.
582
 
 
 One thus observes that, in addition to being able to directly identify an individual, 
identifying information also constitutes that for which identification of the individual is 
likely to occur. Moreover, the definition of identifying information also contemplates the 
possibility of information being combined with other data in order to render the 
individual capable of being identified. 
 The statutory definitions of identifying information in health-specific personal 
data protection thus support the proposition that personal data protection applies to 
clinical trial data, despite the removal of direct identifiers such as a participant’s name. 
To use New Brunswick’s personal health information protection legislation as an 
example, “identifying information” includes information “for which it is reasonably 
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with other 
information, to identify an individual [emphasis added].”583 Recall that, in accordance 
with good clinical practices and the Food and Drug Regulations,
584
 qualified 
investigators and clinical trial sponsors are required to maintain certain records in a 
                                                          
581
 See PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(2); NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1; NL PHIA, supra note 547, s 5(5); 
NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(l); PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(o); YK HIPMA, supra note 550, s 2(1). See 
also, NT HIA, supra note 551, s 1(1): the statute from the Northwest Territories does not offer a definition 
of “identifying information” but instead directly includes a description of identifiability in its definition of 
personal health information: personal health information constitutes information which “identifies an 
individual, or in respect of which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that the information 
could be used, either alone or with other information, to identify an individual.” 
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clinical trial. For example, qualified investigators are required to keep a “Subject 
Identification Code List,” that would allow the investigator to reveal the identity of any 
subject
585
 and clinical trial sponsors must maintain “information sufficient to enable all 
clinical trial subjects to be identified and contacted in the event that the sale of the drug 
may endanger the health of the clinical trial subjects or other persons [emphasis 
added].”586 In New Brunswick, although clinical trial data may be transcribed and coded, 
such that one may not be able to immediately point to a particular individual, a 
participant’s health information in a clinical trial constitutes “identifying information” 
within the meaning of New Brunswick’s health information protection statute because it 
can be combined with other information, such as a “Subject Identification Code List,” in 
order to uniquely identify the individual.  
 The health-specific personal data protection statutes from Alberta
587
 and 
Saskatchewan
588
 do not refer to identifiability in their definitions of personal health 
information. However, Alberta’s Health Information Act is noteworthy because it 
identifies two categories of “health information:”589 “non-identifying” and “individually 
                                                          
585
 Please refer to Table 3, above, which includes the Subject Identification Code List as an essential record 
that must be retained in a clinical trial, through which the identity of any clinical trial participant can be 
revealed. 
586
 Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d). 
587
 See AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(k). Alberta uses the term “health information” instead of “personal 
health information.” 
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 See SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(m). 
589
 Alberta’s health information protection statute, AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(i) defines “diagnostic, 
treatment, and care information” as: “(i) the physical and mental health of an individual; (ii) a health 
service provided to an individual, including the following information respecting a health services provider 
who provides a health service to that individual…;  (iii) the donation by an individual of a body part or 
bodily substance, including information derived from the testing or examination of a body part or bodily 
substance; (iv) a drug as defined in the Pharmacy and Drug Act provided to an individual; (v) a health care 
aid, device, product, equipment or other item provided to an individual pursuant to a prescription or other 
authorization; (vi) the amount of any benefit paid or payable under the Alberta Health Care Insurance 
Act or any other amount paid or payable in respect of a health service provided to an individual, and 
includes any other information about an individual that is collected when a health service is provided to the 
individual, but does not include information that is not written, photographed, recorded or stored in some 
manner in a record.” This definition is included as part of “health information,” under Alberta’s Health 
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identifying.” The term “non-identifying” with respect to describing health information 
means that “the identity of the individual who is the subject of the information cannot be 
readily ascertained from the information.”590 In contrast, ““individually identifying”, 
when used to describe health information, means that the identity of the individual who is 
the subject of the information can be readily ascertained from the information.”591 In light 
of the record-keeping requirements under the Food and Drug Regulations and the 
potential identification of an individual clinical trial participant in this manner, Alberta’s 
definition of “individually identifying” health information also supports the notion that its 
personal data protection applies to clinical trial data.  
Recall that the previous analysis in section 3.3.2 found that clinical trial sponsors 
which are pharmaceutical companies would not be subject to health-specific personal 
data protection but would instead be governed by PIPEDA or, in British Columbia, 
Alberta, and Quebec, by the private sector statutes of those provinces. PIPEDA and the 
private sector statutes from British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec all expressly state that 
“personal” information constitutes that which is about an identifiable individual.592 These 
definitions of personal information and the potential for clinical trial sponsors to identify 
all participants in accordance with the record-keeping requirements under the Food and 
Drug Regulations
593
 are consistent with the proposition that personal data in clinical trials 
remains identifiable. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Information Act: “health information” means one or both of the following: (i) diagnostic, treatment and 
care information; (ii) registration information. See AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(k). 
590
 Ibid, s 1(1)(r). 
591
 Ibid, s 1(1)(p). 
592
 See PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1); BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 1; AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 1(1)(k); 
QC Act, supra note 100, s 2, where “personal information” is that which relates to a natural person and 
allows that person to be identified. 
593
 See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d). 
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This thesis has thus found that all patient data in clinical trials in Canada is 
subject to personal data protection. All three constructs to be explored in addressing the 
research question of this thesis have now been analyzed: the legislative regulation of 
clinical trials, the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies, and the 
individual’s right to personal data protection. Having established the personal data 
protection applicable to health care settings in every province, and having explored the 
requirements for data exclusivity across Canada, the issue is whether there are situations 
in which personal information gathered during clinical trials ceases to be subject to 
personal data protection legislation. The following section explores this issue. 
   
3.4.3. De-Identified Health Information: Definitions and Consequences of this 
Classification 
 Five of the ten personal health information protection statutes surveyed offer an 
express definition of de-identification of information. These jurisdictions are 
Saskatchewan,
594
 Ontario,
595
 New Brunswick,
596
 Nova Scotia,
597
 and Prince Edward 
Island.
598
 The provisions that define “de-identified information” differ slightly in 
language and degree of detail. New Brunswick’s Personal Health Information Privacy 
and Access Act offers a broad definition of de-identification: when the term “de-
                                                          
594
 SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(d):  
“de-identified personal health information” means personal health information from 
which any information that may reasonably be expected to identify an individual has 
been removed. 
595
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 47(1):  
“de-identify”, in relation to the personal health information of an individual, means to 
remove any information that identifies the individual or for which it is reasonably 
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with other 
information, to identify the individual, and “de-identification” has a corresponding 
meaning. 
596
 NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1. 
597
 NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(g). 
598
 PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(g). 
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identified” is used to refer to personal health information, it means “personal health 
information from which all identifying information has been removed.”599 
Saskatchewan’s statute also defines de-identified information in a broad manner but also 
contemplates the likelihood of identification of the individual, since “de-identified 
personal health information” means “personal health information from which any 
information that may reasonably be expected to identify an individual has been 
removed.”600 The de-identification definitions from Ontario and Nova Scotia contemplate 
the likelihood of identification and also consider the possibility that information can be 
used with other information in identifying the individual. According to Ontario’s PHIPA, 
to “de-identify” information means “to remove any information that identifies the 
individual or for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be 
utilized, either alone or with other information, to identify the individual.”601 Similarly, 
Nova Scotia’s legislation defines “de-identified information,” as “information that has 
had all identifiers removed that identify the individual, or where it is reasonably 
foreseeable in the circumstances, could be utilized, either alone or with other information, 
to identify the individual.”602 Finally, Prince Edward Island’s Health Information Act is 
the only legislation to refer to specific anonymization techniques in its definition of “de-
identified information” as “personal health information that has been stripped, encoded or 
otherwise transformed so as to ensure that the identity of the individual who was the 
                                                          
599
 NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1. 
600
 SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(d). 
601
 PHIPA, supra note 384, s 47(1). PHIPA offers this definition of de-identification for the purposes of 
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subject of the personal health information cannot be readily ascertained from the de-
identified information.”603   
Perhaps the difference in the language of these provisions reflects the reality that 
anonymization techniques are not standardized across jurisdictions. El Emam et al have 
noted that the concept of anonymous or non-identifiable data is ambiguous, which in turn 
contributes to heterogeneity and inconsistency in actual anonymization practices for 
health data.
604
 However, the robustness of anonymization merits close consideration since 
some legislators in the area of personal data protection seem to have depended upon de-
identification techniques to deliver, as Paul Ohm expresses it, “the best of both worlds: 
the benefits of information flow and strong assurances of privacy.”605 
Most important, characterizing information as “de-identified” leads to serious 
implications with respect to the breadth of activities that are authorized in relation to this 
information. Personal health information protection statutes from five Canadian 
jurisdictions expressly authorize the collection, use, and disclosure of de-identified 
information for any purpose: Alberta,
606
 New Brunswick,
607
 Prince Edward Island,
608
 the 
Yukon,
609
 and the Northwest Territories.
610
 On the other hand, the statutes from 
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 PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(g). 
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 El Emam et al, supra note 575 at 1. 
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 Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” 
(2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1701 at 1704 at 1732 [Ohm]. 
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 YK HIPMA, supra note 550, s 14:  
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 NT, supra note 551, s 1(4):  
Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to prevent a health information custodian 
from collecting, using, or disclosing non-identifying information. 
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Saskatchewan,
611
 Manitoba,
612
 New Brunswick,
613
 Nova Scotia,
614
 and Prince Edward 
Island
615
 do not authorize collection, use, and disclosure for “any” purpose but instead 
expressly exclude de-identified information from the scope of their application. Although 
it may seem illogical for certain of these statutes, namely those from New Brunswick and 
Prince Edward Island, to exclude de-identified information from the scope of their 
application while simultaneously authorizing the collection, use, and disclosure of this de-
identified information for any purpose, this situation merely means that de-identified 
information is not protected by the statutory rules limiting collection, use, and disclosure. 
The legal authorization to collect, use, and disclose de-identified or anonymized 
health information for any purpose reflects the legislators’ apparent confidence in the 
factual robustness of anonymization as an adequate safeguard for individual privacy 
interests. In other words, for confidentiality to be upheld by de-identification, de-
identified data must be truly anonymous. If this data is not truly anonymous and is being 
collected, use, and shared in a widespread manner, this situation would run contrary to 
                                                          
611
 SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 3(2)(a):  
This Act does not apply to: (a) statistical information or de-identified personal health 
information that cannot reasonably be expected, either by itself or when combined with 
other information available to the person who receives it, to enable the subject individuals 
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612
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the individual’s fundamental right to control his or her personal health information.616  
However, recall from the discussion of data exclusivity at section 3.3.1, above, that 
clinical trial data in Canada can never be de-identified because the federal government 
does not allow it. 
Research has shown that individuals can be re-identified from information that 
was presumed to be anonymous.
617
 In their re-identification study, Latanya Sweeney et al 
used 1,130 public profiles of individuals who shared their genetic data for the Personal 
Genome Project (PGP), which was launched in 2006 in order to sequence the information 
and make it publicly available in order for researchers to gain further insight into genetic 
disease mechanisms and for individuals to learn about their own genetic profiles for 
disease risk.
618
 Roughly half of the PGP profiles consisted of an individual’s date of birth, 
gender, and 5-digit postal code, and Sweeney et al used a voter registration list and a 
public records website to re-identify the PGP data according to individual names. The 
researchers ultimately produced a list of 241 unique names for 42% of profiles in the 
entire PGP dataset, and PGP staff confirmed that 84% of the matches were correct.
619
 In 
addition to DNA information, many participants revealed sensitive conditions including 
abortions, sexual abuse, illegal drug use, and clinical depression.
620
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 Recall, from Chapter Two, the words of LaForest J. in McInerney, supra note 375 at para 22 with 
respect to the expectation regarding a patient’s continuing interest and control in personal information 
confided to a physician. 
617
 This research, and most research on re-identification, was conducted using publicly available data sets. 
Nevertheless, this research is still relevant in light of the fact that some Canadian personal health 
information protection statutes authorize a technique called data matching, which is done without 
individuals’ consent. For example, data matching under Alberta’s Health Information Act, AB HIA, supra 
note 542, s 1(1)(g), involves the creation of identifying information through the combination of non-
identifying or identifying information or “other information” from two or more  electronic databases 
“without the consent of the individuals who are the subjects of the information.” 
618
 Sweeney et al, supra note 403 at 2. 
619
 Ibid at 3. The percentage of correctly matched profiles and names was as high as 97% if the use of 
possible nicknames was considered. 
620
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Importantly, the PGP dataset consisted of data from individuals who had 
expressly consented to the public sharing of their DNA information and who also had 
control over the extent of the information that they wished to disclose. However, as will 
be discussed in section 3.4.4 of this thesis, some personal health information protection 
statutes authorize the creation of individually identifying information through data 
matching, which can occur without the consent of the individual,
621
 albeit with the 
approval of the requisite research ethics boards.  
 The ability to create identifying information from the availability of multiple data 
sets raises the possibility of negative consequences for individuals, especially with 
respect to genetic discrimination. For example, insurers routinely rely on an individual’s 
family history and health status when determining risk classifications for health or life 
insurance policies that are sensitive to mortality risks.
622
 Although predictive genetic 
information may be necessary for an accurate assessment of risk and the subsequent 
determination of the terms of insurance coverage,
623
 genetic information is nonetheless, 
at best, “no more than probabilistic regarding the materialization of the risk in question,” 
particularly with respect to conditions with multiple causal factors, and the individual can 
remain asymptomatic.
624
 In this way, re-identification of publicly available information 
by certain parties, such as insurers, can contribute to the denial or limitation of an 
individual’s access to private insurance, thereby affecting his or her ability to respond to 
unfortunate life events.  
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 Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Potential for Genetic Discrimination in Access to Insurance: Is there a Dark 
Side to Increased Availability of Genetic Information?” (2013) 50 Alberta L Rev 577 at para 20. 
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Ultimately, it is the correlation between the individual’s name and another piece 
of information, such as being afflicted by a certain condition or disease that can create the 
risk of harm to the individual upon disclosure.
625
 The volume of available data 
accordingly plays an important role in increasing the likelihood for re-identification 
because it increases the potential for correlation between variables.
626
 The more detailed 
the information in a data set, the easier it is to re-identify an individual in that data set.
627
 
Nevertheless, commentators such as Ann Cavoukian and Daniel Castro have asserted 
that, although re-identification of data sets is possible, the chance of re-identification is 
relatively difficult in actual practice, such that the use of proper de-identification tools 
render re-identification extremely unlikely.
628
  However, Cavoukian and Castro also 
acknowledge that removing only direct identifiers – i.e. variables that provide an explicit 
link to a data subject and that can directly identify an individual – is often insufficient to 
ensure the de-identification of information.
629
 The problem of de-identification involves 
“quasi-identifiers,” which are variables that may not directly identify individuals but are 
highly correlated with unique identities and may thus be used for indirect re-
identification, either alone or in combination with other available information.
630
 
Cavoukian and Castro accordingly recommend that, in creating de-identified datasets, 
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organizations should perform initial risk assessments and should consider the current 
techniques regarding de-identification and re-identification.
631
 
It is thus a question of achieving a balance between utility and anonymity of 
information, since “data can be either useful or perfectly anonymous, but never both.”632 
The ability to access multiple records and the absence of precise limitations on data 
collection can accordingly render it easier for analysts to match and re-identify 
information.
633
 Gratton thus proposes that the notion of identifiability should be 
interpreted in light of the information’s overall sensitivity.634 In addition to the “intimate” 
nature of the information and the extent of its availability to third parties or the public 
upon disclosure, Gratton asserts that an analysis of the definition of personal information 
should also consider whether the information collected may create a risk of harm upon 
use or disclosure, since the risk of harm to an individual is minimal if an organization 
merely collects personal information without using it and also protects the information 
against disclosure.
635
 
 
3.4.4. Contemplating Technological Realities: Personal Health Information Statutes, 
Data Matching, and Re-Identification of the Individual 
 
Protecting individual privacy is particularly challenging in 2017, where the 
variety of data, size of data sets, and scope of data analyses are “unprecedented.”636 Even 
if Canadian law did not require that clinical trial participants remain capable of being 
identified, de-identifying data does not eliminate all risk of re-identification of data 
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subjects, since reducing this risk to zero would destroy or at least significantly impair the 
utility of the data for subsequent research.
637
 There is always some level of risk that 
individual participant data, even de-identified, could be used to re-identify a research 
participant, especially if “auxiliary information were linked with the clinical trial data 
set.”638 Using such auxiliary information, it may be possible to infer or learn information 
about individuals in a research data set, including the presence of sensitive conditions 
such as alcoholism or mental illness.
639
  
Research Ethics Committees are aware of the need to protect individual privacy 
interests. For example, the TCPS 2 notes that where data is linked to different sources of 
publicly available information, such linkages could give rise to new forms of identifiable 
information, thereby raising issues of privacy and confidentiality.
640
 Accordingly, the 
TCPS 2 requires that researchers who propose to engage in data linkage must obtain 
approval from the appropriate Research Ethics Board before carrying out the linkage, 
unless the research relies exclusively on publicly available information.
641
 In addition to 
requirements to describe the data that will be linked and the likelihood that identifiable 
information will be created through data linkage, researchers must also prove to the 
applicable Research Ethics Board that the linkage is essential to the research and that 
security measures will be implemented to protect the information.
642
 The TCPS 2 
requirements reflect the reality that a growing number of databases and the advanced 
technological capacity to link databases together create new risks to confidentiality of 
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information, in which the linkage of de-identified or anonymized data may permit re-
identification of individuals.
643
 Thus, data linkage is directly relevant to the risk of re-
identification. 
Most important to this thesis, personal data protection legislation has 
acknowledged modern technological realities. Certain Canadian personal health 
information protection statutes have expressly addressed “data matching,” and 
consequently have, indirectly, addressed the issue of re-identification in doing so. For 
example, Alberta’s Health Information Act defines data matching as meaning: 
…the creation of individually identifying health information by combining 
individually identifying or non-identifying health information or other 
information from 2 or more electronic databases, without the consent of the 
individuals who are the subjects of the information.
644
 
  
With respect to health information custodians, Alberta’s Health Information Act 
states that the custodian may perform data matching using information that “is in its 
custody or under its control”645 and may also perform this technique by “combining 
information that is in its custody or under its control with information that is in the 
custody or under the control of another custodian.”646 Importantly, since data matching 
occurs without the consent of the individual subject of the information, custodians who 
engage in data matching under Alberta’s Health Information Act are required to conduct 
a privacy impact assessment before data matching can be performed.
647
 These privacy 
                                                          
643
 Ibid at 67. 
644
 AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(g). Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act, supra note 548, s 
52(a) defines “data matching” in an almost identical manner, except the databases do not necessarily have 
to be electronic (even though, in practice, they almost certainly will be electronic):  
“data matching” means the creation of individual identifying health information by 
combining individual identifying or non-identifying health information or other 
information from two or more databases without the consent of the individuals who are 
the subjects of the information. 
645
 AB HIA, ibid, s 69. 
646
 Ibid, s 70(1). 
647
 Ibid, s 70(2).  
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impact assessments must describe how the information for use in the data matching will 
be collected and must also delineate the use and disclosure for the information that will 
be created by the data matching.
648
 The other Canadian jurisdictions that authorize data 
matching by health information custodians are New Brunswick,
649
 Nova Scotia,
650
 the 
Northwest Territories,
651
 and Prince Edward Island.
652
 In enacting rules to address the 
technique of data matching, these jurisdictions have acknowledged that the availability of 
multiple data sets can create identifying information that might have otherwise been 
unavailable.  
Identifying information that is created from data matching will be protected under 
personal health information protection statutes and other personal data protection 
legislation across Canada in accordance with statutory definitions of personal health 
information therein. However, the ability to engage in data matching in the first place 
emphasizes the importance of clarifying the definition of identifiability with respect to 
information that has been rendered anonymous.    
 
                                                          
648
 Ibid, s 70(3). 
649
 See NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, ss 56-57. Section 56(1)(c) requires a privacy assessment to be 
conducted in the event that personal health information is to be used in data matching, and section 56(2) 
mandates the privacy assessment to “describe…how the proposed administrative practices and information 
systems relating to the collection, use and disclosure of individually identifying health information may 
affect the privacy of the individual to whom the information relates.” 
650
 See NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 59(3)(j): This provision requires an explanation of why data matching is 
required for research. 
651
 NT HIA, supra note 551, s 36(2):  
Subject to the regulations, a health information custodian may, for a purpose for which 
personal health information may be used or disclosed under this Act, (a) create or 
produce personal health information by combining information from two or more 
electronic databases or records; or (b) compare personal health information about an 
individual on two or more electronic databases or records. 
    This legislation thus authorizes data matching but does not contain extensive rules regarding the issue. 
652
 See PEI HIA, supra note 549, ss 26-32. Section 25(1)(c) requires the custodian to prepare a privacy 
impact assessment “if a custodian performs data matching with personal health information collected by it 
or with any personal health information held by another custodian or another person.” 
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3.4.5. De-Identification and Re-Identification: Is Data Ever Truly Anonymous? 
Anonymization plays a central role in modern data handling, one in which data 
handlers try to safeguard the confidentiality of personal information by de-identifying 
data, including the suppression of patient names.
653
 However, according to Ohm, 
legislators must abandon the following notions: 1) the idea that one can single out fields 
of information that are more “linkable” to individual identity than others; and 2) the idea 
that individual privacy can be protected when “we do nothing more than identify and 
remove [personally identifiable information].”654 In light of the results of re-identification 
research, and particularly the fact that personal health information protection statutes 
expressly acknowledge the ability to combine data together, there is merit in Ohm’s 
observation that “maybe everything is personally identifiable information to one who has 
access to the right outside information.”655 
Some academics note that most measures of the risk of re-identification assume 
that someone will only attempt to identify a single record in the disclosed database.
656
 
Identity disclosure and attribute disclosure are two types of disclosure that are of concern 
in making raw data on individuals publicly available for secondary research purposes.
657
 
Identity disclosure can occur where someone uses indirectly identifying information or 
“quasi-identifiers”658 to assign an identity to a record in a particular data set, whereas 
                                                          
653
 Ohm, supra note 605 at 1707. 
654
 Ibid at 1732. 
655
 Ibid at 1723. 
656
 Khaled El Emam et al, “Evaluating the risk of patient re-identification from adverse drug event reports” 
(2013) 13 BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 1-14 at 4. 
657
 Ibid at 3. 
658
 Ibid at 2. “Direct identifiers” are identifiers that, either by themselves or in combination with other 
readily available information, can be used to uniquely identify an individual. These identifiers include an 
individual’s credit card number, health card number, and social insurance number. On the other hand, 
“quasi identifiers” constitute the background knowledge about an individual in a data set, which can be 
used either alone or in combination with each other to re-identify a record based on probabilities. Quasi 
170 
 
 
 
attribute disclosure can occur when someone discovers a new, sensitive characteristic 
about a patient in a database without necessarily knowing which specific record belongs 
to the patient.
659
 Disclosing information that is not associated with an individual’s name 
may create the mistaken belief that the individual is truly anonymous, thereby promoting 
a false sense of security and increasing the willingness of the individual to share the 
information publicly.
660
  
The willingness to freely disclose de-identified information is also relevant to 
organizations that are health information custodians. Personal health information 
protection laws do not apply to de-identified information: for such information, no 
limitations regarding collection, use, and disclosure of information apply.
661
 Rather than 
focusing on the utility or merits of de-identification, this thesis focuses instead on the 
question of clarifying what it means to be identifiable in 2017, given the power of current 
information technology and the assumption still reflected in some personal health 
information protection statutes that data can still actually be rendered truly anonymous 
and thus does not merit personal data protection. The evidence is that the assumption of 
de-identifiability is not valid. Therefore, personal data protection legislation needs to 
preserve personal data protection for all data regardless of purported status in terms of 
identifiability or anonymization. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
identifiers include demographic information such as an individual’s sex, date of birth, ethnic origin, marital 
status, and total income. 
659
 Ibid at 2-3. With respect to attribute disclosure, the authors note that an analyst does not have to know 
which record belongs to the specific patient. For example, if the data set shows that a patient was given a 
lab test for creatine kinase, the analyst can infer that the patient showed symptoms of a heart attack. 
660
 Sweeney et al, supra note 403 at 1. 
661
 For example, please refer to the previous discussion in section 3.4.3 of this thesis, which found that 
some health-specific personal data protection statutes authorized the collection, use, and disclosure of de-
identified data for any purpose: see AB HIA, supra note 542, ss 19, 26 & 32; NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, 
ss 30, 33 & 36; PEI HIA, supra note 549, ss 20, 22(4) & 23(4); YK HIPMA, supra note 550, s 14; NT HIA, 
supra note 551, s 1(4).  
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3.4.6. Withdrawal of Consent to Use and Disclosure of Personal Information: A 
Potential Conflict with Data Exclusivity? 
 Although it appears to be uncommon for patients who withdraw consent to 
participation in a clinical trial to also request the removal of their previously collected 
data, such requests do occur.
662
 However, in addition to the fact that the withdrawal of 
patient data from a clinical trial dataset can reduce the integrity of the sample and 
compromise the scientific validity and generalizability of the research,
663
 the Food and 
Drug Regulations oblige clinical trial sponsors to retain, for 25 years, all records involved 
in a clinical trial,
664
 including those that would enable the individual to be identified.
665
  
This mandated requirement to retain all records involved in a clinical trial is 
directly relevant to the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies with respect to 
clinical trial data. The requirement, however, appears to conflict with an individual’s 
right to control his or her personal data in terms of the right to withdrawal of the data 
from a clinical trial dataset. According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, individuals 
should have the right to have data “erased” upon successfully challenging data related to 
them.
666
 To explore this potential conflict between personal data protection and data 
exclusivity, this thesis analyzed the private sector statutes that govern clinical trial 
                                                          
662
 Chenglin Ye et al, “Data withdrawal in randomized controlled trials: Defining the problem and 
proposing solutions” (2011) 32 Contemporary Clinical Trials 318 at 319: These Canadian authors note that, 
in one of their randomized controlled studies, of the 60 of 1102 patients who withdrew consent to 
participation in a randomized clinical trial, only one patient requested withdrawal of his or her data. The 
researchers also seem to accept a right of withdrawal under Canadian personal data protection legislation, 
although they do not provide pinpoint citations within the Canadian legislation they cite. 
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 Andre P Gabriel & Charles P Mercado, “Data Retention after a Patient Withdraws Consent in Clinical 
Trials” (2011) 3 Open Access J Clin Trials 15 at 17 [Gabriel & Mercado]. 
664 See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(4). 
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 Ibid, s C.05.012(3)(d). 
666
 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 92, Part Two at para 13.  
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sponsors in Canada.
667
 Specifically, this thesis examined PIPEDA and the private sector 
statutes from British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec, in order to determine whether these 
statutes authorize a right of absolute withdrawal of personal information that has already 
been collected.  
Of the four statutes analyzed, Quebec’s An Act respecting the Protection of 
Personal Information in the Private Sector (“Quebec’s Act”) is the only statute that has 
expressly implemented the right to “erase” personal information in the same manner 
contemplated by the OECD Privacy Guidelines. Quebec’s Act grants the individual a 
right of access to personal information held by an “enterprise”: upon the individual’s 
request, the enterprise must confirm the existence of the file and communicate any 
personal information to the individual.
668
 Most important for the purposes of the present 
discussion, the individual “is entitled to obtain that any personal information collected 
otherwise than according to law be deleted.”669 Accordingly, in Quebec, clinical trial 
participants have express rights of withdrawal of personal data with respect to personal 
data held by a clinical trial sponsor. 
PIPEDA and the private sector statutes from British Columbia and Alberta do not 
expressly give individuals the right to insist that personal data be erased or deleted by 
organizations once it has already been collected. Nevertheless, all three of these statutes 
                                                          
667
 Recall from the discussion in section 3.3.2, above, that clinical trial sponsors that are pharmaceutical 
companies are not governed by health-specific personal data protection but are governed instead by the 
applicable private sector statutes in a particular jurisdiction. 
668
 QC Act, supra note 100, s 27. 
669
 Ibid, s 28:  
In addition to the rights provided under the first paragraph of article 40 of the Civil Code, 
the person concerned is entitled to obtain that any personal information collected 
otherwise than according to law be deleted. 
See also Civil Code, supra note 556, s 40: 
Every person may cause information which is contained in a file concerning him and 
which is inaccurate, incomplete or equivocal to be rectified; he may also cause obsolete 
information or information not justified by the purpose of the file to be deleted, or deposit 
his written comments in the file. 
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require individual consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information.
670
 Furthermore, all of these statutes expressly authorize the withdrawal of 
individual consent at any time. For example, PIPEDA states that “an individual may 
withdraw consent at any time, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable 
notice.”671 British Columbia’s Personal Information Protection Act (“British Columbia’s 
PIPA”)672 and Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act (“Alberta’s PIPA”)673 also 
authorize individuals to withdraw consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
information by organizations, such that the organization must cease these activities.
674
 
The right to withdraw consent to use and disclosure of personal information has 
implications in the data exclusivity context. Figure 6 illustrates the reality that clinical 
trials involve multiple stages with respect to the flow of information, in which the 
information is ultimately disclosed to Health Canada at the final stage in the course of the 
regulatory market approval process for new drugs. As discussed earlier, personal health 
information is first collected by qualified investigators, and this information is 
subsequently disclosed to the clinical trial sponsor. The information then becomes part of 
the clinical trial data set which is submitted by the clinical trial sponsor to Health Canada. 
At each stage, the information is held by a separate organization – and each organization 
is governed by specific personal data protection legislation – and no single piece of 
personal data protection legislation governs all of these organizations.   
                                                          
670
 See PIPEDA, supra note 101, Sch 1, s 4.3; BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 6; AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 7. 
671
 PIPEDA, supra note 101, Sch 1, s 4.3.8. 
672
 BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9. The right to withdraw consent is subject to subsections 9(5) and (6), in 
which, respectively, an individual may not withdraw consent if it would frustrate the performance of a 
“legal obligation” or if consent had been given to a credit reporting agency. 
673
 AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 9. The right to withdraw consent is subject to subsection 9(5), in which the 
withdrawal of consent does not operate to the extent that it would frustrate the performance of a “legal 
obligation.” 
674
 See BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9(4); AB PIPA, ibid, s 9(4).  
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Figure 6 - Flow of Information in a Clinical Trial from a Personal Data Protection 
Perspective 
As demonstrated in Figure 6, the withdrawal of consent to use or disclose 
personal information at an early stage in the clinical trial (i.e. before the data makes its 
way from the clinical trial sponsor to Health Canada) will prevent information from 
moving to the next stage in the chain of information. Thus, although PIPEDA, British 
Columbia’s PIPA, and Alberta’s PIPA do not grant patients express rights to “erase” data 
that has already been collected from them in a clinical trial, these statutes nonetheless 
authorize patients to withdraw consent to the use and disclosure of this information 
before a clinical trial sponsor can submit it to Health Canada.
675
 Such a withdrawal of 
consent will essentially “remove” the data from the dataset because the organization that 
is the custodian will not be able to include the data in the dataset for further study.
676
 
                                                          
675
 The present discussion focuses on clinical trial sponsors, for whom the data exclusivity right is relevant. 
If patients were to withdraw consent to the use or disclosure of personal health information held by 
qualified investigators, the applicable health-specific personal data protection statutes govern the consent to 
collection, use, and disclosure of personal health information in a particular jurisdiction. See Table 1, 
above, for the jurisdictions with health-specific personal data protection statutes that would govern 
qualified investigators therein. 
676
 Disclosure of personal information for “research purposes” constitutes an exception to the requirement 
that individual consent be obtained by an organization: see PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 7(c); BC PIPA, 
supra note 105, s 21; AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 20; QC Act, supra note 100, s 18(8).  
      Nevertheless, disclosure of personal information for research purposes is often subject to the 
satisfaction of certain conditions, including the signing of a research agreement: for example, see Alberta’s 
Personal Information Protection Act Regulation, Alta Reg 336/2003, s 14(3), and BC PIPA, supra note 
105, s 21. This thesis does not have any evidence to indicate that clinical trial sponsors have complied with 
all the requisite conditions for disclosure of personal information for research purposes without individual 
consent. Further research could establish the following: a) whether these clinical trial sponsors have indeed 
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Therefore, if patients withdraw consent to use and disclosure of personal information 
before it is submitted to Health Canada, the clinical trial dataset submitted to the federal 
government (Health Canada) will not be complete.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 In the past, personal data protection appears not to have even been contemplated 
as applying to clinical trial data, probably because of the assumption by authors that the 
data from clinical trials had been anonymized. As such, patients were simply assumed to 
lack rights of control over their data. Current information literature indicates that true 
anonymization of data is no longer factually possible. As the analyses in this chapter have 
shown, legislative definitions of personal health information and the record-keeping 
requirements under the Food and Drug Regulations taken together indicate that personal 
data protection applies to clinical trial data right up to and including the period of data 
exclusivity protection. This finding represents the first time that a link has been made 
between the previously diverse legal areas of data exclusivity and personal data 
protection.   
Through an analysis of Canadian data exclusivity and personal data protection 
legislation, this chapter has demonstrated that data exclusivity does not abrogate the 
personal data protection rights of the individual clinical trial participant. Instead, personal 
data protection and data exclusivity regulate different parties’ rights of control to the 
same information. This situation does not necessarily indicate a conflict between the two 
legislative regimes, although a conflict may arise in the event that a clinical trial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
complied with the conditions that would allow them to disclose information for research purposes without 
individual consent; and b) what this effect would have, from a personal data protection perspective, on the 
flow of information with respect to the market approval process for new drugs. 
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participant exercises the right to withdraw consent to the use and disclosure by clinical 
trial sponsors of personal information under the applicable private sector statutes. 
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Chapter 4 – Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
4.1. Conclusions 
Modern intellectual property law seeks to maintain a balance between the rights 
of individual innovators, the private interests of corporations that dominate intellectual 
property ownership in many contexts, and the public good in accessing knowledge that 
will further human progress.
677
 The need for balance among multiple stakeholders 
involved with intellectual property law is particularly evident in the course of 
pharmaceutical innovation. As part of this contestation, there is a struggle for control 
over the confidential information generated in clinical trials.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the protection of commercially-related confidential 
information, since the mid-nineties, has been classified as intellectual property under 
international trade agreements including both TRIPS and NAFTA. As described in 
Chapter Two, Canadian law provides protection both at common law and in civil law 
consistent with this international trade obligation that such confidential information be 
protected. In Chapter Two, this thesis noted that the secrecy of confidential information 
has the potential to endure forever.
 678
 The 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Merck Frosst reinforces this legal reality: information submitted to the government in 
innovative drug submissions is exempt from disclosure under the federal Access Act 
(because Parliament accepted the inviolability of commercial confidential information 
and exempted confidential “third party” information from being accessed by requesters). 
The decision reinforced the protection of confidential information held by governments 
from businesses, even when it has been transmitted from the business to the government, 
                                                          
677
 See Wilkinson, “Marrakesh,” supra note 1. 
678
 See Hagen et al, supra note 68. 
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despite the fact that the Access Act gives the public a general right to access information 
in government records.
 679
  
Both TRIPS and NAFTA also require that nation states confer temporary, 
exclusive rights, known as “data exclusivity,” upon pharmaceutical companies: rights to 
the test data that is submitted to regulatory agencies in the course of the market approval 
process for new drugs. The review of the academic literature on data exclusivity in 
Chapter Two of this thesis demonstrated disagreements among scholars about the nature 
and purpose of data exclusivity. This thesis, in Chapter Two, has established that, 
contrary to the situation of potential permanency established by the law surrounding the 
secrecy of commercial confidential information in Canada, Canada’s legislated data 
exclusivity protection actually places a limitation on the period of secrecy in exchange 
for giving the innovator pharmaceutical company a temporary monopoly on the 
information. By placing a temporal limit on this secrecy, data exclusivity functions in a 
manner analogous to classic intellectual property devices such as patent and copyright, 
which confer limited term monopolies in exchange for public disclosure of information 
with respect to an invention or work. Accordingly, data exclusivity is consistent with the 
“bargain” in intellectual property law which seeks a balance between public and private 
interests. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that a proper understanding of the role of data 
exclusivity (that it is consistent with, and thus a new species of, intellectual property) 
runs counter to much of the current literature on data exclusivity which represents data 
exclusivity as purely a benefit to private interests.
680
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 See Merck Frosst SCC, supra note 111. 
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 See sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 in Chapter Two. 
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The need for balance among multiple, potentially divergent interests also raises 
important questions with respect to an individual’s right to control personal information 
in clinical trials. Since it is individual participants whose personal health information 
comprises clinical trial data, those individuals have the right to control their personal 
information in accordance with Canadian personal data legislation
681
 and in light of 
Canada’s commitment to the OECD Privacy Guidelines.682  
This thesis examined three constructs: 1) the legislative regulation of clinical 
trials; 2) the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s 
right to personal data protection. Examination of these three constructs was necessary in 
order to answer the research question guiding this thesis: does the data exclusivity right 
of pharmaceutical companies either operate consistently with or abrogate an 
individual’s right to personal data protection in the clinical trial context? 
To answer the question of whether data exclusivity operates consistently with 
personal data protection, this thesis analyzed the data exclusivity provisions under 
Canadian legislation and the definitions of personal health information according to both 
Canadian health-specific personal data protection legislation and other non-specific 
Canadian personal data protection legislation relevant to the regulation of personal health 
information.
683
 In respect of every province and territory in Canada, this research 
identified the relevant personal data protection legislation that would apply to qualified 
investigators and clinical trial sponsors (those who are mandated by the federal Food and 
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 For example, see PIPEDA, supra note 101. 
682
 See OECD Privacy Guidelines, supra note 92. 
683
 See Table 1 in Chapter Three for jurisdictions that have health-specific personal data protection. 
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Drug Regulations to keep records that would enable the identification of clinical trial 
participants).
684
 Based on this methodology, this thesis found the following: 
1) Clinical trials involve the collection, use, and dissemination of personal health 
information;
685
  
2) According to definitions of personal health information in Canadian personal 
health information protection statutes,
686
 information must be about an 
identifiable individual in order to constitute personal health information; 
3) The existence of applicable health-specific personal data protection does not 
necessarily mean that all clinical trial sponsors will be covered by this legislation, 
although all qualified investigators will be. Clinical trial sponsors such as 
pharmaceutical companies were found to not constitute health information 
custodians under health-specific personal data protection statutes and were found 
to be governed instead by private sector personal data protection legislation 
applicable in each respective jurisdiction.
687
  
4) For jurisdictions that have not enacted health-specific personal data protection, 
the public sector and private sector legislation of those particular jurisdictions 
governed qualified investigators and clinical trial sponsors, respectively.
688
 
5) Personal health information that initially comprises part of a data set from a 
clinical trial can technically be “de-identified” using various “anonymization” 
                                                          
684
 See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d). 
685
 For example, see Institute of Medicine, supra note 392 at 93. 
686
 See for example, PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(1):  
“personal health information”, subject to subsections (3) and (4), means identifying 
information about an individual in oral or recorded form. 
687
 This legislation was PIPEDA, supra note 101. By virtue of its status as substantially similar to PIPEDA, 
Alberta’s private sector legislation, the Personal Information Protection Act, supra note 104 governs 
clinical trial sponsors in the province of Alberta: see Table 3 in Chapter Three.  
688
 For the jurisdictions and statutes in question, see Table 5 in Chapter Three. 
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techniques. De-identified data is not subject to personal data protection legislation 
and can thus be freely used and disclosed by its custodian. At first glance, this 
would seem to include “de-identified health information” from clinical trials, but 
for two important findings from this study:  
a) Despite having been subjected to anonymization techniques, data can 
never be truly anonymous in light of the ability of modern information 
technology to re-identify individuals. This factual finding that data is 
never truly anonymous has implications for patient health information 
that has undergone de-identification and might otherwise be assumed 
to be excluded from the application of personal data protection laws; 
b) Although clinical trial data might be thought to be capable of de-
identification through anonymization techniques during the course of a 
clinical trial, clinical trial participants must always be capable of being 
individually identified with their data because of the record-keeping 
requirements made under the federal Food and Drug Regulations. 
Based on current statutory definitions under the Food and Drug Regulations in 
Canada, clinical trial data must retain the characteristics of identifiability that 
bring the data within the Canadian statutory definitions of personal information 
protected by relevant personal data protection legislation.
689
  
6) The importance of legislated privacy controls in situation where there is an 
imbalance of power between those gathering information (here, the qualified 
investigators and clinical trial sponsors) and clinical trial participants (patients) 
                                                          
689
 As established above in Chapter Three, the Food and Drug Regulations mandate clinical trial sponsors 
to retain records for a period of 25 years, including the records that would enable the identification of 
individuals. 
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has recently been highlighted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Douez (2017). 
In Douez, the Court established that contract cannot necessarily oust legislated 
privacy protections, particularly when there is an imbalance of bargaining power 
between parties.
690
 In light of Douez, and despite whatever past understandings of 
the role and effect of informed consent to participation in a clinical trial might 
have been, this thesis indicated in Chapter One that henceforth the “price” for 
treatment of an individual’s medical condition should not be considered to 
necessarily include the relinquishing of that individual’s statutory rights to control 
his or her personal information when it becomes part of the clinical trial data sets 
going forward through the processes mandated by Health Canada. 
As this thesis establishes in Chapter Three, a patient in a clinical trial who applies 
under the relevant personal data protection legislation to get access to his or her data 
collected as part of the clinical trial data to be submitted by a pharmaceutical company to 
the government in an innovative drug submission will be entitled to that access. On the 
other hand, also discussed in Chapter Three, this thesis establishes that private sector 
statutes, with the exception of Quebec,
691
 do not authorize patients to “erase” personal 
data from a clinical trial dataset. However, the right to withdraw consent to collection, 
use, and dissemination of personal information, which is authorized by private sector 
statutes,
692
 essentially “removes” the data from a clinical trial dataset in practice. 
Therefore, this thesis has found that, while data exclusivity and personal data protection 
operate consistently with each other in Canadian law and that data exclusivity does not 
abrogate the personal data protection rights of the individual, there is a potential for 
                                                          
690
 See Douez, supra note 25. 
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 See QC Act, supra note 100. 
692
 See PIPEDA, supra note 101; BC PIPA, supra note 105; AB PIPA, supra note 104. 
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conflict between the two legislative regimes if individuals withdraw consent to disclosure 
of data. As established in Chapter Three, since clinical trials involve multiple stages with 
respect to the flow of information,
693
 the withdrawal of individual consent to disclosure 
of personal data at an early stage of a trial effectively prevents the data from making its 
way to Health Canada. This “removal” of data can diminish the strength of the evidence 
that supports the safety and efficacy of a new drug. 
These findings are new to the literature about Canada’s data exclusivity provisions. 
Scholars have argued that data exclusivity hinders access to affordable medicines by 
delaying the market entry of cheaper generic drugs, thereby negatively affecting public 
health.
694
 Although one Canadian judge has demonstrated agreement with the perspective 
that data exclusivity postpones the market entry of lower-cost medicines,
695
 this thesis 
has demonstrated that other Canadian judges and legal commentators have asserted that 
data exclusivity actually promotes public health by providing incentives to develop new 
medicines.
696
 Nonetheless, this earlier debate over the effect of data exclusivity on access 
to affordable medicines appears to have contributed to an absence of scholarly or judicial 
attention to the interests of the individual clinical trial participants in the data exclusivity 
discourse. Despite the fact that clinical trial data comprises personal health information 
protectable under personal data protection legislation across Canada, the need to consider 
the potential application of personal data protection laws in the context of data 
                                                          
693
 See Figure 6, above, in Chapter Three. 
694
 For example, see Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 338. 
695
 See Canadian Generic FC, supra note 430 at para 76: Mandamin J. states that Canada’s data exclusivity 
framework does not directly contribute to public safety, since it postpones the introduction of lower cost 
generic drugs. 
696
 See Canadian Generic FCA, supra note 451 at para 114; Lietzan, “Myths,” supra note 285. 
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exclusivity appears to have been previously neglected by legislators, judges, and 
academics. 
 
4.2. Future Research 
 There is currently very little evidence that patients do withdraw consent to their 
data being used and disclosed in clinical trials (or that withdrawal of consent with respect 
to these activities is a sufficiently common occurrence that it affects the integrity of 
datasets submitted to Health Canada). However, this does not mean that such a situation 
will never occur in the future. Since there is an evident imbalance of power between 
individual clinical trial participants and clinical trial sponsors, and in light of the fact that 
the Douez decision prioritizes statutory protections over contractual restrictions in the 
event of an imbalance of power between parties, there is an urgent need for a solution to 
the potential conflict between the rights of individuals to control their personal data and 
the data exclusivity rights of clinical trial sponsors.
697
 
 Moreover, reconciling this potential conflict depends on legally binding solutions. 
This thesis focused solely on legally binding instruments with respect to the regulation of 
clinical trials. This methodological decision revealed potential interpretive issues with the 
law regarding data exclusivity and personal data protection. While ethical guidelines, as 
described in Chapter One, that are contained within policies such as the TCPS 2 are 
informative regarding acceptable practices in clinical research, it is the law, not ethics, 
                                                          
697
 For example, the private sector statutes of British Columbia and Alberta both state that individuals may 
not withdraw consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information if this withdrawal would 
frustrate the performance of a “legal obligation”: see BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9(5); AB PIPA, supra 
note 104, s 9(5). Since the term “legal obligation” is not defined under these statutes, future research could 
explore the circumstances that would constitute a “legal obligation” within the meaning of each statute, 
which would thus clarify the circumstances under which an individual could not stop the flow of data in the 
context of clinical trials. 
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that ultimately governs personal data protection and data exclusivity in Canada. Thus, the 
challenges of the role of personal data protection, in light of data exclusivity, must be 
considered and addressed by the respective levels of government. 
Legally binding solutions would also avoid conflicts with Canada’s trade 
obligations. Article 39(3) of TRIPS does not expressly allow any exceptions for member 
states to meet the personal data protection rights of individuals.
698
 Similarly, there is no 
exception under NAFTA to allow for domestic personal data protection obligations. 
Canada’s refusal to enforce its domestic data exclusivity laws on the basis of a conflict 
with personal data protection could be interpreted as a contravention of Canada’s data 
exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA. Member states that fail to enforce 
intellectual property rights under TRIPS and NAFTA are subject to potential economic 
sanctions under each agreement. As mentioned previously in Chapter One, TRIPS 
facilitates a dispute mechanism that authorizes the suspension of “concessions” or “other 
obligations” in various economic sectors.699 NAFTA provides for sanctions in a similar 
manner, in which Article 2019 of NAFTA directly authorizes the “suspension of 
benefits” for “measures” that do not conform to NAFTA.700 As in TRIPS, complainant 
                                                          
698
 Wilkinson, “Confidential Information”, supra note 49 at 288: Wilkinson notes that the language of 
Article 39(3) of TRIPS mandates the protection of “undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort (i.e. clinical trials).” She also observes that there are permitted exceptions to 
the obligation to protect test data (such as “where necessary to protect the public” or “where steps are taken 
to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use”). However, Wilkinson ultimately 
concludes that “there is no permitted exception under TRIPS for meeting the personal data control rights of 
individual patients in such trials.” 
699
 Please refer to section 1.2 of this thesis, which described this sanctions mechanism. See also GATT 
1994, supra note 56 and DSU, supra note 57. 
700
 NAFTA, supra note 51, art 2019(1):  
If in its final report a panel has determined that a measure is inconsistent with the 
obligations of this Agreement or causes nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 
2004 and the Party complained against has not reached agreement with any complaining 
Party on a mutually satisfactory resolution pursuant to Article 2018(1) within 30 days of 
receiving the final report, such complaining Party may suspend the application to the 
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parties under NAFTA are also authorized to apply sanctions in different economic 
sectors.
701
 In light of these far-reaching economic reprisals under TRIPS and NAFTA, 
Canada’s failure to implement data exclusivity in accordance with its obligations would 
have significant effects on Canada’s participation in global trade and would thereby result 
in negative consequences to Canada’s national economic interests. 
If personal data protection provisions diminish the value of data exclusivity rights 
to the point where Canada is found not to have met its trade obligations in this regard, 
there will be pressure on governments to reconcile these interests to preserve the integrity 
of data exclusivity. On the other hand, the protection of privacy rights, including those 
embedded in personal data protection statutes, though not an express part of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
702
 is part of Quebec’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms
703
 and may engender constitutional protection. These topics are 
worthy subjects for future research. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they have 
reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute. 
701
 Ibid, art 2019(2):  
In considering what benefits to suspend pursuant to paragraph 1: (a) a complaining Party 
should first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors as that affected by the 
measure or other matter that the panel has found to be inconsistent with the obligations of 
this Agreement or to have caused nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004; 
and (b) a complaining Party that considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend 
benefits in the same sector or sectors may suspend benefits in other sectors. 
702
 Charter, supra, note 357. 
703 CQLR c C-12, s 5. 
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Appendix 2: Information Constructs Summary 
 
 Confidential 
Information 
Data Exclusivity Personal Data Protection 
 
Definition 
 
Information that 
is intended to be 
kept secret and is 
thus 
communicated 
only to select 
parties, if at all. 
 
 
Allows innovative drug 
manufacturers to maintain 
temporary, exclusive rights 
to information generated in 
clinical trials.  
Provides rules governing 
processing and handling – 
i.e. collection, use, and 
disclosure – of 
information about an 
identifiable individual, 
where this information has 
made its way into 
organizations. 
Duration of 
Protection 
(Canada) 
Potentially 
perpetual 
8 years For the life of the 
individual; protection after 
death can vary, ranging 
from 10 to 30 years.
704
   
Status in 
Canadian 
Law 
 
Common law 
(duty of 
confidence) 
Food and Drug Regulations 
(federal) 
 
Regulated by federal and 
provincial statutes  
 
Application of a particular 
statute to personal 
information depends on 
whether the organization 
is a public or private 
sector organization.  
 
Most jurisdictions have 
also enacted health-
specific personal data 
protection. 
Status in 
International 
Law 
 
TRIPS, Article 
39 (covered as 
“undisclosed 
information”) 
 
 
NAFTA, Article 
1711 
 
TRIPS: no minimum term of 
data exclusivity protection; 
leaves member states free to 
address term according to 
their own preferences. 
 
NAFTA: requires member 
states to grant a minimum 5-
year protection. 
 
Both TRIPS and NAFTA 
authorize their member 
states to enact more 
extensive protection than 
that required. 
OECD Privacy Guidelines 
                                                          
704
 See Wilkinson, “Control Conflicts,” supra note 355 at 255, fn 141. 
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Appendix 3: List of Acronyms 
 
Acronym Description 
ANDS Abbreviated New Drug Submission 
 
CSR Clinical Study Report 
 
DPR Data Protection Regulation 
 
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding 
 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
 
ICH International Council on Harmonization of 
Technical Requirements for the 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use  
 
ICH-CSR ICH’s Structure and Content of Clinical 
Study Reports 
 
ICH-GCP ICH’s Guideline for Good Clinical 
Practice 
 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
NDS New Drug Submission 
 
NOC Notice of Compliance 
 
PGP Personal Genome Project 
 
SNDS Supplemental New Drug Submission 
 
TCPS 2 Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans  
 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  
 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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